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Overview and summary 
 
Over the past 15 years, neuroscientists and behavioral scientists have increasingly explored 
different constructs of social cognition such as intention understanding, morality, emotion 
processing and theory of mind1. The term social cognition is defined in various ways, but in 
the area of neuroscience it is often related to the capacity to understand other people and 
attribute intentions to them. Understanding the intentions of others and predicting their 
actions is the basis of social cognition and of high importance for any species living in groups 
because it is crucial for self-preservation and adequate social interaction. When observing 
someone, we automatically interpret her/his elemental movements in terms of goals, 
intentions, desires, and beliefs. This capacity emerges early on and is a basic precondition for 
the interpretation and prediction of actions of other agents. Apart from humans, the ability to 
understand intentions has been demonstrated in other social animals like apes [46,290], 
monkeys [36,218,249] and dogs [233]. However, the mechanism behind this ability is poorly 
understood. A series of experiments carried out in the last decade showed that the capacity to 
understand what others are doing from watching their movements is mediated, at least in part, 
by a specific mechanism called the mirror mechanism [240]. Mirror neurons becomes active 
when animals observe a certain action as well as when they execute the same action [107]. 
This mechanism is thought to map the sensory information describing actions of others onto 
the motor system of the observers, just as if they would perform the actions themselves [107]. 
 
In most studies on monkeys activity originating from the mirror neurons was recorded in the 
ventral premotor cortex (areaF5), and the inferior parietal lobe (area PFG and anterior 
intraparietal area, AIP) (for a review see [239]. Additional mirroring neuronal responses have 
been shown in primary motor cortex and dorsal premotor cortex [89,279] during reaching 
observation and in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) during gaze following [258]. In humans, 
the areas that are supposed to belong to the mirror neuron system (MNS), i.e., respond to both 
action execution and observation, are located in the posterior inferior frontal gyrus (pIFG, 
congruent to the monkey F5), the premotor cortex (PMC) and the inferior parietal lobule 
(IPL) encompassing the AIP [210].  Additional mirror neurons, located in the supplementary 
motor area, and the hippocampus were shown by the single-neuron responses during 
execution and observation of actions in humans [199]. As mentioned earlier, the MNS is 
supposed to facilitate action understanding by internal simulation of other people’s actions. 
Thus, we might understand intentions of others by imagining ourselves in the other's position 
and simulating mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) that we would possess if we were in 
the other's 'shoes' (“simulation theory”) [107,293]. Caused by this internal neuronal 
simulation during action observation, the perception of an action leads to simulative 
production of that action on the part of the observer, facilitating a similar action (motor 
                                                           
1
 Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states and the awareness that other people have 
beliefs and desires different from one's own. 
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resonance) and interfering with a different action (motor interference). On the behavioral 
level, motor interference (MI) is seen as an increase of variance in one’s own movement 
while watching an incompatible (incongruent) movement of a different person. MI is 
supposed to be the result of motor resonance, which has been shown to positively correlate 
with intention understanding [3,16,208].  
This work consists of three studies. In the first study, I investigated what aspects in the 
appearance and movement kinematics of the observed artificial agent are required for 
triggering motor interference in human subjects by using a motion tracking method. In the 
following, I will refer to this study as MI-study. In the second study, by using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), I investigated whether MNS-activity can be modulated 
by goal-directed actions performed by non-biological agents (fMRI-study). Finally, in the 
third study, I investigated the flexibility of goal attribution capacity in non-human primates 
and its role in social learning. To this end, I tested the goal attribution capacity in marmoset 
monkeys by presenting them with inanimate previously unencountered agents. Since I used 
the preferential looking time paradigm for this study, I will refer to it as the looking times 
study. In the following, I will shortly explain the methods which I used in my studies and 
their main findings. 
Previous studies emphasized that various features of the observed agent determine the degree 
of MI, but could not clarify how human-like an agent has to be for its movements to elicit MI 
and, more importantly, what ‘human-like’ means in the context of MI. Thus, it is not clear, 
whether the  motor resonance and thus the motor interference require a tight match between 
one’s own and the observed agent’s physical features (presence of a body, head, face, 
extremities) and movement (smooth movement profile, natural joint configuration and 
movement velocity, capability of self-propulsion) to be triggered. Therefore, in the MI-study, 
I investigated in several experiments how different aspects of agent appearance, joint 
configuration (which determines the ability to move), and movement kinematics (variability 
of movement and movement velocity) of the observed agent influence motor interference. 
Participants performed arm movements in horizontal and vertical directions while observing 
videos of a human (i), a humanoid robot (ii), or an industrial robot arm with either artificial 
(industrial) (iii) or human-like joint configurations (iv). Both robots moved with a quasi-
biological movement velocity. My results show that MI occurred for the observation of 
incongruent actions of the human agent, humanoid robot and industrial robot arm in human 
configuration (though, to a much smaller extent) but not for this arm in an unnatural joint 
configuration. Thus, my findings indicate that when observing inanimate agents, the ability to 
move in a human-like way (motility determined by the joint configuration) is more important 
than exhibiting other human-like features, like accurate biological velocity (since a quasi-
biological movement velocity was sufficient), movement variability and human-like 
morphology. 
The MI-study indicated some flexibility of mechanisms responsible for the motor resonance 
for non-goal directed movements in respect to appearance, movement velocity, movement 
variability and non-biological nature of the observed agent. To investigate whether motor 
resonance can also be demonstrated for goal directed movements of artificial agents and, 
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more importantly to test whether the MNS activity is modulated by the artificial agent’s goals, 
I designed an fMRI study. Previous studies that compared the activation of the MNS when 
observing artificial agents and humans have led to inconsistent results. Additionally, almost 
all previous studies only compared levels of MNS activation during action observation across 
agents (humans vs. robots) and did not test whether the activations are present if contrasting 
actions of artificial agents directed to different goals. Thus, in the fMRI study, I investigated 
whether MNS is involved in recognizing different action types and attributing goals/intentions 
to them when they were performed by an artificial agent. While being involved in intention 
detection task, the subject lying in the scanner observed videos depicting human and robotic 
grasping and pointing actions aimed at different object categories. The knowledge about the 
usage of the grasped object suggested different intentions in the following chain of motor 
actions. The debriefing after the experiment revealed that the subjects were able to attribute a 
certain intention to almost every robotic and human action. Further, I found that the bilateral 
IPL and the PMC differentiated not only between observation of action belonging to different 
action types, but also between the same action type (grasping or pointing) directed at different 
goals.  This difference in activation that I have found for observation of both human and 
robotic agents indicates that MNS is involved not only in coding action types of artificial 
agents but also in coding their action goals, despite the fact that these agents are not presumed 
to have mental states. Thus, the MNS codes goals in the agent-independent manner. 
In the third study, I tried to answer the question whether the goal attribution to inanimate 
agents which has been demonstrated in the first two experiments may have been shaped by 
evolution. To this end, I investigated goal understanding in common marmosets (Callithrix 
jacchus), which split from the human lineage ca. 40 million years ago. By testing goal 
attribution to previously unencountered agents I also wanted to investigate whether this 
capacity might be innate. In contrast to human children, who have the possibility to learn from 
experience with dolls from early childhood, the monkeys have never encountered any 
artificial agents before. Therefore, successful goal attribution to them would also point to the 
innateness of goal-attribution capacity. In addition, I assessed whether the perception of goal-
directedness influences the marmosets’ readiness to accept an inanimate entity as a model for 
social learning. If intention understanding was a precondition for social leaning from artificial 
agents in monkeys, it would indicate that the same might hold for the humans. By three 
preferential looking-time experiments, I first demonstrated that the marmosets attribute goals 
to a conspecific even when it is only seen in a video clip. I then demonstrated that the same 
effect holds when the observed agent was a monkey-sized quadruped robot, but not when a 
geometric box covered the same robot. Thus, the monkeys extended their capacity for goal 
attribution to previously unencountered agents, but only if the latter had conspecific-like 
features. Subsequent free choice trials revealed that the monkeys preferred the object which 
had been approached by the agent during the preferential looking-time experiment, but only if 
they previously had perceived its behaviour as goal-directed, i.e. in the case of a conspecific 
and the robot, but not of the geometric box. My results provide evidence that in non-human 
primates, the system for goal attribution does not require previous experience with a specific 
agent or agent-category, as long as it exhibits certain visual characteristics. This indicates that 
goal attribution capacity depends on certain morphological features and adds evidence to the 
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proposition that it is innate.  Furthermore, I demonstrated that goal attribution determines 
social learning in this species, since in the subsequent test, the monkeys tended to prefer the 
object previously chosen by the demonstrator and also spent significantly more time 
interacting with this object if they previously attributed intention to the agent. 
Apart from investigating the mechanism of intention understanding, the secondary aim of this 
study was to test, whether in the future humanoid robots can be used in the area of 
neurorehabilitation and medical therapy. By conducting the fMRI study I tried to find an 
answer to whether we understand the actions of human-like robot agents using the same 
cortical and behavioral mechanisms that we use to understand other humans. The positive 
result indicated that human-like artificial agents might one day be used in therapy and as 
assistants to elderly people who are not used to modern-life technology. With the MI-study I 
aimed at clarifying what factors in the appearance and movement kinematics of robots are 
important to trigger the same kind of motor response as to a human agent during action 
observation. My findings indicated that actions of artificial agents with human-like 
morphology and smooth movements are simulated also on the behavioural (motor 
interference) level and in case of non-goal directed movements. The importance of human-
like motility over human-like features further indicates that for certain medical interventions, 
like observational therapy aimed at improving the function of the paretic hand, the robots do 
not necessarily need to possess a human-like body with a head and two limbs. Instead, it is 
sufficient if the robot moves its limbs in human-like fashion even if it lacks detailed human-
like features (like a palm with fingers). Further, I showed that although the movements of the 
robots should be smooth enough, the movement variability and biological velocity are less 
important. Finally, the preferential looking-times study indicated the importance of certain 
morphological similarities of artificial agents with conspecifics. I therefore suggest that robots 
with basic human features (like human body, head and limbs) are better suited for social 
interaction and learning scenarios than robots with industrial appearance.  
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1 Introduction 
 
In a nutshell, this dissertation builds a bridge between the neuroscience of social cognition, 
animal behavior and humanoid robotics with three aims. The first aim was to investigate the 
agent’s properties which facilitate motor resonance during dyadic interaction. The second aim 
was to test whether during observation of goal directed movements we simulate them in an 
agent independent manner. The third aim was to investigate on what agent cues goal 
attribution capacity depends in non-human primates and whether it is required for simple 
forms of social learning. 
In the introduction, I will provide a brief overview of how all three disciplines could profit 
from my findings and present the reader with the state of the art literature and general 
concepts relevant for this work. The possible applications of the results will be in assessment 
and therapy of impairments of social cognition and in designing humanoid robots for 
neurorehabilitation and medical therapy.  
In the following, I would like to explain in more detail the cortical mechanisms of action 
understanding and provide examples for potential applications of my findings. 
1.1 Intention understating as fundamental building block of social cognitions 
In recent years, the interest in research on the neural correlates of social cognition has been 
growing fast. Social cognition is defined as the ability to construct representations of the 
relations between oneself and others [1] and is based on mental operations that underlie social 
interactions. These operations include perceiving, interpreting, and generating responses to 
the intentions, dispositions, and behaviors of others [123]. Thus, the definition of social 
cognition is broad and refers to many scientific disciplines depending on the emphasis of the 
investigated function. In social psychology, social cognition includes moral reasoning and 
formation of attitudes [173]. In developmental psychology, the investigation of social 
cognition has focused most frequently upon the study of “theory of mind” (ToM) [104], 
which is the ability to attribute mental states to other people and the awareness that other 
people have beliefs and desires different from one's own [225]. In neuroscience, social 
cognition is defined more narrowly as the ability to perceive the intentions and dispositions of 
others [28]. This ability allows animals to interact with one another – a matter of survival not 
only for individuals but also for the species as a whole. In contrast to many animal species, 
humans do not just interact with conspecifics socially, but also engage with them in complex 
collaborative activities such as making a tool together, preparing a meal together, building a 
shelter, playing a cooperative game, collaborating scientifically, and so on. These collective 
activities require intention understanding and the capability to predict the behavior of other 
individuals. Therefore, inferring others' intentions and being able to understand and predict 
behavior of other people is a crucial aspect of social cognition.  
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Although intention understanding feels rather automatic and effortless to us, the complexity 
of this process becomes obvious in people with neuropsychiatric disorders. Many of these 
disorders are developmental in nature and include impairment of emotion processing and 
intention understanding – two processes which are closely related and most likely function in 
a highly integrated fashion. Impairments of these building blocks of social cognition can lead 
to various mental illnesses such as Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) [140], 
schizophrenia[123,298], depression [255], posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)2, 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS)3 [60], psychopathy [83] and social phobia [272]. On the 
other hand, William’s syndrome [216], a genetic disease, has been associated with 
hypersociabililty [12], so that the individuals with WS seem driven to greet and interact with 
strangers. ASD is a complex developmental disability that causes deficits in social interaction, 
verbal and non-verbal communication, and might lead to restricted and repetitive behaviours 
[302]. Subjects with ASD have an impaired ability to attribute mental states to others (that is, 
to have a theory of mind) [146], impaired face and emotion processing, deficits in joint 
attention abilities and attributing mental states [129]. Autistic children have deficits in the 
processing of biological motion of point-light displays [15], whereas children with Williams 
syndrome have intact face recognition [216] and were shown to have intact processing of 
biological motion [160]. If social cognition deficits are determinants of daily functions, tasks 
designed to study these functions in the laboratory (as the ones used here) might one day used 
as a form of assessment of the efficacy of interventions on these patients.  
 
1.2 The Mirror Neuron System as the mediator of intention understanding 
When we see other persons act, we do not just recognize and categorize their actions, we 
frequently even imagine the reason behind the actions of the agents; there is evidence that 
adults encode actions in terms of their outcomes [143]. However, since the same motor act 
may lead to different outcomes, attributing intentions goes beyond recognizing the motor act 
as such [130,264]. Thus, intention understanding is a multi-layer process involving different 
levels of action representation, which spans from the motor intention that drives a given chain 
of motor acts to the propositional attitudes like beliefs, desires and so on. Hence, monitoring 
the properties of a prehensile movement (motor intention) conveys different cognitive 
intentions of the actor toward the object depending on the context: touch, use, move, drop or 
throw. But how does the intention understanding work on the neuronal level? 
It has been argued, that in humans and non-human primates, the mirror neuron system (MNS) 
facilitates action understanding through neural simulation of action [148,153,240]. In 
monkeys, single-neuron recordings showed that mirror neurons discharge both when a 
monkey executes a specific object-directed action and when it observes another individual 
performing the same motor act (see Figure 1a). Thus, it is supposed that during action 
observation we get into the mental shoes of the people whom we observe [107] (simulation). 
The simulation theory has gained support from a number of recent experiments. By means of 
                                                           
2
 PTSD is characterized by recurrent and invasive trauma-related memories, increased fear responsiveness, and 
increased physiological reactivity to trauma-related stimuli. 
3
 ALS involves the progressive degeneration of upper and lower motor neurones. 
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functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) [30,31], transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) [8] and electroencephalography (EEG) [70], it has been demonstrated that observation 
of human action gives rise to matching motor activation in the observer. Likewise, during 
hand action observation, there is a significant increase in the motor-evoked potentials from 
the hand muscles which are involved in performing such a movement [94].  The congruency 
between visual and motor properties of mirror neurons indicates that when we observe an 
action performed by others, a “potential motor act” is evoked in our brain that is identical (or 
at least similar) to that which would be spontaneously activated when we plan the execution 
of that same action. However, although in the latter case this act would be translated into an 
overt series of movements, in the former it would remain a motor representation of that goal 
at its potential stage. Based on this representation, we automatically attribute the intention to 
the action which appears to be most compatible with the object, the actor, our prior 
knowledge and the context. But now let us look at the anatomical bases of intention 
understanding. 
1.2.1 The anatomy of the Mirror Neuron System 
The mirror neurons were first discovered in the premotor area, F5, of the macaque monkey 
[106,293]. Later, they were found in the area PF [99] and the anterior intraparietal area (AIP, 
see Figure 1b). Both AIP and PF belong to the inferior parietal lobe (IPL). The neurons 
located in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) have only visual properties (responding to body 
movements) and are not active during action execution [238].  
 
The three cortical areas: STS, area PF and area F5, are reciprocally connected. Thus, the area 
PF of the inferior parietal cortex is reciprocally connected to the area F5 [186] (see [164] for a 
review). The area F5, on the other hand, is connected with area F6 (the pre-supplementary 
motor area), with the area F5 and the prefrontal cortex [241]. The prefrontal cortex is 
connected with the AIP [241]. Both area PFG and the AIP receive higher-order visual 
information from the cortex located inside the STS [20]. The AIP also receives connections 
from the middle temporal gyrus (IT), located in the temporal lobe [20]. This input could 
provide the parietal areas, which are suggested to play a role in intention understanding [99], 
with information concerning object identity. On the other hand, the frontal inputs control the 
selection of self-generated and stimulus-driven actions according to the intentions of the 
observed agent [105].  
 
Although MNS was originally discovered during recording of responses of single neurons in 
the monkey [238], there is a growing body of evidence from noninvasive neurophysiological 
techniques and brain imaging studies that a similar MNS-based action observation-execution 
matching mechanism is also present in humans [122]. Most of these studies have shown that 
in humans,  as in the monkey, the  mirror circuit is formed by three main regions: the inferior 
section of the precentral gyrus (premotor cortex, PMC), the posterior part (pars opercularis, 
po) of the inferior frontal gyrus (pIFG) and the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) including the 
cortex located inside the anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) [238] (see Figure 2). Based on 
over 200 fMRI studies investigating social cognition, another meta-analysis [210] also 
 demonstrated that the MNS areas with motor and visual properties  are most often found in 
the parietal lobe (aIPS), IFG and the premotor cortex (see 
 
Figure 1: Activity of a mirror neuron and 
mirror neuron recorded from the
object and when it observes the experimenter grasping the obj
brain. The areas of the parieto-fro
(area F5), area PF and the anterior intraparietal area (AIP). The parieto
order visual information from areas located inside the
adopted from [243] with permission from the publisher.
 
Additional cortical areas (such as superior
found to be active during action observation and execution 
that their activation is due to a mirror mechanism, it is equally possible that it reflects motor 
preparation [243]. Single-neuron data from monkeys showing that these areas are involved in 
covert motor preparation [73]
movements directed to a particular location in space
in the superior temporal sulcus (STS)
[104,126] and the posterior part of the STS region is recruited by relatively low level 
processes such as observation of biological motion 
the STS is higher level operations such as social inferential processing in tasks involving 
theory of mind reasoning and mentalizing
is not part of the mirror system in a strict sense. 
 
Figure 3).  
cytoarchitectonic map of the monkey cortex. 
 area F5. The neuron discharges both when the monkey grasps an 
ect. b) Lateral view of the macaque 
ntal circuit containing mirror neurons are the ventral premotor cortex 
-frontal circuit receives high
 superior temporal sulcus (STS). 
 
 parietal lobule, SPL) have also been occasionally 
[111,124]. Although it is possible 
 or are activated when volunteers observe proximal arm 
, support this interpretation 
 also respond selectively to biological movements  
[154]. A different function attributed to 
 [252]. Since this region has no motor properties, it 
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Figure 2: Lateral view of the human brain with coloured areas representing the human MNS. The 
MNS consists of the pars opercularis the inferior frontal gyrus (IFGpo), the premotor cortex, the 
superior parietal lobe (SPL) the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) consisting of the supramarginal gyrus 
(SMG) and angular gyrus, as well as anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS). The superior temporal sulcus 
(STS) provides the MNS with visual input (like the area IT in the monkey brain) but has no motor 
properties.  
 
 
Figure 3: Brain regions revealed by fMRI-studies investigating action execution and observation. 
Every circle represents the hypothesized anatomical localization of mirror neurons in one of the 
studies. All studies were taken from an earlier meta-analysis on social cognition by [211] and updated 
by including fMRI studies on mirror neurons and social cognition located by searches in PubMed and 
Science Direct in the period between April 2007 and August 2008. Figure adopted with permission 
from [210]. 
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Analogous to the monkey MNS, a similar pattern of connectivity between premotor areas and 
inferior parietal lobule has also been shown in humans, both directly [248] and indirectly 
[147,149]. In addition, a sequential pattern of activation in the human MNS has been 
demonstrated during action-observation (for details see [205]). The premotor node of mirror 
system is somatotopically organized [30]. Thus, observation of motor acts done with different 
effectors determines activation of specific parts of it so that leg, hand, and mouth movements 
are represented in a medial to lateral direction of the premotor cortex. 
 
1.2.2 Neurons with mirroring properties outside the classical MNS  
Single-subject fMRI analyses have recently provided evidence that other cortical areas, which 
lie outside the classical MNS (for example, the primary and secondary somatosensory cortices 
and the middle temporal cortex) also become active during action observation and action 
execution [111]. A recent study showed that the mirror neuron system in humans extends 
beyond the ventral premotor cortex and inferior parietal lobe traditionally associated with the 
MNS [199]. The authors inserted electrodes in the medial wall (cingulate cortex, 
supplementary motor area (SMA and pre-SMA) and the medial temporal lobe (amygdala, 
hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus and entorhinal cortex) of the patients’ brain. Although 
these brain areas are not classically associated with mirror neurons, in  line with what 
previous fMRI experiments have suggested [111], the authors found mirror neurons in the 
SMA, the hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus and the entorhinal cortex. This indicated 
the existence of mirror neurons in many brain regions. Additionally, the authors reported 
evidence for the existence of inhibitory neurons, which might help us understand how we 
perform motor simulations without moving our body.  
 
Another recent analysis used combined results from 125 fMRI papers to document the areas 
which were associated with mirror neurons apart from classical MNS-areas [196]. Although 
the main revealed areas were BA 44 (21% of the studies), BA 7 (27% of the studies), BA 9 
(38% of the studies), BA 6 (40% of the studies) and BA 40 (48% of the studies) which belong 
to the classical MNS, further significant clusters of activation encroached upon 34 separate 
Brodmann areas and revealed regions such as the primary visual cortex, cerebellum and parts 
of the limbic system (see Table 1). Another recent meta-analysis of MRI studies investigating 
observation and imitation of actions showed that MNS-areas additionally encompassed the 
dorsal PMC, SMA, posterior MTG, and V5 [57]. Further, neuroimaging studies in both 
humans [111,112,113] and monkeys [93,235] demonstrated overlapping activity for the 
generation and the perception of hand actions also within the somatosensory and motor 
cortices. The activation in these areas might result from the fact that the classical mirror 
neuron studies are unable to measure exclusively mirror neuron activity. Some of the areas 
which do not belong to the “core MNS” are likely to be involved in processes of visual 
recognition (primary visual cortex for example), visual motion perception, working memory, 
movement planning, and movement execution (in the case of imitation), which are all integral 
components of fMRI tasks.  
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Table 1: Regions associated with the mirror neuron system. These regions were found in meta-
analysis of studies which investigated the MNS [196]. Abbreviations: BA-Brodmann area, N: Number 
of studies which found a certain region; da: dorsal anterior; p: posterior; DLPF: dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex; ITG: inferior temporal gyrus; SFG: superior frontal gyrus. 
1.2.3 Features of mirror neurons  
Although the monkey area F5 includes also the  canonical neurons, which respond to the 
presentation of an object [241], the mirror neurons do not fire in response to a simple 
presentation of objects, including food [243]. Most of them do not respond or respond only 
weakly to the observation of the experimenter performing a motor act (for example, grasping) 
without a target object [106,171].  
 
A number of fMRI studies in humans show that, similar to monkeys, the information about 
the goal of the observed motor acts can be encoded with different degrees of generality. Some 
mirror neurons (strictly congruent mirror neurons) fire when the observed and executed motor 
acts are the same or at least very similar (for example, grasping with precision grip). For these 
neurons (about 30% of mirror neurons) ‘‘corresponding’’ seems to mean an action that 
achieves a similar goal and that involves the same motor details [163]. In contrast, broadly 
congruent mirror neurons, making up about 60% of all mirror neurons, fire when the observed 
motor act has the same goal as the executed motor act (for example, grasping), but can be 
achieved in a different way (for example, with both precision and whole-hand grips) [240]. 
For such neurons, ‘‘corresponding’’ means ‘‘having the same goal.’’ Together, strictly and 
broadly congruent mirror neurons could therefore represent both what another individual did, 
and how he did it [278].  
 
Mirror neurons in the F5 of the monkey brain may also fire in the absence of visual 
information describing the motor act of the experimenter only if the sound of an action is 
present (such as ripping a piece of paper) [167]. Thus, the neurons fired also if the monkey 
saw the experimenter’s hand disappear behind the screen and knew that behind a screen there 
was an object [293]. The neuronal activation therefore underpinned the coding of the goal of 
the motor act of the other individual, regardless of the sensory information that described that 
motor act. Likewise, in humans, it was shown that listening to the sound of hand and mouth 
motor acts alone activated the parieto-frontal mirror network [110]. This activation was 
BA Region N BA Region N BA Region N
1 SI 1 18 V2 5 38 Temp. Pole 1
2 SI 12 19 V3 10 39 IPL 7
3 SI 11 20 ITG 2 40 IPL 60
4 MI 13 21 MTG 9 41 pSTG 4
5 SPL 4 22 STG 19 42 pSTG 3
6 PM 59 24 vaCingulate 4 43 Post-, precentral 4
7 SPL 34 28 Entorhinal 1 44 IFG, pars opercularis 26
8 SFG 2 31 pCingulate 4 45 IFG, pars triangularis 23
9 IFG 48 32 daCingulate 5 46 DLPF 15
10 SFG 4 34 aEntorhinal 1 47 Orbital frontal cortex 7
13 Insula 29 36 Parahippocampus 1 Cerebellum 13
17 V1 3 37 Fusiform gyrus 15 Other 26
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somatotopically organized in the left premotor cortex and was congruent with the motor 
somatotopy of hand and mouth actions.  
 
A recent study provided compelling evidence that  in monkeys most of the motor neurons in 
F5 encode motor acts (that is, goal-related movements, such as grasping) rather than 
movements (that is, body-part displacements without a specific goal, such as finger flexion) 
[292]. Thus, when monkeys were trained to grasp objects using two types of pliers: normal 
pliers (which require typical grasping movements of the hand), and ‘reverse’ pliers (which 
require hand movements executed in the reverse order), F5 neurons discharged during the 
same phase of grasping in both conditions, regardless of whether this involved opening or 
closing of the hand. However, in contrast to monkeys, whose MNS has been shown to react 
only to the sight of goal-directed actions, in humans, motor system also “resonates” in 
response to intransitive movements, including those without any obvious meaning. The initial 
evidence for this mechanism was based on the transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
experiments which indicated that the observation of other’s movements results in activation of 
the muscles involved in the execution of those movements [94,274].  In a more recent study, 
motor-evoked potentials in response to TMS were recorded from the right opponens pollicis 
muscle in participants observing an experimenter either opening and closing normal and 
reverse pliers or using them to grasp objects [58]. The observation of moving tools (that is, 
opening and closing the pliers without grasping anything) activated the cortical representation 
of the hand movements involved in the observed motor behavior, whereas the observation of 
the tool grasping action activated a cortical representation of the observed motor goal, no 
matter what individual movements were involved. Due to this feature of goal matching during 
action observation, the human MNS can resonate even if the person who observes the action 
does not have body parts with which the acting agent performs the action [113]. Indeed, it has 
been shown that two aplasic individuals who were born without arms and hands showed an 
activation of parieto-frontal mirror circuit (that was active during their movements of the feet 
and mouth) when observing hand motor acts that they have never executed but the motor 
goals of which they could achieve using their feet or mouth.  
1.2.4 Brain regions associated with goal understanding 
There is evidence that parietal mirror neurons are involved in encoding of not only the 
observed motor acts but also of the entire action of which the observed motor act is part. 
Thus, when monkeys performed motor acts embedded in grasping, the inferior parietal lobule 
(IPL) neurons showed markedly different activations when this grasping act was part of  
grasping for eating than grasping for placing [99] (see Figure 4a, b). Likewise, when monkeys 
saw the experimenter who grasped the objects with either the intention to place it to the mouth 
or into the container, the majority of the IPL neurons were differently activated depending on 
the final action to which the observed motor act belonged (see Figure 4c, d). This finding 
indicates that, in addition to describing what the observed individual is doing (for example, 
grasping), IPL mirror neurons also enable the observer to explain why the individual is 
performing the action.  
 
 Figure 4: Activation of the parietal 
their study, Fogassi et al. presented
observation [99]. During action execution, the animals had to gras
their mouth (line I in 4a) or inside a container
higher firing rates around the time of grasping followed by eating relative to grasping followed by 
placing (b). During observation of 
activity of the mirror neurons which
it was higher when grasping was
(d). In the trials in which the container is present, the experimenter puts the food in it. When the 
container is not present, the experimenter eats the food. So, the container was the contextual cue for 
the monkey to code the grasp as grasp
with the permission from the publisher.
 
A recent experiment using electromyography
there is an organization of chained 
experiment, children were asked to observe the experimenter who grasped a piece of food and 
brought it to his mouth (see Figure 
Figure 5b). During execution of grasping actions, the mouth
strongly when grasping for eating than for grasping for placing
the researchers recorded an activation of the mouth
the reaching and grasping phases 
they preceded placing the food to a different location
the capacity of the child’s motor system to predict the experimenter’s intention. 
as soon as the action starts, the entire motor program for a give
motor representation is identical to that which the observer himself would activate if planning 
the same action [242].  
                                                          
4
 Electromyography is a technique for evaluating and recording the electrical activity produced by skeletal 
muscles. 
mirror neurons in monkeys depending on the goal of grasping.
 the monkeys with 2 tasks: grasping execution and grasping 
p a food pellet 
 (line II in 4a)  The mirror neurons coding eating show
according grasping acts performed by an experimenter
 coded eating was also modulated by the particular action context: 
 followed by eating relative to grasping followed by placing an object
-to-eat or grasp-to-place. Modified figure adopted 
 
4
 suggested that similar to monkeys, in humans 
motor acts underlying intention understandin
5a) or grasped an object and placed it into a container
-opening muscle was 
 (see Figure 
-opening muscles during observation of 
only when grasping preceded eating the food 
 (see Figure 5d). This activation 
n action is activated
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and put it either into 
ed 
 (c), the 
 
from [19] 
g [59]. In this 
 (see 
active more 
5c). Interestingly, 
but not when 
indicates 
It seems that, 
. This 
 Figure 5: Motor behavior of the mouth
figure 5a and 5b depict the schematic 
The individual reaches for an item on a
placed on his shoulder. The figure 5b shows the t
of the mouth-opening muscle during the execution (left side) and observation (right side) of the 
‘bringing-to-the-mouth’ action (red line) and of the ‘placing’ action (blue line). All curves are aligned 
with the moment of object lifting from the touch
[243] with permission of the publisher.
 
Thus, the motor knowledge and experience allow us to recognize the intentional meaning of 
the motor acts we observe both when they are performed singly and when they are part of 
motor chains. In this latter case, their meaning is no longer determined solely by the specific 
goal-centeredness of a single motor act, but offers the goal
describes the intentional meaning of the whole action.
1.3 Is the goal understanding capa
The evolution of social cognition 
aspects of prosocial behavior, as well as mechanisms
manipulation of conspecifics. 
between mother and infant; the latter in the largest
dominance hierarchies. 
 
-opening muscles during action execution and
representation of two grasping tasks directed at different goals
 plate and either brings it to his mouth or puts
ime course of the rectified electromyographic activity 
-sensitive plate (time = 0). Figure was a
 
-centered representation which 
 
city innate? 
predicts mechanisms for cooperativity, altruism,
 for coercion, deception and 
The former are exemplified in the smallest groups, in the
 groups by the creation of complex 
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1.3.1 Development of goal understanding in infancy 
Ontogenetically, the understanding of others’ intentions develops gradually. Already 6- to 9-
month-olds infants manifest an early sensitivity to goal-directedness and appear to be biased 
toward interpreting humans’ reaching behavior as goal-directed [77,116,142,194,224,266]. 
Woodward (1998), for example, showed that even in the first half-year of life infants encode 
goal-directedness over spatiotemporal properties of the human reaching gesture [304].  
 
Most studies have shown that infants younger than nine month attribute goals only to humans 
[142] and agents with a certain degree of human-likeness such as humanoid robots [161]. 
Thus, no intention attribution is possible to boxes [161], claws/rods [142,304], mechanical 
devices [194], or geometrical shapes [77]. However, one study has shown that 6.5-month-old 
infants were able to attribute a goal to a moving inanimate box if it slightly varied its goal 
approach. This suggested that morphological identification of agents is not a necessary 
precondition of goal attribution in young infants and that the single most important 
behavioural cue for identifying a goal-directed agent is variability of behaviour [79]. In 
consent with this finding, by means of near infrared spectroscopy, an action execution and 
observation matching system was demonstrated already in 6-month-old human infants [259]. 
In contrast to adult participants, the sensory–motor cortex of infants (but not that of adults) 
was also activated during the observation of a moving object on a TV screen, indicating that 
during the early developmental stages even non-biological moving objects can activate the 
MNS.  
For investigating goal attribution in infants older than nine months of age, most studies agree 
that infants are able to attribute intentions to both morphologically familiar and unfamiliar 
inanimate agents [10,77,116,157,172,224,262]. Finally, at 12 months of age, infants have 
been shown to attribute goals even to geometrical shapes [116].  
 
Based on these findings, some researchers argue that the early form of the intention 
understanding capacity is an innate brain function, which is triggered by specific 
morphological and behavioral cues such as faces and eyes [9,51,157], biological motion [9], 
self-propulsion [180,224,226], or contingent and reciprocal interactions with other agents 
[157,158]. Thus, according to these researchers, no prior experience with the agent should be 
required if certain morphological cues are present [9,77,116,180,224,226]. In contrast, some 
other researchers argue that goal attribution is not innate but instead is first learned through 
experience with human agents by forming associations between observed actions and their 
target and later gradually extended to less human-like agents [194,197,282,304].  
 
Therefore, it is still unclear whether the capability to attribute intentions is innate and based 
on certain cues, or whether it develops with experience and can be extended to other agents. 
Further, in case of the first, it is not clear exactly which cues (e.g. presence of a body with a 
head, biological motion, monkey shape and size, ability to manipulate objects) a familiar or an 
unfamiliar entity must exhibit in order to be perceived as an intentional agent.   
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1.3.2 Goal understanding in non-human primates 
Traditionally, researchers claim that in contrast to humans, who are thought to understand 
others by means of their capacity to “read mind” [222], all other animal species just read 
behavior [221,223]. Relying on many situations from the past experience, they can predict the 
actions of others if the same situation arises again by extraction of procedural rules from 
observable environmental regularities [295]. 
 
However, the view of primates simply as “behavior readers” has been challenged by studies 
showing that  chimpanzees have been observed doing things that would seem to require more 
than just an understanding of surface-level behavior, like, for example, tactical deception [43]. 
Also rhesus monkeys prefer to steal food lying in front of the human experimenter when he 
does not see it (his gaze is turned to a different direction) in comparison to the condition when 
the experimenter is visually aware of food presence. This indicated that rhesus monkeys seem 
to understand the relationship between seeing and knowing [98].  
There is evidence that at least some primates perceive the actions of others in terms of goals. 
Similar to results obtained with human children, experiments using the Woodward habituation 
paradigm [249] (see section section 3.3.1 for details about the paradigm) found that monkeys 
expect that people will reach for the object after gazing at it. Using the preferential looking 
time paradigm, Rochat, et al. recently investigated the ability of macaque monkeys to predict 
goal-directed actions of others [245]. Her results indicated that macaque monkeys, similarly 
to the nine to twelve-month-old human infants, detect the goal of an observed motor act and, 
according to the physical characteristics of the context, construe expectancies about the most 
likely action the observed agent will execute in a given context. 
 
Further, chimpanzees [46,290], rhesus monkeys [245], capuchin monkeys [218], cotton-top 
tamarins [249] and common marmosets [40] show sensitivity to the intentional structure of 
behavior. The evidence that primates understand the goals of others comes also from the 
studies of social learning, which have shown that when  apes see  a novel action, they do not 
try to simply copy it in all details, but try to reach the same goal (goal emulation) [215]. 
Similar to human children who imitate others’ actions ‘rationally’ by copying a 
demonstrator’s action when that action is freely chosen, but less when it is forced by some 
constraint [114], enculturated chimpanzees also imitate rationally and therefore show some 
understanding of the rationality of others’ intentional actions [41]. 
 
In contrast to cooperative contexts (when experimenter’s goal was to share food with the 
chimpanzee), in which primates performed poorly by failing to understand what others know 
on the basis of where they are looking [222], other data obtained in competitive contexts show 
that when competing for food, chimpanzees perform much better [134]. Another study 
reported that chimpanzees do not simply react to the outcome of the human’s behavior, but 
consider the reason why the human failed to give them food [46]. Thus, when chimpanzees 
interact with a human experimenter who “fails” to give them food, they tend to produce 
begging behaviours more often and leave the room later than if the human is unwilling to give 
them food (for example teasing them). A similar experiment in capuchin monkeys has shown 
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that the monkeys remain in the testing area longer when the experimenter is unable to give 
them food than if he is teasing them [218]. 
 
Not only understanding goal-directedness, but also seeing is an early sign of intentionality. By 
12- to 14-months, infants follow an adult’s gaze around a barrier [157]. Indeed, all primate 
species tested so far visually co-orient with conspecifics or humans [247], including common 
marmosets [35,37], indicating an understanding of what the agent sees. 
1.4 Role of goal understanding for social learning 
It has been proposed that learning by imitation  requires the observer to not just bring about 
the result of the model's action by repeating the bodily movements that another individual has 
performed, but also to understand that the model intended to bring about the goal by that 
behaviour [45,178,280,282]. The perception of actions as goal-directed rather than in terms of 
physical properties in monkeys might be a necessary precondition not only for understanding 
intentional actions and attributing mental states to agents [108] but also for later development 
of human imitative learning. Thus, it might provide the basis for cultural learning [282].  
 
An intimate link between intentional understanding and social learning has been demonstrated 
in one to one and a half year olds. Meltzoff et al. showed that 18-months olds correctly 
inferred and copied the goal of an unsuccessful action [194]. However, the infants did not 
copy the failed action but instead completed the action which was intended by the actor. 
Interestingly, they did not imitate the same actions in case of being performed by a 
mechanical device. The same pattern was present in 15- [158], but not in 12-months olds [11]. 
Furthermore, 14- and 18-months olds differentiate between intentional and accidental actions 
and copy only the former ones [53], and 12- and 18-months olds copy actions in terms of 
goals [54] and do so in the most rational way [114]. Finally, results from a recent study [267] 
indicate that action observation and execution rely on a shared code starting in infancy since 
the infants become better in a certain task after watching a solution performed by an 
experimenter.  
1.5 Motor interference - a tool for investigating motor resonance during action 
observation 
Since the tendency to anthropomorphise humanoid robots is natural, it is important to analyze 
what morphological and behavioural features of a robot facilitate the human-machine 
interaction in social scenarios and which features have less influence on making this 
interaction intuitive.  
Although the quality of interaction between humans and humanoid robots has been 
investigated by some studies (e.g. [88,144], mostly, questionnaire-based subjective judgments 
were used for this purpose [17,82,118]. A possibly objective tool, which is based on the 
phenomenon of motor interference, has been developed only recently [166]. In the following, 
I will describe this phenomenon in detail since it will be used in my investigations. 
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As stated earlier, by using fMRI it has been shown that observation of an action leads to 
activation of the corresponding motor areas in the human premotor cortex [30,31]. On the 
behavioural level, this phenomenon has been supported by the finding that during hand action 
observation, there is a significant increase in the motor-evoked potentials from the hand 
muscles that would be used for performing such a movement [94]. Thus, a part of the central 
motor systems becomes activated during the observation of action (motor resonance). 
However, what happens when we attempt to perform an action while observing a qualitatively 
different (incongruent) action? In this case, the motor program (or representation) associated 
with the observed movement interferes with the outgoing motor output for the intended 
movement.  
 
Figure 6: Setup and results of previous studies investigating motor interference. Left: experimental 
conditions. Right: examples of movement trajectories of the observing subjects.  a) Observation of 
incongruent movements performed by a human subject leads to MI [166];  b): video observation of a 
an incongruent movement performed by a robot arm does not lead to MI [166]; c) observation of an 
incongruent movement of a humanoid robot  elicits MI [212]. Figure was adopted from [174] with 
permission of the publisher. 
 
Thus, caused by the internal neuronal simulation during action observation, the perception of 
an action leads to simulative production of that action on the part of the observer, facilitating a 
similar (congruent) action and interfering with a different (incongruent) action (motor 
interference) [24,152,229]. The first phenomenon is called motor resonance, the second – 
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motor interference. While motor resonance becomes obvious in mimicking actions of our 
interaction partners (e.g. the contagion of yawning), motor interference (MI) can be observed 
as an increase of variance in our own movement trajectory while watching an incompatible 
movement either face-to-face or in video [166] (see Figure 6a). A recent study [133] has 
shown not only interference, but also facilitation effects when observing congruent 
movements (see Table 5). 
Motor interference influences not only the trajectory of the observer’s movements but also 
his/her reaction times. Research on visuomotor priming has shown that responses to human 
body movement (e.g. a video image of a hand opening) are faster and more accurate when 
they involve execution of the same movement (e.g. hand opening) than when they involve 
execution of an alternative movement (e.g. hand closing) [72,275]. Similarly, if the subjects 
are instructed to perform a finger tapping in response to a visual signal depicting finger 
tapping (compatible) or lifting (incompatible), the reaction time to initiate the prepared finger 
movement is significantly slowed down when the stimulus is incompatible [24].   
Individuals automatically mimic many different aspects of their interaction partners, including 
speech patterns, facial expressions, emotions, moods, postures and gestures [67]. Even one-
month-old infants have been shown to smile, stick out their tongues, and open their mouths 
when they see someone else do it [193]. The main function attributed to motor resonance  is 
action understanding, since mirroring the actions of others might help to understand what 
another person is doing [240] and why he/she is doing it [148]. Thus, simulating another 
person’s actions might allow humans to make predictions about the mental states of others 
based on the mental states and behaviours that they experience themselves while mimicking 
others [25]. The higher degree of movement synchronization (chameleon effect) between 
interaction partners is generally regarded as a sign of higher degree of mutual rapport, 
involvement and togetherness [67,285]. For example, people change their breathing when 
observing other people making effortful actions [213] as if preparing to make such actions 
themselves. Students in a small class often exhibit the same postures as their instructor and 
other classmates [13]. A recent study investigating unintentional synchronization of rocking 
frequencies of pairs of participants sitting in rocking chairs has revealed that subjects 
unintentionally adopted the same rocking frequency when they had visual access to each other 
[236]. Surprisingly, subjects moved in synchrony even after the researchers manipulated the 
natural rocking frequency of the chairs. Further, behavioral synchrony during a dyadic 
interaction has been shown to lead to an increase of attention to the interaction partner and 
thus enhanced memories about his appearance and his utterances [187]. Finally, in 
psychotherapeutic counseling, congruent limbs movements of the therapist and the client have 
been shown to be significant contributors to the attributions of rapport [285].  
When talking about the link between the MNS, motor resonance and motor interference, it 
needs to be considered, that at least in monkeys, mirror neurons respond only to object-
directed actions (e.g. a hand grasping an object) and not to movements (e.g. a hand moves in 
the absence of an object to grasp) [240]. Thus, although in humans motor resonance can also 
be triggered by non-goal-directed movements, this effect might be increased when observing 
goal-directed movements. Evidence for this account comes from a recent study which has 
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shown that MI in the observer’s movements was modulated by presence and absence of goals 
in horizontal and vertical arm movements of the observed agent [23]. The authors could show 
an additional increase of MI if two red dots were added on the observed video sequence at the 
level of endpoints of the actor’s arm movements, such that they represented targets for the 
observed movement. Additionally, Capa et al. [49] has performed an experiment to test 
whether MI results from the activation of the MNS. The authors have investigated MI in two 
groups of subjects who watched incongruent movements. However, only one group received a 
brief visuo-motor practice phase of the observed incongruent action. The authors suggested 
that in case that MI arises from activity in the mirror system, this effect would increase when 
the observer received prior practice with the observed movement, because visuo-motor 
experience should increase motor resonance with the observed movement by strengthening 
excitatory links between its visual and motor representation. In contrast, if motor interference 
only reflects the adjustments to synchronize with the observed movement, increasing the 
visuo-motor experience with that movement should facilitate its perception and 
synchronization and thus reducing the MI effect. As expected, prior action observation 
induced a larger motor interference in participants who had practiced the observed action 
supporting the mirror neuron account for the emergence of MI.  
 
Nevertheless, the system underlying MI during non goal-directed movement observation 
might be distinct from the goal-sensitive mirror neurons described in the monkey premotor 
cortex since in humans the resonance arises from any kind of movement and is not restricted 
to goal-directed actions. Possibly, human goal-sensitive mirror neurons are part of a much 
wider ‘mirror’ system, which has a number of levels.  
1.6 Factors which influence goal understanding  
The simulation theory indicates the necessity of morphological similarity with other agents 
for intuitive understanding of other’s actions since the observed actor should have the same 
motor constraints and morphological features as the observer (the "like me" hypothesis [194]). 
Therefore, it seems reasonable that the closer the match between the observed action and the 
observers’ own sensorimotor representations, the more efficient the simulation will be. Thus, 
the process of simulation reduces the possible range of actors, whose intentions the observer 
might be able to simulate. But how closely has an artificial agent to resemble the human and 
what other human-like features does he have to have to engage the MNS? Also, does an agent 
need to be biological in order to be perceived as being intentional? 
 
1.6.1 Agent appearance 
In children, several studies show that the simulation cannot take place when the observed 
action cannot be transformed to the own body of the infants, as in case of geometrical shapes. 
The lack of goal attribution when interacting with mechanical devices  [194], or claws 
[142,304] suggests that interaction with a machine fails to activate the same mechanism that 
codes human motor behaviour; direct matching cannot therefore occur. However, although the 
tested artificial agents do not have mental states, infants have been shown to attribute goal-
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directedness to them, if they exhibit similar motor constraints and morphological features as 
humans (the "like me" hypothesis). Thus, as stated earlier,  in contrast to geometrical shapes 
[161], mechanical devices [194] and claws [142,304], a human-like shaped agent (e.g. a 
humanoid robot) might enable isomorphic mapping of its actions to the observer’s body [161] 
and thus enable goal attribution towards those agents.  
 
A recent study has shown that the tendency to build a model of another person’s mind linearly 
increases with its perceived human-likeness [170]. This study investigated how the increase of 
human-likeness of interaction partners modulates the participants' brain activity. Subjects 
were playing a computer game (the prisoners' dilemma game) against four different game 
partners: a regular computer notebook, a functionally designed Lego-robot, the 
anthropomorphic robot BARTHOC Jr. and a human5. The results clearly demonstrated that 
neural activity in the medial prefrontal cortex as well as in the right temporo-parietal junction 
linearly increased with the degree of "human-likeness" of interaction partners. The more the 
respective game partners exhibited human-like features, the more the participants engaged 
cortical regions associated with mental state attribution. Further, in a debriefing questionnaire, 
participants stated having increasingly enjoyed the interactions most when their respective 
interaction partners displayed the most human features and accordingly evaluated their 
opponents as being more intelligent. 
However, do we need a fully anthropomorphic synthetic robotic agent or is a certain degree of 
human form realism sufficient for social acceptance of robots? In 1978, the Japanese 
roboticist Masahiro Mori has made an interesting discovery: the more humanlike his robots 
became, the more people were attracted to them. However, if a robot became too lifelike, 
suddenly people were repelled from it [198]. In his theory called "The Uncanny Valley" Mori 
suggests that a high degree of human likeness might also cause a negative effect. The uncanny 
valley theory states that as a robot increases in humanness, it becomes more susceptible to 
failures in its functionality and design and can cause the feeling of uneasiness. This results 
from the fact that the more human-like the robot appears, the higher are the expectations of 
people interacting with it. The "uncanny valley" hypothesis predicts, for example, that a 
prosthetic limb covered with skin-coloured rubber, which imperfectly, albeit extremely 
closely, reproduces the texture and the motion of real limbs, would be more repulsive than a 
less realistic limb with a mechanical appearance. Recently, Hiroshi Ishiguro constructed his 
mechanical “doppelganger”, the android robot Geminoid HI-1, using powerful electronics, 
silicone rubber and pneumatic actuators [204]. This robot looks very similar to the original 
and can be used to mimic Ishiguro, who controls this robot remotely. Ishiguro uses a 
microphone to capture his voice and a camera to track his face and head movements. In a live-
setting study, the researchers examined the response of participants who interacted with the 
Geminoid, while it was tele-operated by Ishiguro. Interestingly, only 37.5% of the 
interviewed visitors reported an uncanny feeling with 29% even enjoying the conversation 
[69]. To investigate the effect of uncanny valley on the neuronal level, a recent study has used 
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 During the games the subjects were lying in the MRT scanner and could not see the agents against which they 
play. However, they have seen the agents before the experiment started. 
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fMRI and a repetition suppression6 paradigm. Presenting the participants with videos of 
human, humanoid robot and an android robot (robot with human appearance) has shown that 
the uncanny valley effect should not be ignored [253]. In this study, the participants viewed 
video clips of different transitive and intransitive hand actions of a human agent, an android 
agent and a humanoid robot demonstrating that activation in the IPL or IFG was not selective 
for appearance or motion of different agents per se [253]. Instead, the increased activation in 
the IPL appeared as a result of mismatch between appearance and motion in case of the 
android robot with human appearance but robotic motion. These findings could be explained 
by presence of prediction errors, since the MNS predicts biological movement in case of 
biological appearance and therefore has to negotiate an agent that does not move biologically.  
Therefore, when designing the humanoid robots it is important to remember that the high 
degree of realism is not always the best solution and the robot’s exterior should correspond to 
its purpose. 
Although the infant studies point to the importance of human-like appearance for goal 
attribution, the question of how the MNS processes motor actions of artificial agents has lead 
to contradictory answers. Some studies claim that the MNS does not respond or responds 
weakly if the perceived actor is an artificial agent [64,66,276], whereas other more recent 
ones provide evidence that observing robotic actions leads to similar or even stronger 
activations in the MNS than human actions [76,112,206,253]. In the following, we will 
present the controversial studies in more detail. 
Oberman and colleagues have shown that the mu-rhythm, which is considered to be the EEG-
marker of the mirror neuron activity, is reduced both when participants view human and 
robotic actions, suggesting a similar level of MNS-activation during observation of both 
agents [206]. Further, Gazzola and colleagues have shown that despite differences in shape 
and kinematics between the human and robot arms, the parieto-frontal mirror circuit was 
activated during observation or human and robotic actions [112]. Also, Peeters et and 
colleagues has demonstrated that observation of both human and robotic hand actions leads to 
bilateral activation of a mirror network formed by the intraparietal and ventral premotor 
cortex [217]. Finally, a number of behavioral studies supported the idea of attenuated motor 
priming for movements performed by an artificial agent [182,227,228].  
In contrast to these findings, Chaminade et al. (2010) using fMRI have shown that in brain 
areas important for processing emotional stimuli, activity was reduced in response to robot 
expressions compared with human expressions [66]. Further, Tai et al. (2004) scanned 
volunteers using Positron Emission Tomography and showed that the MNS was activated 
only by observation of human, but not robotic hand closing and opening actions [276]. 
Finally, on the behavioural level, it has been demonstrated, that the Simon effect7  is 
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 Repetition of a stimulus often results in a reduction in blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal in brain 
areas that encode that stimulus, as measured by fMRI 
7
 Simon effect is the phenomenon that reaction times are usually faster and more accurate when the stimulus 
occurs in the same task-irrelevant relative location as the response.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
23 
 
biologically tuned and occurs only when participants interact with conspecifics, but not with a 
non-biological agent (e. g. wooden hand) [286].  
Due to these contradictory findings, it is still not clear how the MNS processes observation of 
actions performed by artificial agents. Further, it is unclear how the MNS activity is 
modulated by goals of actions which are performed by artificial agents. 
1.6.2 Action and actor familiarity  
Familiar actions have been shown to evoke higher MNS activity than  unfamiliar  actions and 
observer’s prior motor experience in observed actions seems to correlate with the signal 
increase in the MNS areas  [2,47,74,75]. Given that we have more motor expertise with 
human actions than with robotic actions, one might predict stronger MNS-activation when 
observing human actions. Consistent with this assumption, a number of studies  investigating 
the plasticity of the MNS showed a stronger MNS-response when the observed actions were 
performed by human compared to (i) robotic agents [66,195,261,276], (ii) other non human 
agents [71,91], (iii) animals [31] and (iv) same-race than different-race individuals [184]. 
Also behavioral work investigating how observed actions influence simultaneously performed 
actions has reported greater interference effects when participants  watched a human actor 
moving with human kinematics compared to constant velocity [165], and when watching a 
robotic agent moving in a human-like manner compared to an artificial manner [212]. Further, 
[32] proposed that only actions belonging to the motor repertoire of the observer (e.g., biting 
and speech reading) are mapped into the motor system of the observer whereas actions that do 
not belong to the natural repertoire of a human being (e.g., barking) are recognized based on 
their visual properties.  
There is experimental evidence that in healthy individuals, also familiarity with the observed 
actor modulates the activity in regions of cortex thought to contain mirror neurons [47,48]. 
Regions of inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) also show 
preferential activity to faces of self as compared to familiar other faces [289]. Therefore, the 
MNS and thus the capability to attribute intentions may be sensitive to the familiarity of both 
the kinematics of movement as well as the actor’s appearance. Knowledge about this issue is 
important for the design of humanoid robots for interaction with humans. 
1.6.3 Biological motion 
Biological motion is a motion of a biological agent engaged in a recognizable activity, such as 
walking or performing sports. Besides being non-rigid, biological motion is characterized by a 
number of constraints caused by the articulated structure of the animal body [265]. The 
information about the type of motion can be recovered even from sparse input, like point-light 
displays (moving images created by placing lights on the major joints of a walking person and 
filming them in the dark) [155]. The ability to perceive biological motion arises early in life. 
Already at four months of age infants look at human point-light motion sequences for longer 
durations than at the same number of point-light dots undergoing random motions [14].  
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On the neuronal level, it seems that biological motion triggers a stronger activation of the 
human MNS than non-biological motion [125,254,291]. The importance of biological 
movement for triggering motor resonance has been supported by investigations performed by 
[165,212]. The authors tested how observed actions influence simultaneously performed 
actions. They reported greater interference effects when participants watched a human actor 
moving with human kinematics compared to constant velocity profile [165] and when 
watching a robotic agent (see Figure 6c) moving in a human like manner compared to a non-
biological manner  [212]. Additionally, TMS studies show that the detailed temporal 
characteristics of an observed human movement are reflected in the motor system of the 
observer [21], indicating that the MNS is very sensitive to how a movement is performed. 
However, accurate biological movement velocity in a robot is only possible by implementing 
human prerecordings into robot’s motion. In my study, we would like to test when also an 
approximation of biological movement (minimum jerk, see section 3.1) might be sufficient 
for perception of a robot as an interaction partner. 
1.6.4 Movement variability and self-propulsion 
A number of studies suggest that another factor, which might be of crucial imprtance in 
perceiving someone's action as being goal-directed, is the variability of movement (typical for 
biological but not artificial agents). Thus, significant activations of the MNS during 
observation of videos of a robotic hand were shown in [112], but only if the hand performed 5 
different actions within a block and not when the exact same action was repeated for 5 times 
in a row. Similarly, in an earlier study, infants might have been unable to attribute goals to a 
moving box because it repeated exactly the same movements in consecutive trials [226].  
Thus, in a different study using the same setup but a variable box trajectory in every trial, 6.5-
month-old infants were capable of attributing goals to the box [79]. Therefore, movement 
variability might be important feature for designing robots for the human-robot interaction. 
This is also an issue which I would like to test in my study. 
Another agent characteristic which seems to play a role in intention attribution is the 
capability of self-propulsion. In a recent study, five-month-olds attributed goals to a self-
moving three-dimensional block after seeing it repeatedly move back and forth across the 
stage [185]. However, they did not attribute goals if the block had a handle extending past the 
stage, so that it was not clear whether it moved itself or has been pulled by the experimenter. 
Thus, one cue for characterizing an entity as an intentional agent might be the capability of 
abruptly changing the speed and the direction of movement, undergoing non-rigid 
transformation, or generally being capable of independent and irregular movements [226]. 
1.6.5 Top-down effects 
It seems that during observation of a non-biological agent, already an imagined suggestion 
about its nature might have an effect on the behaviour of the observer. Liepelt & Brass (2010) 
tested the effect of a belief manipulation about the animacy of an observed action in a motor 
priming task by using an animation of a moving leather hand [182]. Before the experiment, 
the participants were presented with either a human model or a wooden hand wearing a 
leather glove. Although a basic motor priming effect was present regardless of whether 
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participants believed that the movement was executed by a biological or a nonbiological 
agent, the priming effects were larger when participants believed to interact with a human 
hand rather than with a wooden hand. In [287], the participants performed the complementary 
social Simon task under the implemented belief of interaction with either an unseen human or 
a computer program. Despite the fact that all response sequences from either “partner’’ were 
generated by computer, results indicated that the strength of Simon effect was higher in the 
“human” condition, indicating that believe about agent nature might influence how we 
perceive our interaction partners. 
Further, similar effects were also found in a different study [270]. The authors compared the 
interference effect during observation of a moving person with observation of either 
biological or non-biological moving dot stimuli. Interestingly, MI was only observed for both 
biological and nonbiological velocity profiles when the participants were informed that they 
were observing pre-recorded human movement and not when the dot motion was described as 
computer generated. Thus, it seems that the relevant processing of the dot motion might 
involve the participant imagining the (unobserved) arm movement that caused the observed 
dot motion, leading to activation of premotor neurons and hence the interference effect.  
These findings suggest that the belief regarding the biological origin of an agent might play a 
critical role in the triggering of the interference effect. In support of this, it has been shown 
that in human–humanoid interaction, the perception of an agent as a “social entity”, for 
example, due to the observer’s beliefs, is critical for eliciting MI rather than any individual 
appearance or motion kinematics [257]. Therefore, it seems that not only the appearance of 
the agents matters but also the belief about their nature. Even if they are not visible, the fact 
that they are non-biological may impair the simulation procedure. Notably, previous studies 
which reported similar MNS activations for observation of human and robotic actions used 
stimuli depicting only the hand of the artificial agent [112,206]. It is therefore not implausible 
that subjects entertained the possibility that the hand might have been controlled by a human 
being. In my study, we do not use body parts or abstract stimuli for the presentation of robot 
movements. Instead, we show whole-body movements minimizing the possibility that the 
subjects imagine that the movements of the robot are controlled by a human.  
It seems that personal attitudes to the observed actions matter [261]. The authors used fMRI 
to investigate the effect of personal attitudes on perceptions on dance which was performed 
by a human agent and a humanoid robot in either an artificial (rigid, robotic) or a natural 
manner. The perception of motion smoothness was characterized by a large intersubject 
variability which resulted from differences in personal backgrounds and attitudes toward 
expressive body actions. The results of this study indicate that action processing is influenced 
by personal attitudes to the art of dancing during observations of expressive body actions. 
1.7 Possible implications of present findings 
In the future, humanoid robots might be used for the variety of tasks, for example, personal 
assistance duties [305], teleoperation or even cooperative work in the open air [18]. Robots 
might have a potential use in education and therapy of children with autism spectrum 
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disorder8, elderly care (e.g. nursing homes) and neurorehabilitation9. Due to an increase of life 
expectancy and a reduction of child birth rate in many industrialized countries, the amount of 
people who require assistance in everyday activities will grow in the future. A decent 
proportion of these people will spend much time in nursing homes. At the moment, it is 
unclear who will take care of all of these old people. Therefore, one prospect is to use robots 
with appearance based on the human body to perform human tasks such as providing personal 
assistance or cognitive therapy.  
1.7.1 Role of anthropomorphism in acceptance of robots  
Human-like robots  like ASIMO [190], HPR-2 [300], Armar III [4], or Toyota partner robots 
[176] may prove to be the ideal agents to interact with people because they have human-like 
bodies. Many researchers argue that using robots with a humanoid form will make the 
interactions with them more intuitive and pleasant because people will be able to use their 
experience from social interaction with other humans when interacting with robots  [26,27]. 
Thus, the effort on the part of the user dealing with the requirement to learn a new technical 
vocabulary will be minimized. Further, human-like bodies will allow the humanoids to 
integrate into environments already designed for human morphology. Thus, it is traditionally 
assumed that the obvious strategy for integrating robots successfully into human 
environments and increasing their acceptance for the majority of non-technical users is 
building them with a certain degree of anthropomorphism [88]. The tendency to 
anthropomorphize increases with the number of human attributes displayed by an artificial 
agent [86], A human-looking shape and fluent, predictable movements are supposed to enable 
even untrained people to apply social models acquired with human partners to naturally and 
intuitively explain, understand, and predict what a robot is about to do.  
 
Some researchers have tested how people perceive robots of varying degrees of human-
likeness. Goetz and colleagues showed that people prefer more humanlike robots for jobs 
requiring more sociability [118] and also Krach and colleagues showed a linear relationship 
between the degree of anthropomorphism of a machine (computer, functional robot, 
humanoid robot, human) and cortical activation in brain areas related to ascribing mental 
states to agents [170]. Further, Hinds and colleagues demonstrated that, in a joint task, 
mechanical-looking robots are treated less politely than robots with a more human-like 
appearance [141]. Further, this study showed that humans treated mechanical-looking robots 
in less socially interactive way compared to more human-looking robots. Thus, our 
expectations are higher with regard to abilities and reliability for humanoid robots in contrast 
to mechanical-looking robots. This reduces the uncertainty and facilitates collaboration. 
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 Autism is a complex developmental disability that causes problems with social interaction and communication. 
9
 Neurorehabilitation facilitates the recovery of functional skills lost after neurological diseases or accidents. 
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1.7.2 Applications of humanoid robots in the medical sector 
Robots for assisting everyday duties offer a significant advantage in addressing the need of 
the elderly to ameliorate the motor deficits caused by major age-associated neurological 
syndromes such as stroke. In the medical sector, humanoid robots can provide assistance to 
the patients with mental or motor skill impairments by giving them physical therapy, 
instructing them on task goals, coaching them, monitoring their performance. In the home 
setting, robots might support independent living (e.g. eating, bathing, toileting, getting 
dressed, providing household maintenance). Examples  of  assistive  robots  are  ‘nursebot’  
Pearl [220] ,  or  the German Care-o-bot [121] . A healthcare robot can perform tasks which 
might not be possible or practical for humans: e.g., lifting a bariatric patient or monitoring 
medication levels in a patient’s system. Recent studies demonstrated the success of using 
assistive robots in elderly care [277], social learning in children with autism spectrum 
disorder [95] and stroke rehabilitation [191]. 
 
Apart from assistive living, an important sector in which humanoid artificial agents will be 
used in the future is neurorehabilitation. While human caregiving cannot and will not be 
replaced, assistive artificial agents can extend substantially the capacities of therapists who 
work with patients suffering from motor impairments after stroke. Many patients who 
suffered stroke go on to live with motor disabilities like some level of paralysis, with one side 
being more affected than the other. Those affected may have difficulties performing everyday 
activities such as eating, dressing, using the bathroom and grasping objects. The patients often 
compensate for upper extremity deficits by using the less–affected (non–paretic) arm, and 
voluntarily suppressing the use of the more–affected (paretic) arm. Therapeutic interventions 
for stroke typically consist of intense one–on–one practice with a trained clinician. They aim 
at encouraging the use (and recovery) of the paretic arm and restoring the capacity to manage 
the activities of daily living. Over the last decades, promising strategies have been introduced 
based on action observation therapy [101]. Action observation produces an increase in the 
excitability  of  the  corticospinal  path  and therefore facilitates subsequent movement 
execution (for review see [33] by directly matching the observed action onto the internal 
simulation of that action. It has been shown that action observation has a positive impact on 
recovery of motor functions after stroke [92] and there is evidence that action observation 
may also induce cortical plasticity [271]. The authors  showed  that  when  participants  
simultaneously  performed  and  observed congruent  movements,  the  learning  of  these 
movements  was  potentiated  with  respect  to learning  through  motor  training  alone. This 
indicated that the coupling of observation and execution strongly facilitates the formation of 
motor memories. Since the action-observation training should optimally be repeated during 
the therapy course many times, humanoid robots might serve as models for training and 
relearning tasks by imitation in patients who suffer from hemiparesis after stroke. With the 
help of robots, individuals will use the affected limb in the types of meaningful, 
unconstrained, functional tasks that are encountered in daily life, and can also practice in the 
home setting. 
 
Another field where humanoid robots are currently applied in the clinical setting is the 
therapy of Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Recent studies suggest that interaction with 
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robots can trigger imitative behaviour in children with ASD because in these children the 
neural mechanism underlying the coding of observed actions might be tailored to process 
socially simpler stimuli and be not able to process the highly complex and potentially 
unpredictable behaviour exhibited by humans [244]. Also, the robot is not limited by the 
emotional responses (like getting stressed and inpatient) which human therapists may have 
during treatment. Thus, the use of humanoid robots allows for a simplified, safe, predictable 
and reliable environment where the complexity of interaction can be controlled and gradually 
increased. The robots may serve as therapeutic and educational aides to teach children with 
ASD basic social skills. These skills will help them to communicate and interact with others.  
 
Among the robots designed for communication there are not only assistive robots used for 
service such as the support of  independent  but also pet-like  companionship  robots the 
function of which is to  enhance  health  and  psychological  well-being  of  elderly  users  by  
providing  companionship. Examples  are the  Japanese  seal-shaped  robot  Paro [297],  the 
Huggable [273] both specifically developed for experiments in eldercare. Another example of 
interactive robot, a creature-like robot, Keepon, has a potential to be used in the remedial 
practice for children with autism [169]. Social  functions implemented  in  companion  robots  
are  primarily  aimed  at  increasing  health  and  psychological well-being such as increasing 
positive mood  in  elderly  living  in nursery homes. Some robot platforms, like for example 
“CB” [68] can also be used to study the underlying processing of the human brain and the 
results of this research can later be used in the treatment of social impairments. 
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2 Aims and Hypotheses 
 
In this thesis, I investigate behavioral and neural correlates of goal understanding in humans 
and non-human primates. To test how different characteristics of agent’s appearance 
contribute to the ability of attributing goals on the behavioural and the neuronal level I use 
artificial agents. The advantage of using artificial agents in contrast to humans is that their 
appearance and action kinematics can be manipulated in a more simple way than the complex 
aspects of human morphology and behavior. The suggestion that using humanoid robots in the 
neuroscience research will lead to a better understanding of mechanisms involved in social 
interactions has already been proposed by a number of previous studies  [61,64,68].   
 
My first aim was to find out whether, during observation of movements directed to different 
goals, the goals of the action will be covertly simulated by the observers’ MNS independently 
of the agent nature (human vs. artificial). The second aim of the thesis was to investigate what 
morphological and kinematic features an agent has to exhibit so that observation of his action 
will lead to motor resonance on the part of the observer. This motor resonance will in turn 
produce motor interference in the movements of the observer if the observed action is 
incongruent to the performed action.  Finally, I wanted to investigate whether the goal 
attribution capacity is an evolutionary heritage and whether goal understanding is a 
precondition for simple forms of social learning.  
 
Clarifying these questions will lead to better understanding of processes that are required for 
successful and intuitive intention understanding. In the future, my results might contribute to 
a better understanding, diagnosis and therapy of medical conditions involving the 
impairments of social cognition such as autism spectrum disorder, schizophrenia, 
psychopathy or social phobia. Further, the findings will be of importance for the design of 
humanoid robots for social interaction with humans in the area of medical therapy. In the 
future, human-like artificial agents could help patients with hemiparesis to train their paretic 
arm and relearn daily activities. They can also be used as assistants for the elderly in nursing 
homes and in therapy for children with autism spectrum disorders.  
 
In the following, I will explain what aspects of intention understanding and motor resonance 
have been accessed in individual studies performed in this thesis. 
2.1 Agent’s features which facilitate motor interference in dyadic interaction10  
As stated in the introduction, to date it is not clear whether motor resonance and thus motor 
interference need a tight match between one’s own and the observed agent’s physical features 
                                                           
10
 Parts of the text used in this chapter have been published as “Kupferberg A, Huber M, Helfer B, Lenz C, Knoll 
A, Glasauer S. (2012) Moving Just Like You: Motor Interference Depends on Similar Motility of Agent and 
Observer. PLoS ONE 7(6): e39637. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039637” 
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to emerge during action observation. These features could be, for example, presence of certain 
morphological features (a body, head, face, and extremities), ability to move determined by 
joint configuration (motility) or movement kinematics (trajectory, velocity and variability).  
In the original study, which tested the influence of movement observation on the movement 
of the observer [166], motor interference (MI) appeared in case of human movement but not 
in case of artificial movement produced by an industrial robot (see Figure 6b). Interestingly, 
two later studies  have demonstrated MI when subjects watched a humanoid robot performing 
movements based on implemented prerecordings of motion in a human experimenter (see 
Figure 6c) [62,212]. Interestingly, this MI disappeared when the same robot moved with a 
constant-velocity profile. However, it is still unclear which aspect of human motion, absent in 
robotic movements, was responsible for evoking MI while observing movements based on 
human prerecordings. Thus, the interference effect in [62,212] might have been triggered by 
either non-constant velocity (acceleration and deceleration), or variability of movement 
amplitude and trajectory (e.g. due to fatigue or constraints caused by anatomy of the human 
arm) during repeatedly presented movements. Further, previous studies which indicated the 
importance of biological velocity [62,212] were not able to disentangle whether biological 
motion is the only requirement for MI or whether other morphological similarities between 
agent and observer have to be present. Finally, previous studies have compared only 
biological vs. constant velocity profiles but have not investigated whether an artificial 
approximation of the biological velocity might be sufficient. 
Thus, in the absence of top-down cues, the question remains which basic features of the 
observed agent and the observer have to match for MI to occur. In this study we investigated 
what aspects in the appearance (for example, head and body), motility (ability to move 
resulting from the joint configuration) and movement kinematics (variability, velocity) of the 
observed agent are responsible for triggering MI during observation of incongruent 
movements (see Table 2). With motility, we mean the ability to move. Thus, with “similar 
motility” we refer to the capacity of an agent to move in a similar way as another agent. As an 
example, although a dolphin and a shark have a similar body shape, they swim using  
different styles: due to the different configuration of their body, sharks swim in a side to side 
motion and dolphins swim in an up and down motion. In my study, when using the robots, we 
manipulated the configuration of the robot arm “JAHIR” relative to the observer. 
If artificial motility and appearance were sufficient, we expected to see an effect of MI on 
movement production while viewing videos of incongruent movements performed by an 
industrial robot arm JAHIR. Alternatively, absence of MI during observation of artificial 
motion of an industrial robot arm might be caused by either its artificial motility, which 
results from the joint configuration that does not match the one of the human arm, or its 
artificial appearance. To test for the role of biological motility, we presented subjects with the 
rotated video of the industrial robot arm (JAHIR 90°), which in respect to joint configuration 
now resembled more a human arm (see Figure 8). In the comparison between the two videos 
of the industrial robot arm, the kinematics of the end effector (the gripper) of the robot arm 
did not change relative to the observer, but the kinematics of the joints relative to the observer 
did, since the video was turned by 90°. To test for the importance of human-like body shape, 
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we presented the subjects with a humanoid robot which had the same industrial arm mounted 
in a human-like configuration, but additionally had a torso and a head. In case that the 
biological motility but not the appearance is required for MI, we expected to see MI both for 
JAHIR 90° and JAST. In case that only  human-like appearance is required for eliciting MI, 
we expected to see MI only in case of humanoid robot and human, but not when observing an 
industrial robot. 
In case that movement variability is not important for triggering MI, we expect the 
interference effect to be present during observation of incongruent movements of at least the 
humanoid robot which had human-like appearance and motility. Otherwise, if movement 
variability is important, the MI would be present only for the observation of the human agent. 
 Movement kinematics 
(biological velocity and 
movement variability) 
Human-like 
appearance 
Human-like 
motility 
Human (MH) + + + 
Humanoid robot (JAST) - + + 
Industrial robot arm, human-like 
configuration (JAHIR 90°) 
- - + 
Industrial robot arm, artificial 
configuration (JAHIR) 
- - - 
Table 2: Summary of agent characteristics in the MI study. 
2.2 Neural correlates of goal attribution during action observation– an fMRI 
study 
If the MNS is involved in intention understanding through simulation, its activation makes the 
goal attribution possible. But how does it react if the observed agent is not animate and does 
not move with a biological movement velocity? The studies which have shown similar MNS-
activity in response to observation of robots and humans [76,112,206,253] have only 
compared a repertoire of simple motor actions (as a whole) performed by humans with those 
performed by robotic actors. No study investigated whether there is differential MNS-activity 
between the actions of an artificial agent targeted at different goals. In the past, only one study 
investigated the coding of different intentions in artificial agents, failing to show MNS 
activations perhaps because using animated computer-generated agents instead of video 
recordings [56].  However, similar activations when observing motor acts performed by 
humans and artificial agents (as shown by [76,112,206,253]) do not necessarily imply that the 
same networks are involved in understanding the goals of actions of the artificial agent. 
Indeed, during action understanding we not only recognize motor acts such as grasping or 
pointing to an object based on the movement pattern (motor intention such as grasping or 
pointing), but also the “higher” goal in which these acts are embedded (cognitive intention). 
Thus, every single intentional motor act is often involved in a further action chain leading to a 
predefined outcome. For example, grasping (motor intention) directed at a certain goal (e.g. 
piece of bread) is an intentional action, which, in a hierarchical system of action 
understanding stands above the elemental action of grasping (which can be recognized by 
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movement pattern), but below complex action chains such as making a sandwich (cognitive 
intention, see Figure 7). Thus, the question, whether MNS differentiates actions directed to 
different goals performed by a robot is not trivial. Understanding action goals and attributing 
intentions requires understanding the actor’s motivation in reaching for a certain object. It is a 
step toward recognizing the actor as an intentional agent despite the knowledge that it cannot 
have mental states. For the human observer it might be therefore difficult to attribute the 
intention of, e.g., repairing something when he/she sees a robot grasp a tool, and even more 
difficult to think about eating, when food is grasped by the robot. Consequently, even if the 
grasping action of a robot activates the observer's MNS, object-specific coding of the 
intention associated with the observed action is expected only if the observer interprets the 
grasping action with respect to a potential future goal. Alternatively, it is possible that actions 
of the robot might be recognized solely on their visual properties, without being simulated. 
Thus, in a previous study it has been shown that actions which do not belong to the motor 
repertoire of the observer, like monkey’s lip-smacking or dog’s barking, cannot be mapped in 
the on the observer’s motor system and instead are recognized based on their visual properties 
[32]. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Hierarchical organization of movements, actions, goals and intentions. A final goal may 
involve several immediate goals, each of which requires a sequence of basic actions, and each action is 
composed of several movements.  
 
In the present study, we used fMRI to investigate the flexibility of the MNS during 
observation of hand actions of an inanimate agent focusing on MNS-involvement in 
recognizing different action types (e.g. grasping vs. pointing) and processing their goals. To 
this end, we compared brain activation while watching videos of grasping and pointing 
Movements
Actions 
(motor intention)
Intermediate goal
Final goal 
(cognitive intention)
Make a sandwich
Take a piece of 
bread
reach
extend
the arm 
grasp
preshape 
the hand
close the fingers 
for the grip
lift
maintan
fingergrip
force
Take a piece of 
ham
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actions aimed at different object categories (tools and food items). The different object 
categories suggest different motor intentions in the action chain (e.g. eating something vs. 
repairing something). If the MNS is sensitive to different action types performed by the robot, 
we expected to see a stronger activation in the IPL for grasping vs. pointing actions based on 
previous human studies contrasting observation [122,219] and execution [102] of grasping 
and pointing actions. In case that, similar to a human agent, the MNS is involved in 
processing goals of inanimate agents, the robot’s actions will be considered goal-directed, we 
expected to see a differential activation in the IFG and IPL and premotor cortex (PMC) when 
comparing actions directed to different goals. The activation of these regions has previously 
been observed in studies investigating intention attribution by contrasting MNS activity 
triggered by observation of similar or same action types aiming at different goals 
[130,131,148,177] and comparing goal-directed actions to non goal-directed actions [168]. To 
make sure that the possible difference in MNS activation for different object categories is not 
a result of superficial object features resulting from hand-object interaction (position of 
fingers, grip type), we used multiple objects with different shape and size in every category. 
Using pointing as a contrast to grasping is motivated by the fact that apart from the difference 
in kinematics, the first one, being a communicative gesture [281], can either indicate the 
actor’s desire to later interact with the object (e.g. grasp it), or be used for directing someone's 
attention to the object to fix a common frame of reference. Communicative actions have been 
shown to trigger no priming effects when performed by an artificial agent [183] and, in 
contrast to a human partner, a sudden social request from a robotic agent had no influence on 
the kinematics of a pre-planned action [251]. Therefore, observation of pointing performed by 
the robot might lead to a different activation pattern in the MNS than if the actions are 
performed by a human. 
2.3 Is goal understanding innate? – a preferential looking times study 
It is most likely that the neural circuitry thought to support social cognition consists of 
mechanisms that are relatively old in evolutionary terms. In the past decade, fMRI and EEG 
and behavioral studies have been conducted to investigate how we think about others’ minds, 
how we understand actions, how we feel about morality and how we perceive emotion. 
However, much of this work has focused mostly on humans. Few studies have examined 
brain mechanisms of social cognition in non-human primates.  As stated in section 1.3.1, there 
are two different accounts considering the origin of the intention attribution capacity. The first 
group of researchers claims that it is innate and triggered by certain biological features 
[99,51,157,180,224,226]. The second group of researchers argues that goal attribution is first 
learned by collecting experience with human agents and later gradually extended to agents 
which are less human-like [194,197,282,304], such as dolls.  However, it is difficult to test 
whether intention attribution to dolls is innate because infants are familiar with using them as 
intentional agents in play situations with other infants or their parents and thus may be eager 
to attribute goals to them. Thus, the findings available so far are not able to distinguish 
whether the very young infants’ understanding of goal-attribution is based on associative 
learning or triggered by innate cues because in both cases later fine tuning could be possible 
[52]. Similarly, using human agents as models for testing goal-understanding in monkeys [40] 
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using the Woodward paradigm [304] (see section 3.3.1) might have a limitation that captive 
marmosets are exposed to humans on a daily basis. Thus, it is not possible to distinguish 
whether this flexibility is simply based on associative learning processes or whether there is a 
more general goal-attribution mechanism, which responds to a broader array of potential 
intentional agents. Using previously never encountered agents, like monkey-like robots, 
where no associations could be formed before the experiment, may help to clarify whether 
intention understanding is innate. Common marmoset is a small New World monkey and a 
well-suited species for answering these questions, since this primate is renowned for its well 
developed social skills (reviewed in [38]).  
 
 Experience Monkey-likeness (legs, head, 
quadruped, tail) 
Biological motion 
Conspecific + + + 
Robot - + - 
Box - - - 
Table 3: Summary of agent characteristics in the preferential looking-times study 
By manipulating the appearance and the motion of the used model agents we might help to 
answer the question regarding which cues (e.g. presence of a body with a head, biological 
motion, monkey shape and size) an unfamiliar entity must exhibit in order to be perceived by 
these monkeys as an intentional agent (see Table 3). To pinpoint the role of familiarity, 
biological motion kinematics and monkey-like features for intention understanding, we 
performed three different experiments. In the first experiment, we presented the marmoset 
monkeys with videos depicting goal-directed actions of a conspecific agent. In the second 
experiment, we presented the monkeys with actions of a monkey-sized quadruped robot with 
head and tail and in the third experiment, the same robot disguised as a box. In contrast to the 
experiment with a human agent as the model [40], the robot’s size and shape were similar to 
those of a conspecific. However, the robot could not move with a biological velocity, giving 
us an opportunity to test for the influence of movement velocity on goal attribution. Finally, 
covering the robot with a black box allowed us to test for the role of body shape for goal 
attribution. Importantly, in contrast to a human agent and a conspecific, the marmoset 
monkeys have never observed the robot or the box being engaged in goal directed actions so 
that goal attribution to these agents might indicate an innate capacity to do so.  
 
Since a number of studies demonstrated a link between intentional understanding and social 
learning in humans infants, (e.g. [267]), the second aim of the study was to investigated 
whether the link between the goal-attribution capacity and social learning is a human 
development or whether it is already present in non-human primates. The type of learning we 
investigate in the present experiment is called stimulus enhancement. It is a form of social 
non-imitational learning which occurs when the observation of a conspecific performing an 
action on an object facilitates the probability of interaction with that object, even in the 
absence of the demonstrator and at a later time point [139,140]. Stimulus enhancement is a 
common proximate mechanism fostering safe incorporation of novel foods into the diet of 
naive individuals from more knowledgeable individuals.  
AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
35 
 
We expected that stimulus enhancement, like imitation [178,280,282], might be linked to goal 
attribution. To test this hypothesis, after the last test trial of each experiment, each monkey 
was allowed to enter the testing compartment and make the choice between the two objects 
seen in the videos. In contrast to [34,296], we do not use food reward but the natural curiosity 
of monkeys towards new objects. If the monkey's first choice and the time which it spent 
exploring the object were influenced by the agent’s choice only if they perceived it as an 
intentional agent who behaves in a goal-directed way, this would suggest that (i) the function 
of the perception of goal-directedness goes beyond action understanding and drives the own 
behavioural choice of the observer and (ii) the social learning mechanism at work goes 
beyond a reinforcement of interest towards the object approached by a second entity. 
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3 Experimental procedures and data analysis 
3.1 Agent’s features which facilitate motor interference in dyadic interaction 11 
We12 used the MI paradigm described in [212], but replaced live presentations with video 
clips depicting horizontal and vertical movements of either the humanoid robot JAST or a 
human agent. The use of video presentations allowed us to control for the between-subject 
variability in the movements of the human agent, which might lead to variability in the 
subjects' movements. Further, by implementing the so called "minimum-jerk" velocity profile 
[97] into the movements of the robots, we achieved a quasi-biological acceleration and 
deceleration without movement variability. Similar to a biological non-constant velocity 
movement, the implemented minimum-jerk movement starts slowly, accelerates smoothly to a 
peak velocity near the midpoint and then decelerates slowly [179]. This results in a smooth, 
bell-shaped velocity profile, in which mathematically the derivative of acceleration (jerk) is 
minimized over the movement. Thus, by preventing abrupt changes in movement velocity, in 
contrast to the constant velocity profile, minimum-jerk movements look smoother and more 
natural [144]. 
3.1.1 Subjects 
Eleven female and fourteen male graduate students from the local Department of Neurology 
participated in the first experiment. Twelve female and ten male right-handed graduate 
students from the local Department of Neurology (age range: 20-25 years) participated in the 
second experiment. The experiments were approved by the ethics committee of the medical 
faculty of the LMU and conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. All 
participants gave their written informed consent. 
3.1.2 Stimuli 
In the first experiment, the videos of both the robot "JAST" (see Figure 8b) and the human 
(see Figure 8a) agent were rear-projected in a pseudo-randomized order on a white 
semitransparent screen (120cm×160cm)  located ca. 1.5m  in front of the participant. The use 
of video presentations allowed us to control for the between-trial variability in the movements 
of the human agent, which otherwise might have been an additional factor causing increased 
variability in the subjects' movements. JAST had an “animal” head, and a torso with two 
industrial arms covered with a plastic “shirt”. The robot was capable of producing movements 
                                                           
11
 Parts of the text used in this chapter were published as “Kupferberg A, Huber M, Helfer B, Lenz C, Knoll A, 
Glasauer S. (2012) Moving Just Like You: Motor Interference Depends on Similar Motility of Agent and 
Observer. PLoS ONE 7(6): e39637. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039637” 
12
 I will use “we” throughout the methods and results sections, not as pluralismaiestatis, but as pluralismodestiae. 
This work has been conceived with the help of many people, so I will use “we” to speak for all of them. 
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with human-like minimum-jerk velocity profiles directed by the shoulder joint (Huber et al., 
2008). The human agent shown in the videos was always the same male person. 
 
Figure 8: Screenshots from the videos used in the MI-study. The participants were instructed to 
perform horizontal or vertical movements while viewing the videos and fixating on the right hand of a) 
a human agent (MH), b) the humanoid robot JAST, c) the industrial robot arm JAHIR and d) JAHIR 
rotated. The agents performed congruent or incongruent movements. Figure was adopted from [175] 
with permission from the publisher. 
In the second experiment, the videos of the human agent and the industrial robot arm JAHIR 
(Mitsubishi, RV-6SL; Figure 9; see [179]) were rear-projected on the screen in a pseudo-
randomized order (see Figure 8c). In contrast to the humanoid robot JAST, which had an 
“animal” head and the robot arm, JAHIR consisted of one of the arms of JAST and has been 
left uncovered. Thus, both robots had arms with six degrees of freedom and were capable of 
producing movements with a minimum-jerk (quasi-biological) velocity profile [97]. The 
forearm ended in a metallic gripper connected by a wrist joint (see Figure 8c, d). 
 
Figure 9: Drawing of the robot arm JAHIR. JAHIR consisted of a base, upper arm and forearm 
connected though joints. Figure was adopted with permission from [175]. 
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JAHIR consisted of a base, an upper arm and a forearm which are connected through a 
shoulder joint and an elbow joint (shown by circle arrows in the Figure 9) and was mounted 
on a working bench (see Figure 8c). To make the joint configuration resemble the joint 
configuration of the human arm for additional testing, for the second test condition, the video 
of JAHIR was rotated 90° to the left (see Figure 8d). Thus, the configuration corresponded to 
that of JAST. 
During the vertical condition, JAHIR performed an up-and-down movement with an 
amplitude of 50 cm using its shoulder joint (J2 axis) and the elbow joint (J3 axis) (see Figure 
9). During the horizontal condition the movement was performed by the shoulder (J1 axis and 
J2 axis), the elbow (J3 axis), and the wrist joint (J5 axis).  
3.1.3 Procedure 
The human experimenter depicted in the video clip performed horizontal and vertical 
movements with the amplitude of 50 cm. To make the robot gripper and the human hand look 
more similar, his hand had been painted in a silver color (see Figure 8a).  
In an additional baseline control condition, the subjects were instructed to produce horizontal 
and vertical movements without looking at their arm.  
In the first experiment, the observed agent (H, human or R, robotic) performed either spatially 
congruent (C, same direction) or incongruent (I, perpendicular) movements (frequency: 0.5 
Hz) with the right arm (see Figure 10a, b). Like in the second experiment, this resulted in a 
2×2×2 experiment design with eight experimental conditions and three factors: (1) movement 
plane (Horizontal/Vertical), (2) congruency (Congruent/Incongruent), and (3) observed agent 
(Human/Robot) plus 2 baselines.  
In an additional experiment 10 participants who participated in the second experiment were 
retested while viewing horizontal and vertical, congruent and incongruent videos of the robot 
JAHIR. For this experiment, the videos of JAHIR were rotated 90 degrees to the right and 
scaled in a way that the movements of the robot arm had the same horizontal and vertical 
amplitude in both directions as in the original video. For an overview of all conditions see 
Figure 10. 
In both experiment, one trial (duration: ca. 30s) was performed for each of the eight 
conditions. At the start of each new condition, the participants were informed (by an 
instruction appearing on the screen) of the plane in which to move their arm and instructed to 
keep in phase with the experimenter's and robot's movements. The kinematics of the endpoint 
of their right index finger was recorded at 240 Hz using the magnet-field based motion 
tracking system Polhemus Liberty (a small 1×1 cm sensor was fixed to the tip of the 
participant’s index finger).                 
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Figure 10: Overview of all experimental conditions in the MI-experiments. Left: experimental 
conditions (only vertical agent movement is shown). Right: examples of movement trajectories 
performed by the observing subjects. Figure was adopted with permission from [175]. 
3.1.4 Data analysis 
After data acquisition, fingertip positions of subjects were filtered with a 20Hz second order 
Butterworth filter and the data from each trial was split into single movement segments (from 
right to left and from top to the bottom and vice versa). This split was done by finding data 
points at which the x-values (in case of horizontal movement) and z-values (in case of vertical 
movement) reached their maxima and minima (for a sample of horizontal movement, see 
Figure 11). The standard deviation of fingertip position within the plane orthogonal to the 
plane of movement (see Figure 11c) was used to quantify the interference. The mean of the 
deviations of all single movements within one trial was calculated for each subject and then 
across all the participants.  
  
 
Figure 11: Sample of movement trajectory 
horizontal movement. The blue line represents the trajectory of movement
the points in the data where the movement trajectory in the instructed 
minima and maxima. 
 
As a standard measure of MI, most previous studies used variance or standard deviation (SD) 
of fingertip position of the observer from the 
[5,22,49,120,166,270] (for an exceptio
relies on a spatial frame of reference, i.e., the instructed horizontal or vertical direction of 
movement, but is composed of several components contributing to the overall variability and 
thus to the quantification of MI: 
movement direction within a single trial, and 
Evidently, reliance on a spatial reference frame to measure MI might induce higher SD if the 
movement of the observed agent deviates from the instructed direction and thus make 
comparisons between experiments more difficult. However, so far, no study has examined the 
contribution of each component to MI. Therefore, we also investigated the compone
contributing to the quantification of MI.
PROCEDURE AND 
variance in the z- and x-plane during the instructed
. The red arrows represent 
movement plane has reached its 
instructed axis of movement 
n see [63,212]). This standard measure of fingertip SD 
(i) tilt away from the instructed direction, 
(iii) curvature of the individual movements. 
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Figure 12: Illustration of the types of analysis which were performed in the MI-study. These analysis 
types were standard analysis (SA), tilt analysis (TA), deviation analysis (DA), curvature analysis 
(CA). In the SA, we calculated the deviations of the individual movement from the horizontal or 
vertical axis. In the TA, we calculated the tilt (or shift) of the overall line fit from the horizontal or 
vertical axis. In the DA, the deviations of line fits for individual movements from the overall line fit 
have been calculated. Finally, in CA, we calculated the deviations of every single movement from the 
straight line fitting this movement. Figure was adopted with permission from [175]. 
 
The standard deviation of fingertip position from the y-axis in case of instructed vertical 
movement and x-axis in case of instructed horizontal movement was calculated for each 
subject and movement (see Figure 12, SA). The average standard deviation for each condition 
and subject was used for statistical analysis. This analysis will further be referred to as 
standard analysis (SA).  
To investigate the different types of contributions to SA we applied 3 additional types of 
analyses to the data. To determine the amount of curvature of each individual movement in a 
30s trial, a least-squares individual line fit was determined for each movement and the 
standard deviation (see Figure 12, dotted lines in CA) of the actual movement from this line 
was calculated. The average of SD across all single movements was calculated for each trial 
to estimate the curvature. This kind of analysis will further be referred as curvature analysis 
(CA). A similar analysis has been used in two previous studies investigating MI [62,212]. 
In the second analysis method we determined the best line fit to all individual movements in a 
30s trial and then calculated the standard deviation of each individual line fit from this overall 
line fit (see Figure 12, DA). This overall line fit, which represents the average direction of 
movement, does not necessarily need to correspond to the instructed movement along the 
horizontal or vertical axis (as assumed in the standard analysis) but might be tilted or shifted 
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with respect to it. Thus, the deviations in this type of analysis (deviation analysis, DA) are 
composed of the shift (or tilt) of every single movement with respect to the overall plane of 
movement. 
In the final analysis, we determined the deviation of the average direction of movement 
(overall line fit) from the x-axis (see Figure 12, TA) in case of horizontal movement and the 
y-axis in case of vertical movement. This type of analysis will be referred to as tilt analysis 
(TA).  
To test if there is a correlation between these different contributing factors and the standard 
analysis (SA) we investigated the observation of a human agent, since the database for these 
cases was the largest. First, we excluded outliers from the SA data of each condition until 
none of the values fell out of the 95% interval. Due to this outlier rejection, 19 data points 
(4.6%) were excluded from the analysis. For the complete statistical analysis (all factors), this 
procedure resulted in excluding 5 subjects from the first and 7 subjects from the second 
experiment. For the standard analysis, pooling across movement direction (see Results for 
justification) after outlier removal allowed us to use data from all but two subjects (one from 
each experiment). For two other subjects from the present experiment, due to technical 
difficulties, data could be obtained only for observation of the robot but not observation of the 
human agent. 
The correlation analysis was performed across values obtained by different types of analysis 
(SA, CA, DA, TA) for the four conditions of human agent observation: horizontal congruent 
(HC), horizontal incongruent (HI), vertical congruent (VC) and vertical incongruent (VI).  We 
detected a correlation (from moderate to strong) between each of the contributing factors CA, 
DA, TA and SA in most of tested conditions: HC, HI, VC and VI. Therefore, to show that 
values from the DA, CA and TA are contributors of the SA, we performed a multiple linear 
regression with these factors as independent variables and SA values as dependent variables 
in the following conditions: HC, HI, VC and VI. 
3.2 Neural correlates of goal attribution during action observation– an fMRI 
study13 
3.2.1 The principles of functional magnetic resonance imaging 
Ogawa et al. [207] discovered that the oxygenation level of the haemoglobin acts as a contrast 
when put into an external magnetic field. Combined with the growing computational power, 
this finding formed the basis for a new technique: functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI). The contrast in fMRI images is generated by the Blood Oxygenating Level 
Dependent (BOLD) effect. The fundamental signal for BOLD fMRI comes from hydrogen 
atoms, which are abundant in the blood molecules of the brain. 
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 Parts of the text from this chapter have been used in the study submitted for publication to Neuroimage as 
“Kupferberg A, Iacoboni M, Flanagin V, Huber M, Kasparbauer A, Schmidt F, Borst C, Glasauer S Action- and 
goal-specific fronto-parietal activation during observation of actions performed by artificial agents and humans.” 
  
 
       
Figure 13: Neural activity and BOLD signal. 
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to a peak over 4-5s before falling back to baseline. This leads to local changes in the relative 
concentration of oxyhemoglobin and deoxyhemoglobin. The increase is described by a hypothetical 
haemodynamic response function (HRF) corresponding to the fMRI response in the lowe
Comparison of the measured functional magnetic resonance imaging 
predicted from the local field potential (recording of neuronal activity with a 
turquoise: measured neuronal activity. Red curve: 
fMRI response. Both figures were 
The indicator of increased brain activity is the blood flow and blood oxygen concentration in 
the active brain area. Signal processing is used to reveal 
MRI scans. For better understanding, the physiology of the local blood flow changes in active 
brain areas is described in detail in the following. Neuronal activity requires energy in 
form of adenosine triphosphat (AT
ATP through the oxidation of glucose. During neuronal activity, the active neurons must be 
continuously provided with new oxygen bound on haemoglobin through increase in blood 
flow. Haemoglobin exists in an oxygenated and deoxygenated state. When haemoglobin has 
no oxygen bound, each haem
because of iron’s four unpaired electrons. In the oxygenated state, oxygen binds to iron 
(constituent of the haem component of haemoglobin) and causes the net magnetic moment to 
disappear. Molecules of deoxyhaemoglobin are paramagnetic, e.g. they have magnetic field 
gradients that alter the spins of nearby diffusing hydrogen nuclei and introduce an 
inhomogeneity into the nearby magnetic field. In contrast to diamagnetic oxyhaemoglobin, 
which has no influence on the MR signal intensity, the presence of deoxyhaemoglobin 
reduces the MR signal intensity. During neural activity, the increase in blood flow leads to a
higher concentration of oxygenated haemoglobin in comparison to deoxyhemoglobin. This 
increases the local MR signal. 
function (HRF) which is assumed to be the response of the neurovascular system to 
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period of neural activity and thus increased metabolic requirements for the neurons (see 
Figure 13a, b) [137].  
It is assumed that fMRI signal is approximately proportional to a measure of local neural 
activity, averaged over a spatial extent of several millimeters and over a time period of several 
seconds. In fact, a good agreement between the amplitudes of fMRI-signal and microelectrode 
recordings of neural activity has been demonstrated (see Figure 13c) (see [137] for review). 
Thus, in the active brain area the intensity of a voxel in the fMRI image is increased due to 
the increase of oxyhaemoglobin and this effect is used as the bases of the BOLD signal. 
3.2.2 Subjects  
Twenty healthy right-handed individuals with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
participated in this study (age range: 21 to 39 years; mean=26.6 years; SD=4.2; 10 females). 
All participants were recruited from the university and local populations, gave a written 
informed consent and were monetarily compensated for their time. The study was performed 
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the ethics committee of the 
medical faculty of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich. 
3.2.3 Action execution experiment  
The experiment has been conducted in two sessions: (i) action execution experiment as 
localizer for motor regions and (ii) action observation experiment. These experiments were 
performed on two separate days with an interval of several months. The action execution 
experiment has been performed a few months later since we wanted to minimize the influence 
of self-experience on action observation. The purpose of action execution was to allow 
localizing voxels14 that show activity during both action execution and action observation (the 
characteristic feature of the mirror neurons) and thus determine the regions of interest that 
possess execution and observation properties. 
 
3.2.3.1 Experiment design 
The experiment consisted of three test conditions and one control condition. In the test 
conditions the subjects had to grasp objects from different categories: food, tool and a 
geometric shape (block) and in the control condition, the subjects had to solely observe the 
objects. The experiment was segmented in 3 runs and each run lasted 4.5 min. Each run was 
structured in 6 test blocks (grasping objects, 30s), which were separated by 6 control blocks 
(looking at the objects without moving the arm, 18s). Each test block consisted of 3 trials 
(10s/trial) in which the subject was instructed to grasp a certain object with their right hand, 
lift it and then put it back (see below in description of apparatus to understand why a single 
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 Each voxel typically represents the activity of a particular coordinate in three dimensional space. The size of a 
voxel typically represent a volume of 27 mm3 (a cube with 3mm length sides). 
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trial required 10 seconds). There were two blocks for grasping an object from every object 
category in each run which resulted in 6 blocks per run.  
 
The whole experiment consisted of 54 test trials (3 runs × 2 blocks × 3 object categories × 3 
trials) and 18 (3 runs × 6 blocks × 1 trial) control trials. To reduce the cognitive demands 
caused by frequent task changes, we employed a design in which the subjects had to grasp an 
object belonging to the same category of object (tool, food, or block) during each block 
repeatedly (e.g., TTTCFFFCBBBC) and the order of the blocks was randomized in every run.  
3.2.3.2 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
Prior to the scanning session, subjects were extensively trained outside the scanner to grasp 
tool and food items without moving their arm too much. During the experiments, the subjects 
lay supine within the magnet and wore headphones to reduce the noise from the scanner. 
Through a system of mirrors they could view the stimuli and their hand without moving the 
head (see Figure 14b). As illustrated in Figs. 1a, the apparatus consisted of a table, which was 
placed at the level of the subjects’ hips. Thin wooden boards (30×20 cm) with objects were 
attached to it by means of Velcro straps. Different objects pairs were attached to the boards. 
The apparatus was placed approximately 10 cm above the subject’s pelvis in order to place 
the objects at a comfortable and natural grasping distance. The middle part of the apparatus 
(on which the wooden boards were fixed) could be rotated by means of a plastic knob at the 
side of the table. At the beginning of each new trial, the experimenter (standing at the side of 
the subject) rotated the apparatus and thus presented the subject with a new pair of objects. 
The experimenter received auditory instructions when to start a new trial by earphones 
connected to the computer in the control room. While the subjects grasped the objects, the 
experimenter removed the old board and attached a new board with new objects to the back 
side of the table. 
 
Between the trials, the subjects held their right hand at the level of their navel and put their 
right index finger on a response button. The extended left arm was oriented parallel to the 
trunk in a relaxed position. In order to minimize head movements, the subject’s upper body 
and head were fixed to the scanner bed by a wide fabric belt and a narrow fabric strap 
respectively. The right arm of the subjects was also supported by appropriate supports and 
restrained by the belt to minimize movements of the arm and hand during force production. 
This arm belt allowed full motion of the wrist (in order to grasp and reach any object 
comfortably), but limited motion at the elbow and the shoulder (however, enough to move the 
lower arm from the resting position toward the stimuli). The subjects were instructed to start 
the first grasping action as soon as the experimenter turned the board with objects toward 
them.  
 
During the experiment, subjects were presented with different pairs of objects attached to the 
board and composed of a tool and a food item on either side and a cylindrical block in the 
middle (see Figure 14a). Six mock tools, six food items, and a building block were used as 
stimuli respectively. The object to be grasped in each trial was indicated by the letter “W” 
PROCEDURE AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
46 
 
(Werkzeug), “E” (Essen), or “K” (Kreis) written on the plastic block. If the letter was “W”, 
the subjects grasped the tool, if the letter was “E”, the subjects grasped the food item, and if 
the letter was “K”, the subjects grasped the block. If a fixation cross was depicted on the 
block, the subjects were to perform the control task in which they were instructed to attend to 
the objects from the previous trial while fixating the block.  
 
 
Figure 14: Setup and stimuli in the fMRI study. In the action execution experiment, subjects lying in 
the scanner could observe the objects fixed to the apparatus (b) through a system of mirrors (a). The 
apparatus could be rotated by the means of a knob on one side of it. The figures c-j depict screenshots 
from movies presented to the subjects in the action observation experiment: c,g) Robot and human 
grasping d,h) robot and human pointing e,i) baseline with objects, f,j) baseline without objects. 
 
During grasping, the subjects moved their right arm to the target location and grasped the 
object, lifted it, and put it back while thinking about the object’s function. We did this for the 
following reason. The execution of these grasping actions directed at different object 
categories in the artificial lab environment may make them devoid of the meaning they get in 
real life. Thinking about the object’s function while executing the grasping action should 
activate the representation of the intention typically associated with grasping action. After 
returning the object to its place, the subjects placed the hand to the starting position and 
waited for the next trial to start. Prior to the grasping action and after it as well as during the 
control trial, subjects were instructed to press a button on the device located under their hand 
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(see Figure 14b) to indicate start and end of the action. After the experiment, the subjects 
were asked whether they had difficulties thinking about the function of the object. 
 
3.2.4 Action observation experiment 
3.2.4.1 Stimuli, design, task and procedure 
While being scanned, subjects were asked to carefully observe series of video sequences 
presenting grasping and pointing actions performed by either a human or a robot. In addition 
the subjects were presented with videos of motionless human and robot agents (static 
baseline). Video sequences were rear-projected onto a screen positioned in the scanner while 
the subjects saw the images through a mirror located above their head. The experiment 
consisted of 14 conditions with a 2 (human/robot) × 2 (grasping/pointing) × 3 (tool items, 
food items, and block) design and additional static control conditions: 2 (human/robot) × 2 
(baseline with objects/baseline without objects) (see Figure 14c-j; for video stimuli, see 
supplementary material). Similar to the action execution experiment, in the present 
experiment tools, food items, and a plastic block served as stimuli (14 different pieces in each 
category). In case of pointing, however, only food and tool items were used as targets. Indeed, 
our main contrasts of interests involve grasping vs. pointing crossed with humans vs. artificial 
agents.  
 
None of the subjects were familiar with the block and therefore were given a number of 
examples of how the block might be used (stopper for a door or a window, building a tower, 
paperweight). During the grasping action, the actor in the video lifted his right hand from the 
starting position on the table, transported it to one of the objects, grasped it, lifted the object, 
transported it to the middle of the body, and looked at it for 2 seconds after which the trial 
ended. During the pointing condition, the actor pointed to the object with the index finger and 
returned the hand to the starting position on the table. The side of the table at which the 
objects were positioned as well as the category of the objects (tool and food items) was 
randomized; the block was always located in the middle between two other objects. The 
objects belonging to different categories used in the experiment had similar size but different 
shapes so that the configurations of the grip were randomized over the whole experiment.  
 
The experiment consisted of 4 runs. Each run lasted 7 min and consisted of 5 blocks 
presenting human grasping and pointing actions, 5 blocks of motionless video of the human, 
and 10 corresponding blocks for the robot. During each block, 4 actions of the same agent 
were targeted at different objects in randomized order. The blocks were separated from each 
other by baseline blocks in which each agent was depicted either with or without objects lying 
in front of him (baseline with objects, baseline without objects). Each action lasted 5s and was 
separated from the following action by a 1s-lasting grey screen so that each experimental 
block lasted 24s. Baseline blocks (with and without objects present, see Figure 14i, j) 
consisted of 3 motionless sequences (lasting 5s) of robot or human separated by 1s grey 
screen so that the baseline block lasted 18s. For each agent, there were 15 grasping actions 
PROCEDURE AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
48 
 
aimed at food items, 15 grasping actions aimed at tool items and the same amount of pointing 
actions. Additionally, there were 15 grasping actions directed at the block. The order of 
different actions (pointing and grasping), the agent to be observed, the object type, and the 
baselines were counterbalanced over every run. After each trial a grey screen was shown and 
the participants were instructed to press one of the two buttons. After the pointing and 
grasping actions, if the participants attributed an intention to the observed action, they pressed 
the left button. If they had difficulties to associate the observed action with a certain intention, 
they pushed the right button. In case of baseline (static video), the subjects had to press either 
button.  
 
After the experiment, participants were debriefed on intention attribution to every single 
action shown in the experiment for both agents. They were presented with a picture of every 
single object shown in the experiment and asked to write down their opinion about “what the 
respective agent was planning to do with the object” when they observed the human or the 
robot grasping or pointing to the objects. Further, the subjects were asked about the ease of 
intention attribution to the robotic in comparison to human agent: “Did you find it equally 
difficult to guess a possible outcome of actions in case of human and the robotic agent 
(yes/no)?” In case of a negative response the subjects had to comment on their answer by 
naming the agent whose intentions were more difficult to understand. Further, the subjects 
were asked about the naturalness of the robot movement: “Did you find the movement of the 
robot natural? (yes/no)”. Finally, we asked the participants about the ease of intention 
attribution to pointing in comparison to grasping actions: “Did you find it equally easy to 
think of a future action outcome in case of pointing and grasping?” Again in case of a 
negative response the subjects had to comment on their answer by naming the action in which 
the intention attribution seemed more difficult. 
 
3.2.4.2 Trajectory and velocity of the robot arm movement 
The upper body of the robot holds a total of 43 controllable degrees of freedom (2x7 in arms, 
5 in the torso, 2x12 in hands). The trajectory of the robot movement can be described as a 
polynomial of the third order y(x)=a3⋅x3+a2⋅x2+a1⋅x+a0, in other words, a cubic interpolation 
between initial and final configuration of the joints. The velocity of the movement was chosen 
with a low acceleration so that the movements were less jerky and looked sufficiently smooth. 
The initial robot videos have been accelerated applying 300% velocity using the Adobe 
Premiere Pro 2.0 package so that the duration of the movement corresponded to the duration 
of the human movement. 
3.2.5 fMRI data  acquisition 
All BOLD-sensitive (blood-oxygen-level-dependent)  fMRI images were acquired on a 3T 
whole-body scanner (GE Signa HDx) using a standard echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence 
and an 8-channel radiofrequency (RF) head coil for signal reception. The sequence had an 
echo time (TE) of 60 ms, matrix: 96×96; field of view (FOV): 220 mm, and a voxel size of 
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2.3 x 2.3 x 3.5 with no gap. All slices were oriented parallel to the anterior-posterior 
commissure. The action execution session used 37 interleaved slices with a repetition time 
(TR) of 2.25 and the action observation session used 39 interleaved slices with a TR of 2.34. 
During each experimental session, a T1-weighted anatomic reference volume was acquired 
using a 3D acquisition sequence.  
3.2.6 fMRI data analysis 
First level analysis 
 
Image analysis was performed using MATLAB (Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA) and SPM5 
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, University College London). Images of each 
condition were corrected for head movements by alignment to the mean image. The data for 
each subject were normalized using coregistration to the individual anatomical image and 
segmented into MNI standard coordinate space. The data were also smoothed by a Gaussian 
filter (8mm FWHM).  
 
At the single-subject level, we applied a high-pass filter (453 s) to remove baseline drifts. The 
regressors of interest for the all conditions (see below) were entered into a general linear 
model (GLM) as boxcar functions convolved with the hemodynamic response function. In the 
action execution experiment, the baseline condition was not explicitly modelled. In the action 
observation experiment, all control conditions were modelled since we had 2 control 
conditions for every agent (see Figure 14e, f, i, j). In both experiments, head motion 
parameters were included in the analysis as regressors of no interest. For the action 
observation experiment, images of parameter estimates for the contrasts of interest were 
created for each subject. These contrasts were: grasping tool, grasping food, grasping block, 
pointing to tool, pointing to food, baseline with objects, and baseline without objects for robot 
and for human respectively. 
 
Conjunction between action execution and action observation 
 
The SPM conjunction null method [203] was used to assess activation common to two 
experiments for the conditions “execution of grasping food&tool minus baseline” and 
“observation of a human agent grasping food&tool minus baseline with objects.” To restrict 
the activations only to areas with both motor and visual properties, we defined the ROIs as 
voxels in the conjunction analysis which overlap with the anatomical regions of interest from 
the Wake Forest University Pick Atlas [188]: the left/right IPL, left pIFG15, and the bilateral 
premotor cortex. These regions have been reported to be associated with the MNS in most 
studies (see Figure 3) [210]. The so created “ROI mask” was used to mask the activations 
presented in the results section. In the random effects analysis, voxels exceeding a statistical 
threshold of p < 0.05 (FDR-corrected for multiple comparisons) are presented. In the figures, 
significant voxels are overlaid on a single subject MNI template. The nomenclature of 
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anatomical structures lying outside the ROIs follows the Harvard–Oxford structural atlas and 
the Jülich histological atlas [90].  
 
SPM ANOVAS 
 
The second-stage (random effects) group analysis was used to create images for displaying 
the activations of the MNS areas depending on the observed action type, the goal of the action 
and the agent (for overview see  
Table 4). To this end, the individual contrast images (created in the first-level analysis) were 
entered into 3 different ANOVAs. The first ANOVA (action ANOVA I) was performed on the 
factors action type (grasping/pointing), agent (human/robot) and goal (grasping tool, food) 
and aimed at investigating how the activity in the MNS areas is modulated depending on the 
type of action, but also the nature of the agent, and the goal. Since grasping, but not pointing 
was additionally targeted to the geometric shape (block) the second ANOVA (goal ANOVA I) 
with factors goal (grasping tool, food, block) and agent (human/robot) was used to test for the 
differences in activation between grasping specific everyday objects (tool and food) and an 
abstract shape (block). To investigate whether the difference in the activity when comparing 
different agents might be based on the superficial difference in their appearance, a third 
ANOVA with factors baseline type (with objects/without objects) and agent (human/robot) 
was also performed (agent ANOVA I) . 
 
 
 
Table 4: Main ANOVAS and their results. The depicted ANOVAS were used to investigate the influence of 
observed action-type, goal of action and agent on the MNS activity. Post-hoc ANOVAS were performed to 
clarify the nature of interactions described in the text. 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Agent 
Grasping (G)>Pointing(P) Tool(T)>Food(F) Tool (T) >Block(B) Food(F)>Block(B) Robot(R)>Human(H)
action ANOVA I 
action type×goal×agent
for H and R in 
rIPL, lIPL, PMC
goal ANOVA I 
goal×agent
for H and R in
rIPL, lIPL, PCM
for H and R in
rIPL, lIPL, PCM, 
pIFG
for H and R in
rIPL, lIPL, PCM, pIFG rIPL, lIPL, PCM
agent ANOVA I 
baseline type×agent
no difference for static 
pictures of R and H
action ANOVA II
region×action 
post hoc action ANOVA II 
action type×goal×agent
for H and R in 
rIPL, lIPL, PMC
for G but not P in 
rIPL, lIPL, PMC
goal ANOVA II 
region×goal×agent
post hoc goal ANOVA I 
goal×agent
for H and R in
rIPL, lIPL, PCM
for H and R in
rIPL, lIPL, PCM, 
pIFG
for H and R in
rIPL, lIPL, PCM, pIFG rIPL, lIPL, PMC
agent ANOVAII 
region×agent×state
post hoc agent ANOVAII 
agent×state
for G but not for static in 
rIPL, lIPL, PMC
                                                      SPM ACTIVATIONS
                                                           PERCENT SIGNAL CHANGE
Goal
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Percent signal change ANOVAS 
 
To investigate the effect of goal, action type and agent depending on the brain region, we 
calculated the mean percent signal change in every ROI (right IPL, left IPL, PMC, left IFG) 
for each condition and subject. To this end we used the mean intensity (beta values of the 
voxels) in that region in comparison to the mean intensity over all brain voxels. Individual 
mean percentage signal change values for each ROI in each condition were averaged across 
subjects and entered in three different repeated-measures ANOVAs. The purpose of percent 
signal change ANOVAs was to determine whether in each ROI there were significant 
differences in mean signal strength as function of action type (grasping/pointing), agent 
(robot/human), goal (tool, food, block). Similar to the ANOVA design for the contrast images 
(see above), but with the additional differentiation between the different ROIs, the first 
ANOVA was performed on the factors region (right IPL, left IPL, PMC, left IFG), agent 
(human/robot), action type (grasping/pointing) and goal (tool, food) (action ANOVA II). To 
see the goal-dependent activations for tool and food items vs. geometric shape, the second 
ANOVA was performed only for the grasping action and contained all three types of objects 
(goal ANOVA II). It was performed on factors region (right IPL, left IPL, PMC, left IFG), 
goal (grasping tool, food, block) and agent (human/robot). The third ANOVA was aimed at 
investigating whether solely the difference in the agents’ appearance may lead to differential 
activations in the ROIs (agent ANOVA II). In this ANOVA we therefore included both static 
conditions and grasping conditions (we call this factor state) for both agents resulting in an 
ANOVA with the factors region (right IPL, left IPL, PMC, left IFG), state (grasping/static), 
and agent (human/robot). When these three main ANOVAs showed significant main effects 
or interaction effects, post-hoc ANOVAs and t-tests were performed to determine whether 
and how a given condition significantly differed from other conditions. 
 
3.3 Is goal understanding innate? – a preferential looking times study16 
3.3.1 Preferential looking paradigm 
The preferential looking time procedure, also known as the dishabituation paradigm, [269] 
has been used extensively by developmental psychologists to assess cognitive abilities in 
prelinguistic human infants [245,268,304], and recently has been employed with nonhuman 
primates to explore comparable skills [250,290].  Dishabituation experiments are thought to 
help us understand what kinds of predictions infants and primates make about their world and 
how they see the world. The power of the technique is that it provides a tool to investigate 
cognitive abilities across species in the absence of training by reinforcement or punishment. 
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 Parts of the text used in this chapter were used in the study “Kupferberg A, Glasauer S, Burkart JM Do robots 
have goals? How agent cues influence action understanding in non-human primates.” submitted for publication. 
PROCEDURE AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
52 
 
The methodology is simple; an infant is repeatedly shown a stimulus, and as soon as it 
becomes habituated to the stimulus, it becomes disinterested and observes the stimulus for a 
shorter period of time. At this point, a new stimulus is shown. If the infant sees the new 
stimulus as different from the target stimulus, , the infant will look longer at the new stimulus. 
Otherwise, if the stimulus is repeated, the infant’s looking times will decrease further. 
Woodward [304], for example, showed that even in the first half-year of life infants encode 
goal-directedness over spatiotemporal properties of the human reaching gesture. In this 
experiment, infants were familiarized with an agent grasping one of two target objects located 
on different sides. For the test trials, the location of the target objects was switched. Goal 
attribution was inferred when the infants’ attention recovered when the target of the action 
changed (incongruent event) but not when the trajectory of the grasp changed (congruent 
event). The assumption was that looking times in case of change of goal and not trajectory 
indicate that the subjects represented the previously shown action not in terms of its 
superficial features, like location in space, but in terms of its goal.  
 One might assume that longer looking at the incongruent test event is driven by perceptual 
properties of the test stimuli like preference for repeated grasping of the same object. 
However, the fact that intention understanding as shown by the looking-time paradigm can 
have an influence on later action production speaks against the low-level explanation. Thus, 
8- and 10-months olds’ understanding of the ultimate goal of an action presented by the 
experimenter as tested by the Woodward-paradigm correlates with the frequency with which 
infants later produce well-planned solutions in this action task [267]. 
As in human child experiments conducted by [304], monkeys were familiarized with an agent 
grasping one of two target objects located on the left and right side of them  (Experiment 1) or 
approaching it (Experiment 2 and 3). After switching the location of the target objects, goal 
attribution was inferred if the monkey’s attention recovered when the target of the grasp 
changed (incongruent event) but not if the trajectory of the grasp changed (congruent event). 
Like in Woodward-paradigm described above, we assumed that if subjects interpreted the 
actions of agents as being goal-directed, they should look longer at the incongruent event. If 
the monkeys simply preferred perceptual novelty (e.g. a different path trajectory), they were 
expected to look longer at the congruent test event. 
3.3.2 Subjects 
The participants in Experiment 1 were three male and seven female marmoset monkeys 
ranging between 4.1 and 7.5 years (see Figure 15). They were kept in two groups (4 and 6 
individuals) in different cages separated by a wire grid. In Experiment 2, nine adult 
marmosets (five males and four females) were tested. The monkeys were kept in two family 
groups (two breeding pairs and their offspring) and their age ranged from 1 to 11 years (mean 
age 3.5 years). In the third experiment, 10 adult marmosets living in two groups (age range 2 
to 8 years, mean age 4.2 years) were tested.  
  
 
Figure 15: Models used in the preferential
robot (b) and a box (c).  
3.3.3 Object attractiveness test
In order to guarantee that subjects equally preferred the two objects of each pair used in the 
experiment, we tested the reaction of eight groups of marmosets, who did not participate in 
the main experiments, to eight different objects. For this purpose, we presente
with four objects, different in color and shape
dependent variables, indicating the degree 
was the latency (time span starting at object presentation 
approached the object), and the
of the object by this individual). The values of these variables for each object were averaged 
across all groups (represented by one
object) and used as a measure of attractiveness of an object. Based on the results of paired 
samples t-test performed on these variables, two pairs of "equally attractive" objects were 
composed. To confirm this composition of pairs, in the second test, both objects of one pair 
were presented to the eight marmoset groups. The experimenter recorded which one of the 
two objects was approached first (and thus would be more attractive) by the marmosets for 
every group separately. 
3.3.4 Housing and experimental setup 
The marmosets participating in the experiments were housed in indoor home cages which 
consisted of one or multiple units (1.0
These cages contained ropes, branches and a heated sleeping place. In summer, the animals 
had free access to outdoor cages, either every day (in case of bigger groups) or every second 
day (in case of smaller groups). The floor of the cage was covered with a substrate of 
biological soil. The marmosets were fed three times a day: early in the morning (with gum, 
mealworms, and pap supplemented with vitamins and minerals), at 11 o'clock (fresh fruits, 
vegetables and mushrooms), and in the afternoon (cheese, boiled eggs, fish or nuts). 
was always available.  
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The testing cage consisted of three compartments: screen compartment, experimental 
compartment and preparatory compartment (see Figure 16). The first compartment containing 
an LCD-monitor was separated from the experimental compartment by a Plexiglas divider. 
The monitor was connected to a laptop located outside the cage. While watching the videos, 
the marmosets stayed in the experimental compartment and between the trials they entered the 
preparatory compartment through a guillotine door. During the testing of each animal, the rest 
of the group stayed in the waiting cage which was visually isolated from other compartments 
(see Figure 16).  The ceiling and the lower part of the grid of the experimental compartment 
were lined with Plexiglas, so that the marmosets would stay on the floor during the test. 
The testing of the participants in the experiments took place either in the morning or in the 
afternoon, before the subjects obtained their snacks. Therefore, during the testing, the animals 
were neither food nor water deprived. The experiments were approved by the Veterinary 
Office of the Canton of Zurich (license number105/2004). During the experiments, the 
monkeys were free to join or leave at any time: their participation was voluntary, and their 
feeding habits were not modified to encourage participation. Most subjects have previously 
been tested in other experiments and thus often had contact with humans during 
experimentation, but were never handled.   
Between the trials the marmosets stayed in the preparation compartment, which was 
connected to the experimental compartment by a guillotine door (see Figure 16). For the 
entire duration of the test, the marmosets were filmed with a digital video camera (HV20, 
Plexi-glas 
LCD-Screen 
  
Guillotine door Trap door Cable pull 
Experimental 
Compartment 
Preparatory 
Compartment 
Tube connection 
Waiting cage 
Screen 
Compartment 
Figure 16: Experimental setup in the preferential looking-times study. The monkeys entered the 
testing cage via tube connections and could switch between experimental and preparation
compartment through a guillotine door. Figure adopted with permission from (Burkart et al., 2011). 
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Canon) from a distance of ca. 50 cm. The video image depicted the whole testing cage 
including the image on the LCD screen. 
3.3.5 Familiarization with the experimenter and the setup 
To permit the monkeys to get used to the experimenter, testing cage and testing procedure, 
one month before testing, some of the daily meals were distributed by the experimenter and 
every second day the monkeys were allowed to go inside the test cage as a whole group and 
explore it for ca. 30 minutes. Once the monkeys were comfortable with staying in the testing 
cage together with other individuals, they were trained to stay there on their own, while the 
remaining group members were in the waiting compartment of the test cage. Every monkey 
stayed separated from the other group members for increasing durations of time, until it was 
comfortable being alone in the testing cage for at least five minutes without showing signs of 
distress (e.g. piloerection, escaping attempts).  
3.3.6 Video stimuli and paradigm 
Instead of life presentations as used in [40], we presented the monkeys with video stimuli. 
This enabled us to control the timing and the details of the presentation when repeatedly 
presenting the same video clips to different subjects.  
In the first experiment, we used an adult family member (female breeder) as agent (see Figure 
15 a). The videos depicted the monkey who entered the experimental compartment through 
the guillotine door and approached one of two different objects positioned on the left and right 
hand side of the door respectively (see Figure 17). To additionally collect test data from the 
female breeder, we recorded analogous videos with the male breeder as model and presented 
them to the female. The two objects used in the video clips had different shape and colour 
(yellow/blue). For each of these objects, five different video clip types (each lasting 10s) were 
recorded: three for the habituation trials, one for the incongruent test event and the last one for 
the congruent test event. In the three habituation trials, the subject observed one and the same 
object being contacted (touching and sniffing) by the model monkey. In the last two video 
clips, the positions of the objects were reversed and the monkey now approached either a new 
object (incongruent object) along the old pathway (incongruent test event) or an old object 
(congruent object) along a new pathway (congruent test event, see Figure 17).  
 
 
 
Habituation Congruent event Incongruent event 
Figure 17: Video stimuli used in the looking-times study. Three habituations trials and two test 
trials presented to the subjects in the first experiment. Modified figure adopted with permission 
from (Burkart et al., 2011). 
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The habituation videos used in the second experiment depicted a monkey-sized brown 
quadruped robot with very simple front legs without any joints (see Figure 15b). This robot 
was a modified version of ROBOPET by WowWee Robotics, Hong Kong. It could walk 
forward and sit down and its movements were based on the principle of dog locomotion. In 
the videos, it approached one of the objects, stopped in front of it, waggled and sat down.  
In the third experiment, the robot was covered with a paper-made black box (see Figure 15c), 
so that the dynamics of the agent’s movement remained identical as in the second experiment, 
since the box was moved by the robot itself. Thus, the behavior of the robot and the black box 
were identical with regard to approach trajectories and kinematics, as well as the waggling 
movement. An additional black cloth along the bottom of the box ensured that the legs of the 
robot were not visible. 
3.3.7 Procedure  
On the testing day, five trials were presented to the marmosets, three habituation and two test 
trials, a congruent and an incongruent one. The order of test trial types (incongruent, 
congruent) and the type of the object (blue/yellow) was counterbalanced between subjects. 
The experimenter started the video as soon as the marmoset entered the experimental 
compartment and looked at the video screen. After the video was over, the experimenter lured 
the monkey back to the preparation compartment by offering it a mealworm. The inter-trial 
interval was determined by the time which the marmoset needed to eat the mealworm and re-
enter the experimental compartment.  
3.3.8 Familiarization with video-stimuli 
Our experiments were based on the looking-time methodology, which provides a way to 
assess spontaneously available cognitive tendencies of animals. Instead of life presentations 
we used video stimuli, since live presentations with conspecifics would have required 
extensive training of the model subjects. There are a number of studies demonstrating that 
video playback is perceived as an adequate stimulus by monkeys [6,50,299], including 
common marmosets [39]. 
To provide the marmosets with sufficient exposure to the stimuli and the video screen, all 
marmosets were presented with “familiarization” trials on the day before the actual 
experiment was performed. In these trials, the monkeys watched the same habituation videos 
which were used for testing on the next day. Since the marmosets have a short attention span 
[232], the purpose of this familiarization was to assure that the monkeys had seen all relevant 
aspects of the video. Thus, if during one trial the marmosets looked at the screen for less than 
30% percent of the duration of the video (10s), the trial was repeated a few minutes later, until 
at least three trials were attained in which the marmoset's looking duration reached the 
criterion of 30% of the video duration. The videos from the pre-testing were analysed in the 
evening of the same day. In case that it was not possible to obtain three such trials on one day, 
the procedure was repeated on the next day until three trials were collected.  
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3.3.9 Object preference test 
In order to find out whether the subjects would copy the object choice of the model 
individual, the test ended with a free choice trial. After the last test trial, the monkeys were 
allowed to enter the testing compartment and make the choice between the two objects 
themselves by approaching them and possibly exploring them.  
3.3.10 Data coding and analysis 
Since all experiments were videotaped, looking time data were analyzed by the experimenter 
in a frame-by-frame fashion (25frames/s) using the software INTERACT, version 8.0 
(Mangold international GmbH, Arnstorf, Germany). The monkey was considered to be 
looking at the screen if it oriented its head towards the screen and did not focus on anything 
else. Since the monkeys often approached the entities which they focused on, the place of 
focus could often be verified by the subsequent behavior. The coding of the position of the 
monkey’s head was easy since they have conspicuous white tufts around their ears. The other 
entities where the monkeys looked at were normally the experimenter, the mealworms lying 
on the floor or the location on the floor where the monkeys would put their paws for the next 
step. 
To assess inter-rater reliability, the entire data from the three habituation trials and two test 
trials has been analyzed by a second observer who recorded looking times in a frame-by-
frame fashion from videos, just like the first experimenter. The second observer was blind to 
the type of the test events. His judgments were compared with the looking times recorded by 
the experimenter. In the first experiment, the interrater-agreement was between 94% und 
98%. The other three experiments were additionally analyzed by a third rater, who coded all 
test trials, but not habituation trials. She was also blind with regard to the experimental 
condition. The percentage frames for which the observers’ judgments agreed was 96%. We 
used the data recorded by the experimenter for the analysis. 
We used Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics to test whether the data sets deviated from a normal 
distribution. Since all data was normally distributed, we used parametric statistical analyses 
(repeated measures ANOVAs and paired samples t-tests).We first tested whether the looking 
times significantly differed in the congruent and incongruent test events depending on the 
agent. To this end we used repeated measures ANOVA performed on the factors test trial 
order (congruent first/incongruent first) as between-subject factor and congruency (looking 
time duration in the congruent vs. incongruent test event) as well as agent 
(conspecifics/robot/box) as within-subject factors. Further, we also performed repeated 
measures ANOVA to test for the effect of the habituation (decrease of the looking times) in 
the course of three habituation trials. 
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4 Results  
4.1 Agent’s features which facilitate motor interference in dyadic interaction   
4.1.1 Results from standard analysis 
To compare the MI effect elicited by action observation of the human, the humanoid robot 
(JAST), and the industrial robot (JAHIR, artificial joint configuration; present experiment) we 
used the standard analysis. We combined all data to yield a repeated-measures ANOVA 
design with three within-subjects factors and one between-subjects factor. We used movement 
plane (horizontal/vertical), congruency (congruent/incongruent), and agent (human/robot) as 
within-subjects factors and robot (humanoid JAST/industrial JAHIR) as between-subjects 
factor resulting in a mixed 2×2×2 within-subject design with 2 between-subjects conditions. 
The combined analysis (33 subjects; conditions a, b, and c in Figure 8) revealed a significant 
main effect for congruency [F(1,31)=10.5; p<0.0028] that confirmed motor interference. The 
strength of motor interference depended on whether the agent was a human or a robot and the 
type of the robot as shown by a significant three-way interaction agent×congruency×robot 
[F(1,31)=4.38; p=0.044] (see Figure 18).  
Since the factor movement plane became neither significant as main effect nor as interaction, 
we pooled data across this factor. This allowed us to include data from subjects who 
previously were excluded due to an outlier (see section 3.3.4). The pooled analysis (43 
subjects) with congruency (congruent/incongruent), and agent (human/robot) as within-
subject factors and ROBOT (humanoid JAST/industrial JAHIR) as between-subjects factor 
resulted in a main effect for congruency [F(1,41)=20.2; p<0.0001] and a significant three-way 
interaction agent×congruency×robot [F(1,41)=4.53; p=0.039], confirming the results above. 
To further investigate how subjects reacted to the observation of human, humanoid robot, 
industrial robot and rotated industrial robot (industrial 90°) movement, we performed separate 
post hoc analyses (repeated measures ANOVA) with congruency (congruent/incongruent) as 
within-subject factor. This analysis revealed an effect of congruency for the human agent 
[F(1,42)=18.5; p<0.0001], humanoid robot JAST [F(1,23)=5.54; p=0.027], rotated industrial 
robot arm JAHIR 90°  [F(1,9)=6.77; p=0.029], but not JAHIR [F(1,18)=1.34; p=0.26; n.s.] 
(see Figure 18). In both direct comparisons human-JAST and human-JAHIR 90°, the 
interaction agent ×congruency was not significant (both p>0.54), showing that there was no 
difference in MI between the human agent and these robots. In contrast, the comparison 
human-JAHIR yielded a significant interaction agent×congruency [F(1,18)=7.11; p=0.016], 
confirming that MI was not present for JAHIR. Since the industrial robot was the same in 
both presentations – mounted on the table in JAHIR and rotated in JAHIR 90° – this result 
implies that a human-like joint configuration (with respect to the observer) is a crucial factor 
for triggering MI.  
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Figure 18: Results of the MI study using the standard analysis. The bars represent standard deviation 
(SD) of movement from the instructed movement plane during observation of incongruent and 
congruent movements of the human agent (a), humanoid robot JAST (b), industrial robot JAHIR (c) 
and rotated industrial robot JAHIR90° (d). Data from all subjects, i.e., each graph represents a 
different number of subjects (see text). Error bars represent standard error of the mean. Stars denote 
significance (** p<0.01; * p<0.05). Figure adopted with permission from [175]. 
Finally, to test for the presence of facilitation effects on one’s own movement during 
observation of congruent movements of a different person, which would manifest in a more 
accurate movement in comparison to the baseline where no other person is present, we used a 
repeated measures ANOVA with factors agent presence (agent/baseline) and direction 
(vertical/horizontal) for data obtained while watching incongruent and congruent movements 
of a human agent and baseline data. The effect of agent presence could be shown only in the 
incongruent condition [F(1,24)=5.6 p<0.026] with a higher variance in one’s own movement 
during observation of incongruent movements than during the baseline. However, no 
additional accuracy in case of congruent movement observation could be shown 
[F(1,24)=0.37; p>0.54]. 
4.1.2 Other measures of motor interference 
Most previous studies used a measure for MI that is dependent on a space-fixed coordinate 
system, i.e., the deviation of subjects’ movement trajectory from the instructed movement 
plane (SA) (see Figure 12). However, such an analysis depends on accurate alignment of 
movement directions between the subject and the observed agent, and might have led to 
different results if this alignment was absent. In contrast to it, we tested which components of 
the movement contribute to MI.  
To investigate whether the deviations from the movement plane (DA), tilt of the movement 
plane with respect to the coordinate system (TA) and the curvature of the movement (CA) are 
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differentially influenced by observation of congruent and incongruent movements, we 
performed separate analyses (repeated measures ANOVA) of our data while observing a 
human with movement plane (horizontal/vertical) and congruency (congruent/incongruent) as 
within-subject factors. This analysis revealed an effect of congruency for DA [F(1,32)=27.7; 
p<0.001] (see Figure 19a) and for TA [F(1,32)=9.6; p<0.005] (see Figure 19b) but not for CA  
[F(1,32)=0.376; p<0.8] (see Figure 19c). For DA there was an additional effect of direction 
[F(1,32)=7.2; p<0.011] due to higher deviation in the horizontal plane than in the vertical 
plane and an interaction between direction and congruency [F(1,32)=8.0; p<0.008] due to a 
stronger effect of incongruence in the horizontal than in vertical plane. 
 
Figure 19: Results from different analyses for observation of human agent in the MI-study. a) Actual 
plane tilt of movement (mean line fit) with respect to the horizontal and vertical directions (TA). b) 
Standard deviation of individual line fit from the mean line fit (actual plane of movement) (DA). c) 
Curvature of single movements with respect to a straight line (individual line fit) (CA). Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean. Stars denote significance (** p<0.01). Figure adopted with 
permission from [175]. 
Correlation analysis (corrected p-level p=0.004 for 12 tests) of the different factors 
contributing to MI has shown a significant positive correlation between SA and TA in four 
conditions (all n=33 subjects): HC [r=0.681, p<0.001]; HI [r=0.786, p<0.001]; VC [r=0.484, 
p<0.004]; and VI [r=0.760, p<0.001]. SA and DA also correlated in all conditions (HC 
[r=0.409, p=0.018]; HI [r=0.386, p=0.026]; VC [r=0.592, p<0.001]; and VI [r=0.460, 
p=0.007]), even though only VC was significant due to the Bonferroni correction. Similarly, 
SA and CA significantly correlated only in the vertical conditions: HC [r=0.488, n=33, 
p=0.037]; HI [r=0.120, n=33, p=0.5060]; VC [r=0.769, n=33, p<0.001]; and VI [r=0.540, 
n=33, p=0.001].  
Finally, a multiple regression analysis was used to test if the factors curvature, movement 
variability, and plane tilt significantly predicted the SD of the movement with respect to the 
horizontal and vertical axis during observation of congruent horizontal human movements. 
  
 
The results of the regression 
the variance of the standard analysis in each condition with TA and DA contributing most. 
4.2 Neural correlates of goal attribution during action observation
study17 
4.2.1 Behavioral results 
The debriefing of subjects at the end of the action observation experiment has shown that all 
subjects were able to attribute an intention to the actions of both human actor (in 95% percent 
of all trials) and robotic actor (in 94% percent of all trials) (s
the subjects reported that it was more difficult to attribute an intention to grasping and 
pointing actions of the robot in comparison to the human agent (see 
of subjects reported that the grasping 
human movements (see Figure 
Figure 20: Behavioral results in the fMRI study
human and robot during observation of grasping and pointing. b) Difficulty in attributing intention to 
human vs. robotic agent. c) Intention attributed to robotic agent for grasping food d) Subject
perception of the naturalness of robot movement.
The subjective reports indicated that the intention attributed to the robot and the human during 
tool and block grasping was identical for both human and robotic agents 
case of the tool items, this intention was to use the tools appropriately to its function (e.g. 
fixing something, repairing something, measuring something, gluing parts together). For the 
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block, the attributed intention was either to use it as a stopper for a door or for a window 
(47%) or to use it as a building block (53%). In case of observing a human agent grasping 
food item, the attributed intention was “eating” for all subjects. For the observation of the 
robot, the attributed intention in case of food grasping was either “eating” (10% of all 
subjects) or “bringing the object to the mouth (20% of all subjects) or “giving/offering the 
food item to another agent” (70%) (see Figure 20c). To investigate the difference between 
these two types of subjects who either attributed the intention of “giving away the food item” 
or the intention of “eating”/”bringing to the mouth” to the robot, we performed a t-test 
between these two subject groups using contrast images for “pointing to food items”. 
However, this t-test revealed no difference in activation depending on the attributed intention 
in any of the brain regions.  
In case of pointing, 50% of all subjects regarded the pointing gesture as the desire of the agent 
to grasp the object himself and the remaining subjects understood the gesture as a request to 
the observer to grasp the object. We again performed a t-test on the contrast images of 
“pointing to tool & pointing to food items” for subjects who regarded the pointing action as 
the agent’s desire to direct the subject’s attention to the object vs. those who interpreted 
pointing as the agent’s desire to grasp the object himself.  However, a t-test performed on 
these two groups of subjects did not reveal any differential activity in any of the brain regions.  
4.2.2 Conjunction analysis of action observation & execution 
The MNS-related brain areas activated by the execution of grasping were located in bilateral 
PMC, pIFG , anterior IPL and left primary motor cortex, whereas observation of grasping 
activated the posterior IPL (angular gyrus) and the posterior IFG on the left side. The 
conjunction analysis of action observation and action execution activated the bilateral superior 
frontal gyrus, premotor cortex (PMC), inferior parietal lobe (IPL) including the anterior 
intraparietal sulcus (aIPS), middle temporal gyrus, inferior temporal gyrus, lateral occipital 
gyrus, lingual gyrus, primary somatosensory cortex, secondary somatosensory cortex, 
temporo-occipital fusiform gyrus and parahippocampus. Further activations on the right side 
were located in superior temporal gyrus and parahippocampus and on the left side in the 
frontal lobe, the supramarginal gyrus, pIFG (pars opercularis), angular gyrus, insula, the 
middle frontal gyrus, paracingulate, and cingulate gyri (see Figure 21a).  
The regions of interest were defined as voxels located in the overlap of the activations 
obtained in the conjunction analysis with the anatomical regions of interest: bilateral IPL, left 
pIFG, and the premotor cortex from the WFU Pick atlas (Figure 21b). The so created “ROI 
mask” was used to mask the activation in all displayed contrasts. 
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Figure 21: Functional activations in the fMRI-study. a) Brain regions active in the conjunction 
analysis of execution and observation of grasping actions of a human agent (directed at tool and food 
items). Before the images for action observation and execution were entered in the conjunction 
analysis, we subtracted the baselines in each experiment (baseline with objects and object observation 
respectively) from them. b) ROI mask: overlap of activations of the conjunction analysis with the 
ROIs from the WFU Pick atlas (left and right IPL, bilateral PMC, left pIFG). 
4.2.3 Action type-dependent MNS-activations for human and robotic agents 
The comparison between grasping and pointing actions (action type ANOVA I) after masking 
revealed increased symmetrical activations in the bilateral premotor cortex (PMC), in the left 
and right IPL and the left IFG (see Figure 22a). No brain areas were activated stronger for 
pointing than for grasping.  
 
Figure 22: Modulation of MNS-activity by observation of action type and agent.  Activation for 
observation of “grasping minus pointing” (a) and “robot minus human” (b) were stronger in the 
bilateral IPL and PMC. All displayed activations are masked by the ROI mask. c) Mean percent signal 
change (averaged over 20 subjects) during observation of grasping and pointing actions of robot (light 
grey) and human (dark grey) directed at both tools and food items in the right IPL, PMC, left IPL and 
left IFG. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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The action ANOVA II performed on the percent signal change of the ROIs revealed significant 
main effects of region [F(3,57)=7.8 p=0.001], action type [F(1,19)=59.4 p=0.001], and goal 
[F(1,19)=9.1 p=0.007]. Significant two-way interactions were found for region×agent 
[F(3,57)=7.7 p=0.001] and region×action type [F(3,57)=26.78 p=0.001]. A significant three-
way interaction again showed region-specific activations [region×agent×action, F(3,57)=3.1 
p=0.033] indicating the necessity of performing separate post-hoc ANOVAs for each ROI. 
The post-hoc action ANOVA II (action type×goal×agent) performed for each ROI separately 
revealed significant effects of action type with an increased activation for grasping in 
comparison to pointing in the left IPL [F(1,19)=42.8 p=0.001], right IPL [F(1,19)=84.13 
p=0.001] and PMC [F(1,19)=13.9 p=0001], but not in the pIFG (see Figure 22c). 
Additionally, significant effects of agent and goal and a significant interaction action 
type×agent were found for the IPL bilaterally (see below, and Figure 22c). This nature of this 
interaction will be investigated more closely in the section 4.2.5. 
4.2.4 Goal-dependent MNS activations for human and robotic agents 
The goal ANOVA I   aimed at displaying the effect of goal (tool, food, block) on MNS 
activations during grasping, showed increased activity for tools vs. food in the bilateral PMC 
and IPL and tools vs. block/food vs. block in the same regions but additionally in the left IFG 
(see Figure 23a, b, c). The goal ANOVA II, used to investigate the effect of goal in each 
region separately, revealed significant main effects of region [F(3,57)=5.0 p=0.004], agent 
[F(1,19)=14.6 p=0.001], and goal [F(2,38)=29.03 p=0.001]. Two-way interactions were 
significant for a region×agent [F(3,57)=10.6 p=0.001] and region×goal [F(6,114)=9.7 
p=0.001], but not for agent×goal suggesting that the processing of the action goal was similar 
in both agents. To clarify the difference between the ROIs, we performed the post-hoc goal 
ANOVA II (action goal×agent) for each region separately. This ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of goal in all four regions [left IPL F(2, 38)=25.2 p=0.001, right IPL F(2, 38)=15.8 
p=0.001, left posterior IFG F(1, 38)=9.4 p=0.001 and bilateral PMC F(2, 38)=14.6 p=0.001] 
(see Figure 23d), but again no interaction of agent×goal.  
Although the effect of goal has been revealed in all ROIs, it is still unclear whether this effect 
originates only from the differential activity triggered by tool&food items vs. block or tool vs. 
food items, or both. To clarify this, we performed third-level post-hoc ANOVAs including 
only two object categories (tools vs. food items; tools vs. block, food vs. block) as factor goal 
and two agents  (human, robot) as factor agent. The increase in BOLD response for 
observation of grasping tool vs. food items could be shown in the left [F(1,19)=13.96 
p=0.001] and right IPL [F(1,19)=27 p=0.001] and the bilateral PMC [F(1,19)=6.9 p=0.017] 
(see Figure 23a). A higher activation for grasping tools vs. block could be shown in all 
regions [left IPL F(1,19)=31.4 p=0.001; right IPL F(1,19)=18.4 p=0.001; left IFG 
[F(1,19)=13.9 p=0.001]; PMC F(1,19)=22.8 p=0.001] (see Figure 23b). Observation of 
grasping of food items vs. block revealed increased activations in the left IPL [F(1,19)=20.55 
p=0.001], left IFG [F(1,19)=10.2 p=0.004] and bilateral PMC [F(1,19)=9.83 p=0.005] (see 
Figure 23c). There was no interaction of agent×goal in any of the post-hoc ANOVAS. 
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Figure 23: Functional activations for observation of grasping. a) “tool minus food”, b) “tool minus 
block” and c) “food minus block”. Activations for the observation of “grasping tool minus food items” 
were stronger in the bilateral IPL and PMC. Activations for observing “grasping tool and food items 
vs. block were found also in bilateral PMC and IPL but additionally located in the left IFG. All 
activations are masked by the ROI mask. c) Mean percent signal change in the right IPL, PMC, left 
IPL and left IFG (averaged over 20 subjects) during observation of grasping actions of human (dark 
grey) and robotic agent (light grey) directed at tools, food items and block. 
 
To test whether also during pointing the MNS areas differentiated between different goals, we 
looked at the results of the action ANOVA II performed on factors agent, goal and action type. 
This ANOVA showed the effect of goal in the left IPL [F(1,19)=8.4 p=0.009], right IPL 
[F(1,19)=41.7 p=0.001] and the bilateral PMC [F(1,19)=10.9 p=0.004], but no interaction 
goal×action type suggesting that also during pointing, the MNS differentiated between 
different goals. 
4.2.5 Agent-dependent MNS activation 
The agent ANOVA I revealed that there is no effect of agent if we compare the baseline 
conditions depicting the static pictures of the two agents. To investigate whether agent-related 
and region-related activity changes are caused by the difference in appearance of the two 
agents or their movement kinematics (biological vs. artificial) we performed the agent 
ANOVA II on the percent signal change values of the ROIs using the factors region, agent and 
state. In this ANOVA, for the factor state we used the contrast images for baseline with 
objects and grasping block (since the increase of activation for the robot was found 
irrespectively of the goal of grasping). The ANOVA revealed significant main effects of 
region [F(3,57)=5.2 p=0.003], agent [F(1,19)=4.5 p=0.047] and state [F(1,19)=24.02 
p=0.000]. Further, we found significant two-way interactions region×agent [F(3,57)=3.9 
p=0.013], region×state [F(3,57)=5.3 p=0.003], agent×state [F(1,19)=5 p=0.038] and a three-
way interaction region×agent×state [F(3,57)=2.9 p=0.040]. To investigate the nature of this 
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three-way interaction, we performed the post-hoc agent ANOVA II in each ROIs for 
agent×state. In the posterior IFG, no effect became significant. The main effect of agent 
became significant in the left IPL [F(1,19)=6.8 p=0.017] and right IPL [F(1,19)=6.8 p=0.017]. 
A main effect of state was found in bilateral IPL and PMC [left IPL F(1,19)=16.1 p=0.001, 
right IPL F(1,19)=18.7 p=0.000, PMC F(1,19)=19 p=0.000]. Similarly, the interaction 
agent×state was significant in these regions [left IPL F(1,19)=8.4 p=0.009, right IPL 
F(1,19)=6.4 p=0.02, PMCF(1,19)=19 p=0.008]. To clarify the nature of the interaction of 
agent×state in IPL and PMC, we performed paired t-tests for factor agent during the static 
condition (baseline with objects) and movement (grasping block) condition. In all ROIs, the 
factor agent was significant during grasping, but not during the static baseline [left IPL: 
t(19)=3.7 p=002; right IPL: t(19)=3.2 p=004; PMC: t(19)=2.2 p=0.04]. The absent of the 
effect agent when observing the static pictures indicates that the mere appearance of the robot 
did not lead to differential modulation of the MNS.  
As can be seen from the Figure 22c, an increased activation of the bilateral IPL (and perhaps 
PMC) for observing the robot as compared to the human was found only during grasping but 
not pointing. Since the action ANOVA II revealed a three-way interaction 
region×agent×action type, the post-hoc action ANOVA II was performed to investigate the 
nature of this interaction for each ROI separately. This ANOVA revealed an interaction of 
agent×action type in the left IPL [F(1, 19)=5.8 p=0.025] and the right IPL [F(1,19)=8.4 
p=0.009], but not in the PMC and IFG. To investigate the nature of this interaction we 
repeated the ANOVA with the factors agent and goal for different action types (grasping and 
pointing) separately. In line with the activations shown on the Figure 22c, we found the main 
effect of the factor agent in left IPL [F(1,19)=12.7 p=0.002] and right IPL [F(1,19)=14.9 
p=0.001] for grasping but not for pointing. This indicates that the increase activity associated 
with robot was specific only for grasping actions.  
 
4.3 Is goal understanding innate? – a preferential looking times study18 
4.3.1 Object attractiveness test 
To compose object pairs in which both objects were equally attractive for the marmoset 
monkeys, we compared the variables latency and interaction time for all four objects. Based 
on similar values of these variables, we composed two pairs of objects: Object1/Object2 and 
Object3/Object4. The latency was 11.9 s in case of the first object; 15.5 s in case of the 
second object; 22.5 s in case of the third object and 23.6 s for the forth object. The interaction 
time with the objects was 27.7 s; 30.7 s; 14.1 s and 11.7 s respectively. The paired samples t-
test of the latency and object interaction time performed on the first pair revealed no 
significant differences between the two objects (t(6) =-0.90 p<0.856 for the interaction time 
and t(7)= -1.095 p<0.31for the latency). The t-test of the latency and interaction time 
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 Parts of the text used in this chapter were used in the study “Kupferberg A, Glasauer S, Burkart JM Do robots 
have goals? How agent cues influence action understanding in non-human primates.” submitted for publication. 
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performed on the second pair revealed no significance either (t(6)=0.505 p<0.631 for the 
interaction time and  t(7)=0.115 p<0.912 for the latency). These pairs were presented to the 
marmosets in an object-choice task. In case of the pair Object1/Object2, both objects were 
approached four times. In case of the pair Object3/Object4, Object3 was approached five 
times and Object4 three times. The chi-square test performed on the number of approaches of 
both objects in each pair showed that the marmosets approached both objects randomly 
without having preference for any of them in both pair one [X²(1, N=8)=0, p=1)] and pair two 
[X²(1, N=8)= 0.5,  p<0.48)].  
4.3.2 General results 
To test whether the looking-times of monkeys decreased during the habituation trials in all 
experiments, we performed an ANOVA on the factors dishabituation (habituation 1, 
habituation 2 and habituation 3) and agent (conspecific, robot, box). This ANOVA has shown 
an effect of dishabituation [F(2,60)=37; p=0.000]. The absence of interaction effect 
habituation×agent, indicated that during habituation, looking times decreased in all three 
experiments. Thus, repeated observation of an action directed toward the same goal resulted 
in habituation to the stimulus as reflected in the decrease of the looking times (see Figure 24). 
An overall analysis of variance performed on factor congruency (incongruent/congruent test 
event) as within-subjects factor and test-trial order (congruent event first, incongruent event 
first) and agent (conspecific, robot, box) as between-subjects factor has revealed the main 
effect of congruency [F(1,27)=7.37, p=0.011] and an interaction of congruency×agent 
[F(2,27)=10.1, p=0.001]. There was no interaction of congruency×test trial order, suggesting 
that the average reaction times for the test events were not significantly different across the 
three experiments. 
To test for the nature of the interaction effect congruency×agent, we repeated the ANOVA 
with the factors congruency and test trial order for each agent separately.  
4.3.3 Goal attribution to a conspecific 
An overall analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine the duration of looking on the 
screen during the first three habituation trials. The looking times at the monkey’s action 
showed a significant effect of the trial number, demonstrating a significant decrease of 
looking times in the last versus the first habituation trial [F(2,16)=18.5; p<0.000] (see Figure 
24a). Thus, repeated observation of an action directed toward the same goal resulted in 
habituation to the stimulus.  
The second ANOVA examined the effects of test trial order (congruent event first, 
incongruent event first) and congruency (incongruent or congruent test events) on the duration 
of looking times. There was no main effect of test trial order [F(1,7)=3.1; p<0.121]. 
However, there was a main effect of congruency: the monkeys looked significantly longer at 
the incongruent action event than at the congruent test event [F(1,7)=24.6; p<0.002] (see 
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Figure 24a). There were no significant interactions between any factors. At the individual 
level, all nine monkeys looked longer at the incongruent test event.   
4.3.4 Goal attribution to a robot 
The repeated analysis of variance examined the effect of test trial order on the duration of 
looking during the three habituation trials. Similar to the first experiment, it revealed a main 
effect of dishabituation, that is, the subjects looked significantly longer at the first habituation 
trial than at the second and the third habituation trials [F(2,18)=10.5; p<0.001] (see Figure 
24b).  
 
 
Figure 24: Averaged looking times in the preferential looking-times study. The bars represent average 
looking times (in seconds) for the three habituation events (light grey) and the two test events (dark 
grey) in the first experiment (a), second experiment (b), third experiment (c). The vertical bars indicate 
SEM (standard error of the mean). Figure c depicts the percentage of monkeys who approached at 
least one of the objects in the final test (light grey) and the percentage of monkeys who approached the 
congruent object first (dark grey).  
The second repeated measures ANOVA has shown that the monkeys looked for a longer time 
duration if the agent approached a different goal than if it used a different trajectory 
[F(1,8)=6.9 p<0.03] (see Figure 24b). At the individual level, eight monkeys looked longer at 
the incongruent test event and two monkeys looked longer at the congruent test event. 
ANOVA revealed no effect of test event order [F(1,8) = 2.37; p <1.62)] on the looking times 
in the test conditions.   
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4.3.5 Goal attribution to a box 
The repeated measures ANOVA performed on the looking times obtained in the habituation 
trials revealed a main effect of dishabituation, that is, the subjects looked significantly longer 
at the first habituation trial than at the second or the third habituation trial [F(2,28)=10.27; 
p<0.001] (see Figure 24c).  
The second ANOVA revealed a significant effect of congruency [F(1,12)=6.1; p<0.029]. In 
contrast to the Experiments 1 and 2, the monkeys looked significantly longer at the congruent 
event (see Figure 24c). At the individual level, 3 out of 14 monkeys looked longer at the 
incongruent event, 10 looked longer at the congruent event and 1 monkey looked equally long 
at both events. There was no effect of test trial order [F(1,12)=1.3; p<0.277].  
  
4.3.6 Social learning test 
In the final object preference test performed after the first experiment, all monkeys but one 
have chosen the object which has been previously approached by the conspecifics (see Figure 
24d). The paired sample t-test showed that after approaching the object, all monkeys 
interacted longer with the object which was previously preferred by the model monkey 
compared to the other object [t(8)=3.49; p=0.008)] (see Figure 25). The chi-square test 
revealed that object choice in the final test was not random but directed at the object which 
the model has preferred [X²(1, N=9)= 5.44, p<0.01)]. Additionally, all monkeys approached 
at least one of the objects. 
After the second experiment, 7 out of 10 monkeys have chosen the congruent object and one 
monkey did not approach any of the objects (see Figure 24d). From these seven monkeys, five 
have looked longer at the incongruent event. Although chi-square test revealed no preference 
of monkeys for the congruent object [X²(1, N=8)=2.77; p<0.095)], the paired sample t-test has 
shown that all monkeys spent a significantly longer amount of time interacting with the object 
approached by the robot during the habituation [t(8) =4.08; p<0.003)] (see Figure 25). 
After the third experiment, 5 of the 14 monkeys have first preferred the object which has 
previously been approached by the box during habituation, 5 monkeys have chosen the object 
previously ignored by the demonstrator and another 4 monkeys have not chosen any of the 
objects (see Figure 24d). The chi-square test has shown that the monkeys have chosen the 
object randomly X²(1, N=10)=0; p=1). Additionally, paired sample t-test showed no 
difference in the object exploration time t(13) = -0.155.107; p<0.879) (see Figure 25). Thus, it 
seems that the monkeys had no preference for any of the objects if the model approaching the 
object was a box. 
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Figure 25: Duration of object exploration in the looking-times experiment. Bars represent the amount 
of time (in seconds) which the monkeys spent exploring the congruent and the incongruent object after 
approaching it in each experiment. 
4.4 Summary of results 
4.4.1 Evaluation of human-robot interaction by motor interference19 
In two experiments we investigated how different aspects of appearance, motility (ability to 
move resulting from the joint configuration) and movement kinematics (movement velocity, 
movement variability) of the observed agent influence motor interference (MI). Participants 
performed arm movements in horizontal and vertical directions while observing videos of a 
human, a humanoid robot, or an industrial robot arm. The latter was presented to the subjects 
in either artificial (industrial) or human-like joint configuration (see Figure 10c, d).  
Results from the first and second experiment 
The results of the first experiment have shown that a humanoid robot with a limited human-
likeness in its appearance may trigger the same type of implicit perceptual processes as 
revealed by MI as a human agent, given that it moves with a quasi-biological velocity. 
Further, we showed that movement variability is not crucial for eliciting MI. Finally, we 
demonstrated that MI can be elicited by using an approximation of biological velocity (quasi-
biological velocity) in the robot’s movements. 
The second MI experiment demonstrated that the same industrial robot arm performing 
exactly the same movements induced MI when it had human-like motility, i.e. when it was 
presented in a joint configuration similar to the human arm (tilted by 90°) (see Figure 10d), 
but not when it was shown in the standard industrial configuration (see Figure 10c). Note that 
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 Parts of the text used in this chapter have been published as “Kupferberg A, Huber M, Helfer B, Lenz C, Knoll 
A, Glasauer S. (2012) Moving Just Like You: Motor Interference Depends on Similar Motility of Agent and 
Observer. PLoS ONE 7(6): e39637. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039637” 
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the kinematics of the end effector (the gripper) of the robot arm did not change relative to the 
observer in the two configurations; only the robot arm in the tilted, human-like joint 
configuration moved in a way which resembled a human arm movement (human-like 
motility). 
Together both experiments indicate that movement variability and accurate biological velocity 
as well as human-like morphology (like head, torso and 2 arms) of an inanimate entity are not 
required for triggering MI during action observation. However, at least quasi-biological 
movement velocity and human-like motility (capability to move like a human arm resulting 
from the joint configuration) of an agent are necessary for eliciting MI in the movement of the 
observers. To my knowledge, this is a novel finding, since previous studies could not 
distinguish the role of agent’s appearance and its movement velocity for engaging MI in the 
observer. 
Results from different analyses of MI 
The analysis of the three contributing factors indicated that SA correlated with the movement 
curvature (CA), tilt (or shift) of the overall movement plane in respect to the vertical or 
horizontal plane (TA) and deviations of individual movements from the overall movement 
plane (DA). As expected, the regression analysis showed that the combination of the three 
factors DA, CA and TA explained approx. 90% of the movement trajectory deviations from 
the instructed movement plane. However, the curvature of the individual movements (CA) 
contributed only negligibly to the overall effect (see Figure 19c), The DA analysis revealed a 
significantly higher SD in the horizontal than in the vertical plane (see Figure 19b), which 
might be due to a difference in the biomechanical properties of forearm movements in 
horizontal and vertical planes or due to the fact that the deviations during horizontal 
movement might have been facilitated by gravity. Since the overall tilt from the instructed 
movement direction (TA) plays such an important role in MI (see Figure 19a), future 
investigations need to assure careful calibration of the spatial coordinates of both the 
movements of the observed agent and of the test subjects.  
4.4.2 Do robots have goals? – an fMRI study20 
The aim of the second study was to assess whether MNS activity during action observation is 
modulated by action type (motor intention) and action goal (cognitive intention) not only 
when observing humans, but also artificial agents. To this end, we recorded the brain activity 
of subjects observing videos of human and robotic grasping and pointing actions aimed at 
different object categories (tools and food items). These object categories suggested different 
intentions in the following chain of motor actions (e.g. eating or repairing something 
respectively). Apart from action observation, the subjects performed grasping actions directed 
to these different object categories themselves. This enabled us to localize the regions active 
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during action observation and execution by conducting a conjunction analysis between those 
two conditions. The overlap of the conjunction analysis with the four predefined regions of 
interest (based on [210]) revealed activations in the bilateral premotor cortex and left and 
right inferior parietal gyrus. Additionally, activity was found in the pars opercularis of the left 
inferior frontal gyrus (see Figure 21b). We used the mask composed from these regions to 
mask the results in all contrasts of interest.  
 
For observation of grasping vs. pointing performed by both agents, our functional results have 
shown a clear signal increase in bilateral IPL and PMC in case of grasping (see  Figure 22a). 
This indicates that MNS-activity was modulated by observation of different action types 
performed by both human and robotic agents (see Figure 22c). To my knowledge, no previous 
study was able to assess this. 
 
We further investigated goal attribution to observed actions, which we define as 
differentiating between the same action type (either grasping or pointing) directed at different 
goals. The bilateral IPL, PMC, and left pIFG showed sensitivity to the goal of the action, 
again during observation of both agents. Although the activity in the bilateral IPL and PMC 
was increased for the robotic agent, no interaction between agent and goal was present in any 
of the ROIs, suggesting that movements of both agents were processed as being goal-directed. 
Observation of grasping tool items vs. food items (both object categories suggesting a specific 
intention) revealed increased activity for tools in the bilateral IPL and PMC (see  Figure 23). 
Observation of grasping a block (geometric shape) caused smaller activation than for tool or 
food in IPL and PMC, but also in the left pIFG, which did not differentiate between tool and 
food (see  Figure 23).  
 
The modulation of the MNS activity by goal is a new finding since all previous studies only 
compared levels of MNS activation during action observation across agents (humans vs. 
robots) and did not test whether the activations are present if contrasting actions of inanimate 
agents directed to different goals. Differential MNS activity was consistent with the data 
obtained by button presses and the debriefing after the experiment. The analysis of the button 
presses indicated successful intention attribution to both agents in over 95% percent of trials 
(although 50% of subjects reported that it was more difficult to attribute intentions to robot 
than to the human agent, see Figure 20a). Consistent with that, in case of grasping tools, all 
subjects indicated that they anticipated the human and the robot to use the tool appropriately 
to its expected “well-known” function independently of agent nature. However, when 
observing the robot’s grasping action directed at food items, approximately 1/3 of subjects 
attributed the intention of “eating” or “bringing to the “mouth” (like for the human) and 2/3 of 
the subjects attributed the intention of giving/offering the food to someone else.  
 
When observing grasping actions performed by the robot in comparison to the human agent, 
activation was stronger in the bilateral IPL (see Figure 22b, c). Interestingly, this difference 
was absent when comparing the static baselines of the two agents to each other as well as 
comparing pointing actions performed by both agents (see Figure 22c).  This suggests that the 
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increased activation for observing the robot grasping objects was triggered neither by its 
artificial appearance nor by its non-biological movement. Likely, the signal increase was 
attentional, since the grasping action of the robot was executed from above, a rather unusual 
type of grasp. 
4.4.3 Is goal understanding capacity innate? – a preferential looking times study21 
To clarify whether the capability to attribute goals is innate or learned by experience, we 
examined the marmoset monkey’s goal attribution to two previously unencountered agents 
displaying different degrees of monkey-likeness. We supposed that if the marmosets could 
attribute goals to an inanimate monkey-like agent, this would indicate the innateness of the 
goal-attribution capacity. 
In the first experiment we have shown that common marmosets attribute goals to actions of 
their conspecifics, even if these are presented in video clips. This finding indicates that the 
monkeys, like 6-months old human infants [304] habituated not to the physical properties of 
the action (motion path), but to its goal (a certain object). It seems that the monkeys tried to 
predict the actions of their conspecifics on the basis of the goal-directedness of the event 
observed during the habituation trials and thus expected that the subsequent action of the 
agent would be directed towards the object that has previously been approached. This pattern 
of results was obtained in spite of the fact that the congruent event was visually more 
dissimilar to the habituation event than was the incongruent event (which, in fact, displayed 
the very same action). In the second experiment, we demonstrated that the goal attribution 
mechanism still works if the agent presented in video clips is a monkey-sized quadruped robot 
which the monkeys had never before observed to behave in a goal-directed way previous to 
the experiments. However, when a moving geometric box with no monkey-like features was 
used as agent, the monkeys were no longer able to attribute goals to its actions (third 
experiment). Thus, although monkeys attribute intentions to their conspecifics and can extend 
this capacity to infer goals of inanimate, conspecific-like agents, they are not to be able to do 
so in case of objects with only a small degree of morphological similarity. Therefore, since 
the monkeys attributed goals to previously unencountered agents, the capability of goal 
understanding seems to be innate. 
The second purpose of this study was to investigate whether the capability of marmosets to 
recognize goals of an entity has an effect on their readiness to accept such an entity as a 
model in a social learning context. In the final object preference test, we have shown that 
monkeys were more likely to learn from a conspecific and from the robotic model than from 
the box. Since the monkeys also attributed goals to conspecific and robotic agents but not to 
the box, we argue that capability of social learning is linked to goal attribution. This is a novel 
finding since our results indicate that stimulus enhancement, which is a more simple form of 
social learning is a subject to goal attribution. 
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5 Discussion 
 
5.1  Agent and action characteristics which facilitate motor interference, MNS 
activity and intention attribution 
5.1.1 Role of agent appearance and motor system (motility)  
The results of the MI study suggest that the requirement for MI during observation of 
incongruent movements is not the biological nature of the observed agent, its human-like 
appearance (like possessing a head and torso), or its biological velocity, but rather its human-
like motility. Of course, human motility implies at least some similarity in the agent’s 
appearance such as human-like general morphology of the observed body part. In contrast to 
Albert et al. (2010), who suggested that human shape is a crucial factor in triggering MI [5], 
and Chaminade & Cheng who claimed that MI can be triggered only when the whole body is 
visible [61], my study shows that a robot which has an arm displaying a human-like joint 
configuration and moves with smooth movement velocity is able to elicit MI. Thus, the 
presence of the shoulder joint with lower and upper arm might have facilitated the subjects’ 
association of JAHIR 90° with the human arm. The importance of similar motility of the 
observing and executing agent is in line with previous studies mentioned in the introduction 
which indicated that in infants simulation can take place only when the observed action can be 
transformed to the own body of the agent. Therefore, it is conceivable that in the original 
study by Kilner et al. (2003) MI was absent during observation of robotic arm movement not 
only because the robot moved with artificial velocity, but also because the robot's artificial 
joint configuration did not allow observers to map its movements to the human body [166]. 
My findings imply that if robots will be used as models for people with disabilities for 
training of a certain body part, it will be sufficient if the movement of only this body part can 
me mapped into the subject’s body. 
 
In contrast to the MI experiment, since the robot presented to the monkeys had only shoulder 
joints (but no knee joints), I cannot argue that the mechanism involved in monkey goal 
attribution and thus motor resonance requires exactly the same motility of the observed agent. 
However, similar motility in case of monkeys might not necessarily mean the presence of the 
same joint configuration but simply the presence of four limbs and quadruped motion. This 
assumption could explain the absence of goal attribution to a box, which had no limbs. 
Accordingly, a study showed that cotton-top tamarins, which, like common marmosets, 
belong to the family Callitrichidae, attribute the capacity to change location only to living 
animals (like mice and frogs) but not to inanimate limbless agents such as a moving ball or a 
moving clay face [136]. Previous studies which show that capuchin monkeys do not attribute 
goals to rods [218] are in line with this finding.  Nevertheless, I argue that the presence of 
morphological features (body, head, and extremities) is an important cue for the monkeys in 
order to perceive an entity as an intentional agent.  
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The finding, that observation of a robot may trigger the same degree of MI as a human agent 
is in line with the findings of my fMRI experiment, which has demonstrated that MNS 
resonates as a response to movement observation of a humanoid robot with artificial 
appearance. The neural simulation of different action types performed by the robot is 
indicated by the fact that grasping activates the bilateral IPL and PMC stronger than pointing. 
Further, my data show that not only the type of the action, but the goal of the action might be 
simulated when observing robotic grasping and pointing actions (see Figure 23). Supporting 
this interpretation, the debriefing after the experiment has shown that the participants were 
able to attribute an intention to almost every robotic action (see Figure 20). This is not self-
evident because previous infant studies claimed that agents must first be categorized as 
animate before their behavior can be interpreted in terms of goals [194,304]. Attribution of a 
different intention depending on the goal of an action and presence of this differential 
activation during observation of both agents indicated that similar cortical networks are 
contributing to goal attribution when observing both humans and artificial agents despite 
artificial movement velocity and appearance. Thus, it seems that the component of MNS that 
codes goals represents intentional motor actions independently from the nature of the 
performing agent and its movement velocity (biological vs. non-biological). 
Consistent with  finding that MNS in humans is activated by actions of inanimate agents, an 
fMRI study in monkeys showed that at least the most anterior sector of the ventral premotor 
cortex (area F5a) responds to robotic movements [201]. This finding is in line with my result 
revealing that monkeys can extend the goal attribution capacity to unfamiliar inanimate, 
conspecific-like agents, like the robot which has been used in the monkey experiment (see 
Figure 15b). However, the monkeys seem not to be able to extend goal attribution to objects 
which do not have the shape of a human or of an animal, like a box (see Figure 15c). The 
necessity of at least some morphological similarity for goal attribution to unfamiliar agents 
might be explained by the simulation theory which has been described in the introduction 
[107,119]. The simulation procedure reduces the possible range of actors, whose intentions 
the observer might be able to simulate, since for simulation, the observed actor should have 
the same motor constraints as the observer. Thus, we can project our own internal experiences 
onto other agents only if these agents are similar to us (the "like me" hypothesis) [194].  
The combination of the results from the present monkey experiment with  the previous 
experiments showing that marmoset monkeys [40] and macaque monkeys [245] attribute 
goals to a human experimenter, indicates that in order to be seen as an intentional agent by a 
monkey, the agent either has to exhibit a monkey-like morphology (like in case of monkey-
like robot) or be familiar to it (like in case of human). However, it is also possible that 
difference in shape of the body (like in case of humans) does not impair goal understanding as 
long as the entity has certain features characterizing biological agents such as a body with 
head and extremities. Together with previous studies on infants [77,116,157,158,159,224] my 
findings  support  the assumption that understanding goal-directedness is not limited to 
actions of conspecifics and that prior experience with a certain agent is not required for this 
ability. 
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5.1.2 Role of biological motion 
Taken together, the results from the MI and functional experiments indicate that, in 
comparison to observation of human actions, the motor resonance is not reduced during 
observation of actions performed by artificial human-like agents even if they do not move 
with biological movement velocity.   
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Table 5: Overview of studies which investigated MI in live settings. The table was adopted with 
permission from [174]. 
In addition to findings presented in [62,120,165,166,212] showing that biological movement 
was crucial for triggering MI (see Table 5), I now demonstrated that quasi-biological 
movement velocity is sufficient to elicit this effect. Therefore, motor resonance can already be 
triggered using an agent which moves with an approximation of biological velocity profile. 
Interestingly, two studies have demonstrated that in case of a moving geometrical shape, the 
MI can also be triggered by constant velocity  [22,270] (and Table 6). However, in these 
studies, abstract moving dots instead of embodied robots were used. As an explanation for the 
presence of MI despite non-biological appearance and velocity, Bouquet et al. suggested that 
in case of the dot, a single moving point-light dot might have led to a greater accessibility of 
motion information than the robotic arm used by [166]. This suggestion is supported by the 
fact that individuals show a natural tendency to focus upon movement of the hand during 
observation of arm movements [192]. Thus, the moving dot might have activated the 
movement of the participant's hand towards it, irrespective of the type of movement.  
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However, it seems that when it comes to human-like agents, the constant velocity will impair 
motor interference. A recent study investigating the effect of agent shape [256] indicates that 
even a human-like joint configuration cannot compensate for jerky movements produced with 
constant velocity [256]. Thus, although [256] used the robot KASPAR2, the appearance of 
which is very similar to a human (it has 6 degrees of freedom in its arms and hands and a 
skin-like silicon-rubber mask on its face), in the original MI paradigm [166] no MI could be 
demonstrated when using it as the model, which according to my studies has been caused by 
constant movement velocity of the robot.  
Table 6: Overview of studies which investigated MI by using videos of point-lights or dots. The table 
was adopted with permission from [174]. 
The demonstration of MI and therefore motor resonance, when observing a robot moving with 
a minimum-jerk velocity profile is supported by results of my fMRI study, which showed the 
MNS-based neuronal simulation of robotic movements produced with an approximation of 
biological movement velocity. My results from the looking times experiment also indicate 
that marmoset monkeys are able to attribute goals to individuals with conspecific features 
who are incapable of producing biological motion. Therefore, in contrast to [14], biological 
motion is not a necessary cue for goal attribution in monkeys. However, based on the number 
of previous studies investigating the importance of biological velocity [62,120,165,166,212] I 
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argue that in humans, at least a quasi-biological velocity is required for triggering motor 
resonance when observing non-goal-directed movements. This assumption is also supported 
by a recent study, showing that in human-robot interaction, a “minimum jerk” velocity 
profile, which is closer to a biological one, facilitates motor interaction in a handover task  in 
contrast to trapezoidal (more jerky) velocity profile [144]. 
The ability to distinguish biological from non-biological motion is useful for recognizing the 
movements of other animate beings and for prediction of their future actions and making an 
appropriate response. Some studies have suggested that perception of biological motion plays 
a role in social cognition more broadly [81] including the discrimination of living from non-
living entities [156,284] or gender [283] or individuals from one another [150].  
 
5.1.3 Role of agent and action familiarity 
Conflicting results of previous studies 
In the introduction, I mentioned that previous studies have led to conflicting results 
concerning the question whether the MNS can be activated by processing action of inanimate 
agents and whether biological velocity and human-like appearance are required for motor 
resonance. Researchers supporting the familiarity account claim that during action 
observation, familiarity and presence of the observer’s prior motor experience in the observed 
action positively correlate with the signal increase in his MNS areas [2,47,74,75]. Researchers 
supporting the “agent-independent” goal-coding account suggest a similar MNS-activation 
for the processing of unfamiliar (artificial) and familiar (human) actions [112,206].  
Supporting the first account, a stronger MNS-response was demonstrated when the observed 
actions [195,276] or facial expressions [66] were  performed by a human compared to a robot. 
Further, observation of movements performed by objects [71,91] or animals [31] led to a 
weaker MNS activation when compared to those performed by human agents. Also behavioral 
studies investigating how the observed actions influence simultaneously performed actions 
has demonstrated greater interference effects when participants watched  a  human actor 
moving  with natural kinematics vs. constant velocity [165]. The same outcome was present 
when watching a robotic agent moving in a human-like compared to a non-biological manner 
[212]. 
 In support of the second account, [56] demonstrated no difference in the IFG- and IPL-
activity when comparing brain response elicited by the observation of object manipulation by 
four agents with different degree of human-likeness (a human, a humanoid robot, stacked 
boxes and a mechanical claw22). Additional evidence indicating that the MNS is sensitive to 
non-biological nature and motion kinematics of the observed agent comes from recent studies 
demonstrating activity in the MNS-areas  during observation of humanly impossible 
movements [71,246] or animated geometric shapes which manipulate simple  objects [231]. 
                                                           
22
 However, this finding might also be a result of passive viewing task or usage of computer-generated/televised 
stimuli instead of videotaped ones [127,189,259]. 
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Further, using EEG, [87] have shown that the P123 wave was enhanced in response to happy 
compared to neutral facial expressions for robotic as well as for human stimuli, suggesting 
that emotional expressions of robots are encoded as early as those of humans. Additionally, 
two recent studies indicated the same degree of activation in the MNS when observing hand 
actions performed by humans and robots  [112,253]. Finally, [206] found equal mu 
suppression24 effects during the observation of human and humanoid robot’s opening and 
closing hand movements, and [117] showed similar premotor activation when observing 
human and humanoid emotional facial expressions (in fact, there was a larger response for 
humanoid actions at some coordinates). Also behavioral studies showed motor facilitation 
[227] and interference effects on the movement of the observer [175,212] when observing 
robotic actions.  
How my results help to clarify the nature of conflicting findings 
We found increased activity in the MNS areas responding to action observation for the robot 
in case of grasping actions but no difference between human and robot neither for the static 
pictures nor for pointing actions. I suggest that these findings might be explained by the fact 
that robotic movements were performed with an unusual hand trajectory which looked 
unnatural to the subjects (in fact, 40% of the subjects perceived robot’s movements as being 
not natural, see Figure 20d). As stated in the methodological section, the robot’s joint 
configuration required heightening of the hand right before lowering it for the grasp – thus, in 
contrast to the human who grasped the objects from the side, the robot grasped them from 
above. The interpretation that the trajectory of the robot and not the artificial movement 
velocity and appearance is responsible for the stronger activation in case of the robot is 
supported by the fact that during pointing, as well as during static conditions, there was no 
difference in the BOLD signal in the regions of interest between observing human and robotic 
agents. 
Based on the predictive coding framework [151,200,234], I argue that the signal increase in 
PMC and IPL during observation of robotic grasping might be due to the higher prediction 
error when watching movement performed with an unusual trajectory [103]. This framework 
claims that when observing agents,  we  generate  expectations about  how  they might  move  
based  on  our own motor system,  the form  of  the agent’s body [31], the goal of action [107] 
or/and  environmental  context [183]. We then compare these expectations to the observed 
motion and get a stronger activation for the larger prediction error. Consistent with my 
findings, a number of studies showed increased activity in the IPL and PMC when observing 
robot-like human [76] and robotic motion [112]  when compared to natural human motion. 
Further, a higher activation in the left IPL and SPL when observing robotic faces has been 
shown in [217] and [117]. 
Our results therefore contradict the suggestion that MNS responds   most   robustly only when 
watching familiar compared to less familiar movements. Instead, I argue that studies which 
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 P1 is an early ERP component which is positive and is related to processing of visual stimuli 
24
 Mu suppression is an indirect measure of mirror neuron activity and is recorded over the sensorimotor cortex 
with electroencephalography  
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found a stronger MNS-activation when observing familiar vs. less familiar actions [47,48] 
have used stimuli with different characteristics than the studies which were described in the 
paragraph above [76,117]. On the one hand, as in the present experiment, the observation of 
unfamiliar actions might have lead to increased prediction error   and   greater   BOLD   signal   
compared   to observation of ‘generally familiar’ human actions [76]. On the other hand, a 
greater BOLD response when comparing   extensively rehearsed  actions  to  generally 
familiar actions (see [47,74,75]) might be explained by the fact that for rehearsed actions, the 
participants can  make  very  strong and specific  predictions  about  how  an  action will 
continue based on prior experience, which in case of slight deviation of sensory input might 
lead to a higher prediction error compared to observation of ‘generally familiar’ actions. Thus, 
it might be possible that the relationship between the activation of the MNS and action 
familiarity is not linear. Instead, in comparison to generally familiar actions, MNS might be 
stronger activated when observing extensively familiar [47,74,75], non-intended  [29,71]  or 
surprising actions [177].  
However, I have to note that a very unnatural, mechanical movement might also lead to a 
reduced activation of the MNS. A recent study investigated how the MNS-activity is 
modulated due to the unnaturalness of an observed action [260]. The authors inserted short 
pauses in the middle of the presented action. Interestingly, they revealed that although the 
MNS activity was still present when two pauses were inserted, it was significantly reduced by 
the jerkiness of movement when four additional pauses were added. The discrepancy between 
my results and findings from [195] and [276] might be thus explained by the fact that a 
slightly deviated, but smooth action, like in case of JUSTIN, may enhance the MNS activity 
during action observation, while a highly unnatural action like in [195] and [276] would lead 
to a deactivation of the MNS. The smaller number of joints and the more restricted range of 
motion of each joints might have impaired the motility of robots used in these two 
experiments, leading to a smaller degree of motor resonance when observing them [175]. 
Attentional explanations of the increased MNS activity 
In the present study, the increased activation of the MNS for the robot might additionally 
result from the participants’ engagement in an explicit intention attribution task. Indeed, an 
fMRI-study has shown that the request to explicitly attend to the emotion of the agent led to 
significantly increased response to robot, but not human facial expressions in the left IFG 
[66]. Further, [29] demonstrated an increase of activation in the MNS in the group of 
participants who had to judge whether the observed action was intended or not in comparison 
to the participants who were simply asked to observe the presented actions. Thus, observation 
of less predictable actions in comparison to familiar actions could lead to stronger MNS 
activity due to the effort to create an action representation where there is less prior 
information available. In line with this, a recent study has shown that movement prediction 
during hand-over is impaired when the prior knowledge about the usual movement kinematics 
(velocity and trajectory) acquired during the daily interaction does not correspond to the 
observed movement kinematics [144].  
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Finally, there are also several alternative explanations for the higher BOLD signal during 
observation of robotic actions compared to human. Due to motor constraints and lacking 
familiarity, it  is  possible that  simulation of robotic movements might have required  greater  
muscle  tension compared  to  performing  the  natural  human  style  movements. Another 
reason for a stronger activation in the MNS might be a higher  ‘engagement’ of the 
participants by the more salient robotic actions, since it  is  possible  that actions not 
belonging to the  motor  repertoire capture  attention  stronger  than  actions  we  see and 
perform more frequently.  
5.1.4 Role of movement variability, self-propulsion and capability to interact 
Some studies claimed that movement variability is a crucial factor in triggering MNS-activity 
[112] and perceiving someone's action as being goal-directed [226]. Likewise, although 
infants did not attribute goals to a moving box because it repeated exactly the same 
movements in consecutive trials, in the same setup 6.5-month-old infants were capable of 
doing so if it moved along a different path in every trial [79]. Although I have used monkeys 
and not human infants, my results do not support this later study, since despite having a 
slightly different starting point and trajectory in each habituation trial, the box was not 
perceived as an intentional agent. Also the results from the MI study show that MI can be 
evoked even by robotic monotonous movements, indicating that movement variability is not a 
crucial factor for motor resonance. Thus, when designing robots for interactions with humans 
we do not have to take this factor into account. 
Although my results indicate that certain morphological cues are necessary for intention 
attribution, they cannot rule out the possibility that self-propulsion is also required for it, as 
previously claimed in [116,180,226]. However, since the monkeys were not able to attribute 
intentions to a moving box, this study provides additional evidence that self-propulsion is not 
sufficient for triggering categorization of the object as an ‘intentional agent’ as suggested by 
[10,226] when the required morphological cues are absent. Likewise, [161] demonstrated that 
young infants do not attribute goals to a self-propelled box (but see [185]).  
The looking time study further indicates that interaction with the object is not required for 
goal attribution. In my experiment, the monkey attributed goals to the robot, although it did 
not interact with the object after approaching it. This finding is in contrast to [7], who used 
the looking time methodology to show that infants interpret only an interactive humanoid 
robot but not a non-interactive robot as a biological agent.  
5.2 Neuronal activations related to understanding actions and attributing 
intentions  
5.2.1 Common system for action execution and action observation 
The areas which were active during both action observation and execution and therefore are 
likely to be classified as MNS were located in the ventral part of the pars opercularis of the 
left IFG, bilateral supramarginal gyrus, AIP and the PMC. Thus, my results support the 
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account that observation of a hand action performed by another individual triggers activity 
within a network of areas which broadly matches some neural systems relevant to hand action 
execution [31,112] and thus underlies action understanding through motor simulation 
[107,238]. These results are widely in line with findings from the recently performed meta-
analysis of studies incorporating observation of visual images of actions and/or a requirement 
to execute motor actions [196]. These findings yielded significant clusters in the IFG, ventral 
and dorsal PMC, SPL and IPL in the conjuction analysis of action observation & action 
execution. The sum of voxels activated during action execution and action observation 
separately was larger than the number of voxels which were active during both conditions and 
thus can be categorized as the MNS. 
 
5.2.2 Differentiating action types  
When observing grasping actions performed by both the human and the robotic agent in the 
fMRI-experiment, bilateral PMC and the IPL (aIPS) were activated more than during pointing 
(see Figure 22c). Activity in the area IPL was also demonstrated during action recognition and 
action planning [263]. The activity in this region was further shown by  [219] and [122], who 
compared observation of grasping and pointing actions performed by a human agent. When 
performing actions, IPL was activated more during grasping than reaching or pointing 
movements [80,109], which can be explained by increased demands on motor control 
required by precise finger coordination during the grip and lifting phase after grasping. In my 
experiment, increased activity in the IPL during observation of grasping can be explained in 
the following way. During action observation, the observers simulate the actions by activating 
motor circuits which they would recruit while performing this action themselves. The 
simulation of grasping would require a more precise motor coordination than the simulation 
of pointing. The stronger IPL activation during observation of robot’s grasping pointing 
indicates that we might recognize actions of conspecifics and even inanimate agents by 
simulating them with our own MNS.  
One might argue that apart from higher requirements for finger coordination during grasping, 
the increased activation in the PMC and IPL might be caused by attributing generally 
different “prior global intention” to pointing vs. grasping actions. Thus, pointing differs from 
grasping not only through visual characteristics, but besides might have a different final goal 
(e.g. grasping the object vs. indicating the presence of an object). In contrast to grasping an 
object, when the person points to an object, this might mean that (i) the person indicates the 
desire to later interact with the object or that (ii) he/she wants the observer to interact with the 
object. In my experiment, 10 subjects attributed the intention (i) to the agents and 10 other 
subject the intention (ii). I assigned these subjects to two groups and performed a t-test using 
individual contrast images for “pointing” to find out whether the brain activity was different 
according to the intention attributed to pointing. However, this test did not reveal any 
difference between the groups indicating that my findings for the contrast “grasping-pointing” 
were not due to different intentions attributed to the hand action but due to different 
movement patterns of the two action types.  
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5.2.3 Attributing action goals  
All tool and food items had different size and all three object categories were presented in 
every trial, independent from the action goal, thus allowing us to minimize the possibility that 
goal-related activity was caused by different physical and visual features of objects. Thus, in 
contrast to the previous studies [130,230], in my experiment, the goal of grasping was not 
defined by the form or color of a certain object (which would have made the differentiation 
between grasp configuration and goal object impossible) but by its belonging to a certain 
functional category defining the widely known purpose of the object. In most daily life 
situations, grasping something is just an initial component of a broader action, in which the 
object is likely to be used to achieve a subsequent final goal. I therefore supposed that, after 
the agent grasped a certain object, the subjects would expect the agents to act upon it based on 
the range of possibilities which this object offers [145,301]. I characterized this expected 
further action stream (e.g. “eating something” or “fixing something with a tool”) as a 
primitive form of intention attribution and argued that it will be reflected in the differential 
activity within the MNS, depending on the action goal. Even if these expected actions are not 
seen, occlusion mirror neurons and sequence selective neurons could add to differential 
activations [99,148,293]. Indeed, in my study, the debriefing after the action observation 
experiment revealed that observation of grasping of every item suggested a further stream of 
actions. Accordingly, during action observation, the MNS was differentially activated 
depending on the goal of grasping. 
During observation of both human and robotic agents, for the comparison of grasping actions 
directed at tools with those directed at food items, I find increased activation for tools in the 
bilateral IPL, PMC but not left pIFG (BA 44, see Figure 23a). For attributing intention to 
grasping familiar specific objects (tool/food) versus unspecific objects (block, see Figure 23b, 
c) I find additional increased activation in the left pIFG. This increased activation was present 
for the observation of actions of both agents. 
Activations in PMC and IPL are consistent with studies demonstrating repetition suppression 
of brain activity in these regions when repetitively observing an action which has the same 
intention [130,131,132,209,230]. Further, [294] found robust activation in the bilateral aIPS 
during discrimination of action intentions for actions aimed at displacing or using a tool-
object. Finally, there is some evidence for more abstract goal representations in the inferior 
parietal cortex from studies of patients with apraxia [42,128] and from studies which use 
transcranial magnetic stimulation for disrupting goal processing [288]. Therefore, I suggest a 
central role for the left aIPS/IPL in representing and interpreting the goals of observed hand 
actions irrespective from the agent nature and biological velocity. I further argue that the 
stronger activation in the IPL and PMC for observation of tool grasping in comparison to food 
grasping is elicited by expectation of a more complex action chain following grasping a tool 
(which suggest using a tool in a further complex action) vs. grasping a food item (which is 
less abstract and most likely suggests direct eating action). 
The (i) absence of difference in pIFG activity when comparing grasping tool with food items 
and (ii) increase of pIFG-activity for observation of grasping directed at familiar and specific 
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items (tool and food) vs. the geometric shape (block), might be explained by the following. 
First, the actions performed with the block might be less meaningful than those performed 
with tools and food. A recent study of object-directed actions revealed that although all 
actions led to increased activity in the bilateral IPL, the bilateral IFG differentiated between 
meaningful and meaningless actions [202]. However, since another study revealed no 
difference in the IFG activity when comparing observation of grasping actions (both robotic 
and human) directed at meaningful objects (e.g. cocktail glass) in comparison to simple 
geometric shapes (e.g. a cylinder) [112], this explanation seems to be unlikely. An alternative 
explanation could be related to hand configurations during grasping. In contrast to trials with 
tool- and food-items, where I have used multiple objects, grasping a block resulted in the 
repeated grasping of one item. Thus, when comparing grasping tool and food items to 
grasping a block also resulted to comparing various hand configurations with only one hand 
configuration. This could have led to an increased pIFG activity for tool and food items. 
Consistent with this assumption, [132] have shown that although the IPL activity is modulated 
by the goal of grasping, the activity in the IFG is modulated by observation of different grasp 
configurations. Supporting this suggestion, it has been shown that in monkeys, the area F5 
(congruent to human IFG) has direct connections to primary motor cortex and neurons 
specializing for different grasp configurations [237]. The proposal, that IFG is involved in 
processing grip configuration is at odds with some studies which have attempted to link IFG 
to more abstract action understanding functions, such as the interpretation of goals [293] and 
intentions [177]. However, I have to note that these studies either did not distinguish between 
the configuration of the hand and the identity of the goal object [293] or did not control for 
context [177].    
5.2.4 Present results in light of studies investigating the mentalizing network25 
The conjunction analysis between action observation and action execution revealed common 
activations in the ventral part of the pars opercularis of the left pIFG, bilateral supramarginal 
gyrus, aIPS and PMC. Despite using an intention attribution task, in contrast to [65,170], I 
found no activation in the brain areas which are supposed to be involved in mentalizing when 
comparing human to robotic actions. These studies have demonstrated a stronger activation in 
the mentalizing regions - the medial prefrontal cortex and right temporoparietal junction (see 
Figure 26) - for human agent in comparison to humanoid robot during playing a rock-paper-
scissors game [65] or an iterated prisoner's dilemma [170]. I argue that the usage of different 
methods serves as an explanation for the difference in findings between these studies and my 
study. Similarly to my experiment, studies investigating the MNS typically use photographs 
and videos of articulated body parts in interaction with objects or whole-body movements 
performed in contextually impoverished contexts [31,76,112,148,177,230,253]. These studies 
do not explicitly manipulate and investigate the extent to which participants make mental state 
inferences (beliefs, desires, and intentions). On the other hand, for investigation of the 
mentalizing system  as in [65,170], researchers often use interactive games, verbal or abstract 
visual stimuli such as cartoons or animations (e.g., geometric shapes, see [138]) and  present 
                                                           
25Mentalizing is a psychological concept that describes the ability to understand the mental state of oneself and 
others which underlies overt behaviour. 
  
the participants only seldom with stimuli showing embodied actions or observable behaviours 
[55,210]. In me experiment, however,
mental state but rather anticipating the further not yet executed chains of actions as
which lead to an observable physical change
mentalizing areas by observed videos of human and robot action was not expected. 
 
We argue that attribution of intentions and mental states (associated with 
network) are processed in different brain regions and take place on different levels. 
possible mechanisms by which the mirror system intera
mirror neurons provide rapid and intuitive input to the mentalizing system. In fact, the mirror 
neuron mechanism captures the motor intentional dimension of action, c
agent and the observer, supporting the process of mentalizing
explain the actions of others in terms of beliefs or desires were we not able to recognize 
immediately their intentional motor meaning;
specifies that a particular movement is part of this or that action. Similarly we would not be 
able to explain the behavior of others in terms of intentions (in the “propositional” sense of 
the term) and foresee their possible consequences
that regulates the various goal
understanding actions. I therefore argue that
involving a visuomotor analysis of the scene  is
second level of intention understanding, involving a more abstract and descriptive content 
might be mediated by the metalizing network 
 
Figure 26: Brain regions supposed to be involved in the process of mentalizing. The regions
in mentalizing are drawn based on 
temporo-parietal junction. 
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(ii) goals are achieved through the most rational and efficient action available, given the 
constraints of the environment [115]. However, based on the results of the debriefing and 
differential activation of the MNS depending on the goal of grasping (as seen in the 
behavioral data and supported by the imaging data) this assumption of rational action seems 
unlikely. 
5.2.5 Limitations of classical fMRI design  
There is no reason to believe that the premotor and parietal cortices are the only MNS-areas in 
the human brain that have mirror or simulation properties. Until recently, studies investigating 
the neural basis of the MNS have used experimental designs such as passive observation and 
active imitation protocols for various tasks. Thus, the researchers could demonstrate areas 
which are more active during a certain condition (e.g. gesturing, hand-object interactions, 
symbolic hand movements, or emotional facial expressions) compared to a control condition 
(e.g. random hand movements or rest). However, it is possible that certain regions of the brain 
include neurons with simulation properties that cannot be displayed by conventional methods, 
since their activity might be not higher than during the control task.  Thus, since most fMRI 
studies compare activation patterns to a rest baseline, the seeming lack of activation of the 
MNS (as for example in autism spectrum disorder), may result as a consequence of a greater 
resting state [85]. The second problem with using classical control tasks used for studying the 
MNS is that in the test condition the active areas sum over the responses of many neural 
populations which might be involved in processes other than simulation (such as vision, 
motor planning, motor execution, working memory, and emotion). 
Mirror neurons make up only about 10%-20% of the neurons that respond either during 
movement observation or execution in monkey mirror system areas [99]. Thus, one of the 
early studies on the MNS found that only 92 out of 532 neurons (17%) in F5 of the macaque 
had so-called “mirror” properties [106]. Since during action observation and execution, MNS 
matches one’s actions with resonant actions of other people, the temporal changes in brain 
activity in a certain brain voxel (MRI voxels typically represent a brain volume of 27 mm3) of 
a person who performs an action should modulate the “ups” and “downs” in the activity of the 
same voxel in the person who observes the action almost simultaneously. The concept of 
simulation entails more than only “going on and off together” at the beginning and end of a 
single action - it involves a continuous tracking of the more subtle changes in activity during 
the execution and observation of entire streams of action. Single cell recordings [199] show 
that the temporal profile of the mirror neuron activity is indeed similar during action 
observation and execution, potentially providing a neural basis for resonance. However, the 
usage of conventional fMRI designs makes it possible to display only the location of 
activation in certain brain areas during a certain task.  
Conventional fMRI experiments are classically analyzed using general linear modeling 
(GLM) which requires a highly controlled setting and predefined, isolated stimuli. This 
analysis uses the GLM for each voxel indexed against a specified experimental design but 
does not explicitly involve measuring highly structural temporal dynamics of neuronal 
responses. For these reason, [135] moved away from the classical experimental MRI design, 
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where a predefined stimulus is used to locate brain regions. Instead, in order to define 
preferred stimuli, the authors recorded brain activation during a free viewing of a movie and 
examined its temporal dynamics. The authors coined the term “inter-subject synchronization” 
a method of voxelwise temporal correlation between subjects performing the same 
“naturalistic” task that is now called inter-subject correlation analysis (ISC). In contrast to 
classical MRI analysis, in the ISC analysis, hemodynamic response of one subject serves as 
reference to predict the hemodynamic response of another subject. The correlation coefficient 
of the corresponding voxels is calculated between the time series of the hemodynamic activity 
in two subjects. Therefore, for the future study of mirror neuron activity some studies might 
prefer using a ISC method. 
5.3 Goal attribution in non-human primates is innate and subject to 
morphological similarity 
In accordance with my expectations, in all three experiments with marmoset monkeys, 
looking times decreased significantly during the first three habituation trials (see Figure 24a, 
b, c). Further, when the subjects were presented with the conspecific and the robot models, all 
subjects displayed a higher recovery of attention in the incongruent condition. This indicates 
that they expected the model monkey and the monkey-like robot to adjust their grasping/path 
to the change of the object position in the test events. In contrast to the first two experiments, 
in the third experiment, the subjects looked longer if the agent (box) changed its trajectory 
than if it changed its goal, indicating that the monkeys did not attribute intentions to it. Thus, 
that the generalization mechanism for goal attribution in monkeys required at least some 
resemblance of the model to a conspecific (which could be for example a head or torso).  
But why did the monkeys look longer when the box changed its trajectory? The explanation 
for this kind of behavior might lie in the fact that after observing the box repeatedly perform 
one and the same movement toward the same direction with no significant modification in the 
path, the monkeys had formed an expectation about the box and its physical movement 
pattern.  Therefore, they were likely to expect an inanimate entity to repeat its behavior from 
the habituation phase during the test phase and understandably looked longer when it changed 
its previous trajectory.  
Our results suggest that in monkeys, goal attribution to inanimate agents is possible, but 
limited only to agents possessing conspecific-like features like similar body shape and 
presence of limbs. This goal-attribution capability might allow the monkeys to predict the 
behavior of predators and prey, and of conspecifics in contexts related to hierarchy and food 
retrieval. Thus, it enables the animals to respond appropriately to objects and animate agents 
(e.g., run away from a predator, approach a piece of fruit that has dropped from a tree and 
rolled next to a rock) and  might provide some of the relevant building blocks for the 
development of the theory of mind during evolution [222].  
Our results bring us closer to answering one of the central questions in the cognitive 
development which concerns the nature of our understanding of intentionality. Thus, my 
study provides evidence in favor of an innate vs. learned-by-experience mechanism of 
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intention understanding proposed by [99,51,157,180,224,226]. Based on certain 
morphological and behavioral features, monkeys are able to positively attribute goals to 
robots without having any previous experience with them, indicating that the capacity to 
understand goals is something which does not need to be learned as long as the agent 
possesses conspecifics-like features. The sensitivity of goal attribution ability to certain 
morphological features might explain why monkeys do not attribute intentions to a moving 
box. Additionally, the increasingly demonstrable overlap between infants and primates in 
early intention understanding capacity strengthens the view for the idea that inferring goals is 
an innate ability, shaped by our evolutionary heritage [245,303]. However, since adults 
attribute intentionality even to moving geometric figures [138], it seems that the innate goal 
attribution capacity can be widened by experience and extended by the mechanisms of the 
mentalizing system (see section 5.2.4).  
The innateness of goal understanding indicates that when designing robots for interaction with 
humans, implementing basic human features into their appearance might facilitate intuitive 
understanding of their actions by untrained users. 
5.4 Goal attribution is a precondition for social learning 
Apart from investigating goal attribution to inanimate agents, the second goal of the looking-
times study was to investigate whether the capability of marmosets to recognize goals of an 
entity has an effect on their readiness to accept such an entity as a model in a social learning 
context.  Social reward-learning from a conspecific model has been demonstrated in a number 
of studies with marmosets [34,44,84], even if the model was presented in video-clips rather 
than in real life [39]. In [34], it could be shown that after observing a monkey demonstrator 
perform a certain task-solving technique for a food reward, some of the observer monkeys 
showed a stronger tendency to use this technique to reach the goal. Also [296] have shown 
that monkeys who observe a conspecific used certain method to solve a task for getting food 
reward (opening a canister with their mouth), they are more likely to use this method instead 
of a different one which is equally effective (opening a canister with paws). 
 
It has been shown that imitation might be linked to goal attribution [178,280,282]. However, 
it is not clear whether goal attribution is also a precondition for more simple forms of social 
learning, such as stimulus enhancement. As expected, I could demonstrate that in case of 
intentional agents (conspecific and a robotic conspecific-like agent), the monkeys were more 
likely to prefer the object which has been previously approached by the agent (see Figure 24d) 
and spent more time exploring it than the second object (see Figure 25). Additionally, when 
intention attribution was present, the number of monkeys who showed interest in at least one 
of the objects was higher than when it was absent (see section 4.3.6). In contrast, in the third 
experiment, when the monkeys did not attribute intention to the agent, they did not show any 
preference in approaching the objects and explored both objects for equal amounts of time 
(see Figure 24d and Figure 25). Thus, the monkeys were more likely to learn from a model, 
which they considered an intentional agent (conspecific or robotic model) than from an entity 
to which they did not attribute goals (a moving abstract shape). My data imply that the 
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capability of social learning by stimulus enhancement is subject to goal attribution. These 
results indicate that also in humans, intention attribution to robots might be a precondition 
even for learning simple tasks from a robot.   
5.5 Novelty of the present research and implementation of results 
5.5.1 Better understanding of factors contributing to motor resonance and goal 
understanding 
The results from the motor interference study demonstrate that MI and thus the process of 
simulation can be elicited while observing a robotic arm moving with a stereotyped quasi-
biological velocity profile. The fMRI study has supported these findings since observation of 
robots moving with artificially generated, although quasi-biological movement velocity led to 
similar activation of the MNS as human action (at least for pointing movements). This is a 
novel finding since previous studies have compared only constant vs. biological movement 
velocity and did not test the effect of smooth artificial velocity. A further novel finding is that 
the motor resonance during action observation does not require movement variability which is 
a characteristic aspect of human motion and has been suggested to be crucial for motor 
resonance [112]. Finally, while none of the studies has tested the influence of agent’s 
appearance on motor resonance in the observer, results of the MI-study demonstrated that not 
human-like appearance, but human-like motility is a precondition for motor resonance when 
observing actions of inanimate agents. Altogether, I have shown that the combination of a 
human-like joint configuration and at least quasi-biological motion of the observed agent, i.e., 
its motility, rather than its human-like appearance is the most important precondition for 
perception of an inanimate agent as a partner in joint interaction. 
The results of the fMRI-study have demonstrated that the MNS-activity is modulated by 
action goals of artificial agents indicating that intention attribution operates in an agent-
independent manner. This is a novel finding since previous studies have investigated MNS-
activity only in response to either different intentions from the same human agent or human 
vs. artificial agents having the same intention. My results show that MNS-activation can be 
modulated by attributing various intentions to artificial agents, although these agents clearly 
do not have mental states. Thus, the processing of actions and goals does not depend on 
whether an agent is animate or artificial as long as we are tempted to attribute intentions to it. 
Concerning the functional activations I could show that when we observe actions of both 
conspecifics and human-like inanimate agents, the type of actions and their goals are both 
processed in the bilateral IPL and PMC. In contrast, another MNS-area, pIFG, might play a 
role in processing different hand grasp configurations during observation of hand actions. 
Thus, the fMRI study shed light on how the function of mirror neurons in various brain 
regions differs. Further, there was an increased activity in IPL and PMC when contrasting 
grasping actions of the robot vs. human. However, this difference disappeared when 
contrasting the activations elicited by observation of static pictures of both agents and also 
pointing actions produced by them. Thus, I propose that activity of MNS is not sensitive to 
the agent’s appearance or to its movement velocity. Instead, I argue that increased activity 
when observing robot’s grasping actions in comparison to human actions is caused by 
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artificial appearance of the grasping action, which led to a higher prediction error on the part 
of the observer.  
 
In contrast to [276] and [195], which demonstrated stronger involvement of the MNS in  
covert simulation of human action than in action of artificial agents, my data indicates that 
MNS activity is not reduced when observing robotic actions in comparison to humans. In fact, 
it can even be increased when observing actions that look unnatural. Thus, I suggest that, in 
contrast to [47,48] which claim that the MNS is stronger activated by familiar actions, the 
relationship between the activation of the MNS and action familiarity is non-linear. Therefore, 
observing extensively familiar [47,74,75], non-intended [29,71], and surprising [177] actions 
might activate the MNS stronger than generally familiar actions. 
 
The looking-times study on marmoset monkeys indicated that the ability to attribute goals is 
most likely shaped by evolution and is bound to certain morphological features of the 
observed agents. Until now, there were only two studies which investigated how monkey 
process actions of inanimate objects  [136,218]. However these studies have not investigated 
which cues (e.g. presence of a body with a head, biological motion, monkey shape and size, 
ability to manipulate objects) an entity must exhibit in order to be perceived by monkeys as an 
intentional agent. I demonstrated that although marmoset monkeys attribute intentions to their 
conspecifics and can extend this capacity to infer goals of inanimate, conspecific-like agents, 
they seem not to be able to do so in case of objects with only a small degree of morphological 
similarity. Thus, presence of at least some basic degree of monkey-likeness, such as limbs and 
head, might be a precondition for goal attribution.  My study indicates that the dependence of 
goal-attribution capacity on the agent’s morphology is shaped by our evolutionary heritage. 
Further, my results indicate that goal understanding is a requirement for simple forms of 
social learning (social enhancement). This result is interesting, since up to now it was 
assumed that intention attribution was required only for cognitively demanding forms of 
social learning such as true imitation [45,282]. 
While the robot used in the fMRI study was clearly inanimate, it was similar in overall form 
to a human and displayed human-like motion. Since I did not use robots with different 
morphological features in this study, the present data do not provide any hints which 
particular morphological characteristics of the (robotic) agent are crucial for modulation of 
the MNS-activity by goal-directed actions. Future studies will need to address this issue in a 
more detailed way using even more disparate forms of artificial appearance. Another 
interesting issue would be to test the role of the subjects’ experience with artificial agents on 
the activity of neural markers of motor resonance.  
5.5.2 Applications of present results in the medical sector  
The area of humanoid robotics develops very fast and has a promising future. But is it a 
realistic that in the future some percentage of human caregivers and therapists will be 
replaced by robots for accomplishing at least some tasks? If so, which morphological factors 
influence our perception of robots as intentional beings and enable us to learn from them? 
Further, which human-like features should be present in a robot so that the observational 
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therapy used in stroke patients can be effective? This therapy is based on the assumption that 
observing actions of a person will facilitate the execution of these actions since during action 
observation we simulate the observed actions with our motor system. Thus, people with 
physical impairments will profit from using robotic models in the observational therapy only 
if the simulation is successful. In this thesis, I therefore not only examined whether humans 
perceive artificial robots with human like appearance as intentional beings but also whether 
they simulate the robot’s action using the same mechanism as they use to simulate actions of 
other humans during action observation. To this end, participants were scanned by means of 
functional magnetic resonance imaging enabling us to measure cortical activation during 
observation or robots’ actions. I further investigated what aspects of the robot’s appearance 
and movement kinematics are important for using them in clinical and household settings. For 
this purpose, I tested the importance of morphological features (presence of human-like body 
shape), joint configuration (motility) and movement kinematics (biological velocity, 
movement variability) for engaging the observer’s motor system during observation of the 
robot’s actions.  
Based on the results described above I suggest following recommendations for the design of 
robots for human-robot interaction: 
 
i. As long as the robot is designed only for use in the observational therapy or teaching 
humans certain motor skills during rehabilitation therapy of an upper limb, the overall 
human-like appearance (like presence of human body shape, head and other 
extremities) is less important than human like motility (joint configuration) of the 
observed limb. The similar appearance and motility of the to be trained limb will 
enable the patients to simulate the robot’s actions internally and learn from them. 
ii. However, during a dyadic interaction with artificial agents for the purpose of care 
giving or entertainment, the absence of features characterizing a human body shape of 
an artificial agent (like presence of a head, arms and torso) might have a negative 
effect on action prediction and also intention attribution to them. Thus, our results 
provide indications that robots designed for close human-robot interactions should 
exhibit at least main human-like features like presence of a body, limbs and a head. 
The human-like appearance will enable people to use their behaviour models and 
experience from social interaction with other humans in the interaction with robots. It 
will also facilitate intention attribution to humanoid agents and therefore have a 
positive effect on learning skills from these agents. 
iii. Although biological velocity and movement variability are not required for triggering 
the activation of motor system during action observation, I advice to use at least an 
approximation of biological velocity to minimize the jerkiness of the robot’s 
movements. 
5.5.3 General recommendations for designing humanoid robots 
In a nutshell, this dissertation has shown that humanoid robots which convey 
anthropomorphic cues and move smoothly are more advisable for use in robot-human 
interaction than robots with machine-like appearance. However, the high degree of 
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anthropomorphism of a robot is not a necessary precondition for building every artificial 
agent - it rather depends on the context and purpose. People with bad vision will need robots 
for guidance and support in the everyday living, people with chronic illnesses like diabetes 
will need a robot that can help them with shots; people with deadly diseases will need a robot 
to entertain them, people with motor deficits will need a robot to provide them with therapy 
and help them to re-learn motor tasks. Therefore, not in every scenario it is the best idea to 
create human-like robots. For example, robots designed to perform a certain automatic task, 
like dishwashing, do not have to be similar to the human person they replace. Thus, cleaning 
the floor can be accomplished by machine-like service robots like “Roomba” [100]. Further, 
while robot`s appearance might be important at the start of an interaction, its behaviour might 
become even more important during the course of the interaction. Indeed, a recent study 
suggested that although both the appearance and the behaviour of robots play a significant 
role, if they are contradictory to each other, the robot’s behaviour is more crucial than its 
appearance [214]. Another study has investigated how robot’s behaviour influenced the user’s 
evaluation during a dyadic interaction in a route guidance situation [162]. When the robot 
showed human like behaviours like eye contact, arm movement and head nodding, the users 
evaluated the robot as more reliable. Thus, in a real-life scenario, not only the human-like 
behaviour, but also human-like expressiveness and cooperative behaviour play a role. 
Therefore, robots should be designed for specific purposes and their appearance will have to 
support the correct estimation of the robot’s real competence by the users. 
5.5.4 Future directions 
Although a number of studies investigated the neural correlates of social cognition and its 
dysfunctions, many fundamental questions remain unanswered.  At present, detailed 
knowledge is lacking about the neural correlates of circuits supporting different aspects of 
social cognition and the neuronal bases underlying impairments of social cognition in 
neuropsychiatric conditions such as autism, psychopathy or schizophrenia. Further studies on 
healthy subjects are required to facilitate the characterization of atypical developmental 
pathways and improve our ability to develop more effective interventions and early 
identification of difficulties in social information processing. As mentioned in the 
introduction, in the future, functional neuroimaging and behavioural techniques may provide 
means for assessing the efficacy of treatment in these disorders. 
 
My thesis has shown that there are similarities between perceiving human and artificial 
agents. The questions is whether there are still some aspects of agent perception that are 
uniquely dedicated to processing of human actions, and whether there are specific neural 
processes which allow humans to use their social knowledge acquired in interactions with 
conspecifics with unfamiliar agents. An answer to these questions will require inputs from 
multiple disciplines and profit from the integration of data collected in studies on human and 
nonhuman animals. By combining neuroscientific and behavioral studies with a 
developmental perspective we will enhance our understanding of the representation of 
actions, intentions and agents.  
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